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7FoRWaRD
ConferenCe ProCeedings - soCial resourCes in loCal 
develoPment
It was the intention of the Institute for Sociology and Social Policy at the Corvinus 
University Budapest in collaboration with the University of Trento to reflect the 
breadth of local development studies in the conference it staged in June 2011 
‘Social Resources in Local Development’. The event was in the framework 
of ‘Efficient Government, Professional Public Administration and Regional 
Development for a Competitive Society’ which is part of the TAMOP Project 
4.2.1/B-09/1/KMR – 2010-0005 (Social and Cultural Resources Development 
Policies and Local Development Research Workshop led by Professor Zoltán 
Szántó). All the papers which feature in this volume were presented at the 
workshop. The research activity behind these papers (with the exception of 
Blokker) was supported by the aforementioned TAMOP project. The event was 
attended by a range of international participants including Erasmus Mundus 
students from the University of Trento and Corvinus students taking the MA in 
Local Development. It is hoped that this publication of conference proceedings 
highlights some current and key issues and controversies in local development 
research and academic debate. 
Notions of active and inclusive public input in local development are popular 
and now much promoted concepts but are something of a new phenomena 
in Central and Eastern Europe given the history before the ‘transition’ of a 
centralised and command control society in what was known as the soviet bloc. 
Paul Blokker (University of Trento) in his paper ‘The Constitutional Premises of 
Subnational Self-Government in New Democracies’ discusses the significance 
and role of subnational democracy in the context of new European democracies 
in flux. Blokker demonstrates that in a context of fragile democratic traditions, 
the displacement of national sovereignty, and increasing civic adversity to 
national politics, local forms of representative and direct democracy might – in 
advantageous circumstances – help to re-attach citizens to the democratic process. 
Furthermore, enhanced civic input into local and regional policy-making may 
enhance local capacities and strengthen forms of local cooperation. Subnational 
democracy might therefore work as a partial antidote to problems of European 
democracies, and in particular in the post-socialist context in Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Poland. 
8Unemployment is also something of a new phenomena for post-socialist 
states in transition society. György Lengyel, Borbála Göncz, and Éva Vépy-
Schlemmer (Corvinus University) in their paper ‘Temporary and lasting effects 
of a deliberative event: the Kaposvár experience’ outline the perceived benefits 
of deliberative polling as has been demonstrated by the work of the authors in the 
Kaposvár region where deliberative polling was applied to gain local residents’ 
insights into unemployment and related issues of the local economy. The authors 
verify that participants proved to be better informed on average following this 
exercise. Furthermore, attitudes concerning economic competitiveness became 
more open while solidarity and tolerance towards the unemployed also increased. 
However, the authors strike a note of caution as to the long term impacts of 
deliberative polling. One year later, as part of a follow-up survey the authors 
visited the participants again (as well as a control sample of non-participants) and 
measured the stability and change of their knowledge, opinions and evaluation of 
the event. The authors argue that the majority of the opinion changes proved to be 
temporary after the event, but some of them were lasting. 
In transition society where the state and social policy has adopted a less 
overbearing role the emergence of the ‘volunteer’ has also presented something 
of a new development. Again touching upon themes of participation Éva Perpék 
(Corvinus University) in her paper ‘Formal and Informal Volunteering in 
Hungary: Similarities and Differences’ explores volunteerism in Hungary 
and focuses on its formal (organizational) and informal (non-organizational) 
statistical differentiation. The paper concludes that organizational volunteerism 
is a more effective tool of community participation and local development. First, 
it fosters better regularity of the activity and attracts more professional and skilled 
volunteers. Finally, the paper notes that formal volunteers are moved by new or 
instrumental motivations which could mobilise even greater numbers in the 
present and future.
Andrew Ryder (Bristol University and Corvinus University) in his paper ‘Big 
Bang Localism and Gypsies and Travellers’ raises concerns about one form 
of participation in local development which has been dubbed as ‘localism’ and 
although based on data collected in the UK raises concerns about supposed ‘local 
democracy’ and decentralisation and its effect on equality which is of relevance to 
many European democracies. Concerns are raised in the paper, which question the 
justification for rejecting what could be termed as ‘statist’ approaches where the 
state champions and intervenes to protect the interests of the vulnerable despite 
the possible opposition of the majority. The paper thus raises important points of 
9relevance in the west and east of Europe where statist governance is increasingly 
being questioned and rejected. 
Of course another marked feature in local development in transition society 
is the move towards a Market Economy. Polányi (1957) argued that pre-modern 
economic systems were ‘embedded’ in social relations. Under modern capitalism 
it has been claimed that economic action is largely disengaged from social 
obligations and driven by individual gain in a depersonalized economic framework 
which both creates a loss of autonomy and a process of proletarianisation for 
large numbers of the populace (Gudeman, 2001). Granovetter and Swedberg 
(1992) however argue that Polányi and his followers have ‘over sociologised’ 
their analysis and that in fact interpersonal relations are embedded in the modern 
economy through social and professional networks, with personal reputation and 
trust holding currency in a range of situations so that they impact hugely on both 
self-employed individuals and big businesses’ fiscal stability. Peter Futo and Edit 
Veres (Corvinus University) assess the role of inter-firm linkages in business 
networks in their paper ‘Assessing the co-operation willingness and ability 
with Hungarian small business networks and clusters’. The authors note that 
co-operation is an important component of social capital. The article focuses on 
Hungarian clusters as special types of business networks and presents a series 
of working hypotheses on factors that facilitate inter-firm co-operation and 
influence the strength and stability of inter-firm ties. Another set of hypotheses 
formulates that the performance of these networks and of their member companies 
is influenced by the quality of co-operation between its members. 
Tamás Bartus (Corvinus University) returns to another feature of 
transition societies namely unemployment and what the implications are when 
interventionist and compensatory models are not in place, in ‘Commuting 
time, wages and reimbursement of travel costs: Evidence from Hungary’. 
The paper explores the hypothesis that high costs of commuting are responsible 
for the persistent unemployment of Hungarian villages. An attempt is made to 
estimate the compensating wage differential associated with commuting time 
using individual-level data, taken from a survey conducted among workers who 
have left the unemployment register and got a job in March 2001. The empirical 
analyses are motivated by a simple wage posting model, which predicts a positive 
effect of commuting time on wages and explicit reimbursement of travel expenses, 
which is conditional on the unemployment rate at place of work. Bartus finds that 
the unemployment rate in settlements where jobs are located lowers the positive 
effect of commuting time on wages, but it increases the probability of receiving 
some reimbursement of travel expenses, conditional on high unemployment at 
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place of work. The findings suggest that wages paid by employers located in 
high unemployment areas do not compensate for costly commuting. The study 
therefore supports the hypothesis that persistent high costs of commuting, relative 
to wage advantages contribute significantly to unemployment.
It is hoped therefore that these conference proceedings throw into relief a 
number of topical and important points related to local development in relation 
to transition society, in particular the role and limitations and dangers of local 
democracy, volunteerism and participation and the balance and inter-relationship 
between local, regional and central government.  The proceedings also contain 
a strong economic dimension in investigating the role of small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) in co-operating in economic activity but also the costs 
of where a laissez-faire approach is adopted to unemployment and commuting. 
To sum up, the papers presented on this workshop address those challenges and 
associated development issues that are relevant for transition countries. Moreover, 
they recommend policy solutions which harmonise top-down and bottom-up 
traditions of governance. Therefore it is hoped that readers interested in local 




IntroductIon –  
What Is local development?
The popularity of development studies as a subject of study, research and 
consultancy has grown since the early 1990s. During the last two decades the 
practical know-how of facilitating international development has gradually 
evolved into a science in its own right. In the international arena a wide range of 
experiences has been achieved and gathered in how to build efficient institutions 
for efficiently absorbing foreign aid in developing and post-socialist countries 
and how to facilitate the transition to market economy and to democracy. These 
experiences have been increasingly explained within a unified paradigm and with 
theoretical underpinnings.
The findings of applied and theoretical research on development studies have 
been increasingly published in an ever wider range of international development 
studies journals. Development studies as a course has been offered to yield 
specialised Master’s and Ph.D. degrees in a number of universities. The main 
objective of these programmes is to equip students with the tools and expertise 
necessary for the formulation, implementation and management of development 
policies. Students of development studies often choose careers in international 
organisations such as the United Nations or the World Bank, non-governmental 
organisations, private sector development consultancy firms, research centres 
and other prestigious working places. As the volume of funds dedicated to aid 
policy increased and the planning and management of development projects / 
programmes have become more decentralised to the local level, the respective 
implementing organisations needed an ever growing number of practitioners, and 
the job market for development experts has further increased.
Economics alone cannot fully address the various issues raised by 
development policy. Development studies have increasingly relied on the concepts 
and integrated the ideas of political science, sociology, administrative sciences, 
agriculture, urban development, environment protection, cultural anthropology 
and other disciplines. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of the praxis of 
12
péter futó
international development processes, the planners of development-oriented 
Master Programmes face a difficult task: on the one hand a wide range of relevant 
social, economic and policy-oriented subjects must be covered, but on the other 
hand, at the same time these courses must also offer some focus and limitation. 
One way of selecting a focus is to opt for a particular integrating paradigm, for an 
organising theory which helps to explain the factors of development and helps to 
plan coherent and feasible development policies.
Local development is a promising choice for such an integrating paradigm. 
Researchers using this concept interpret the development process in the framework 
of the global-local duality. But local development is not only a conceptual 
framework for doing research. Besides offering a structure to understand and 
describe the complex and inter-disciplinary nature of development, local 
development is also a policy approach. local development as a policy approach 
stipulates that top-down development policies should be realistically 
complemented by, harmonised with and implemented through bottom-up 
initiatives. 
Development programmes of remote areas and smaller settlements that 
follow the local development approach may have been conceived in far away 
capital cities but they are sensitive to local specificities and procedures. Aid 
policies devised on behalf of developing and transition countries may have been 
elaborated in other, more developed countries, but they rely on local know how 
and facilitate the generation and re-generation of local economic, natural, social 
and cultural resources. Policies, programmes and projects of local development 
build extensively on the lessons learnt in other countries or regions that face 
similar or analogous challenges, but while applying these lessons, the specific 
local endowments and cultural practices are seriously taken into consideration.
Courses and research devoted to local development studies deal with 
economic, social, political and spatial processes, structures and mechanisms, 
which shape the welfare of communities on the local and regional level. Special 
attention is given to those aspects and policies of local development, which 
directly influence the attractiveness and competitiveness of settlements and 
regions. Local development courses offer an analytical framework to interpret 
those sectoral policies, which influence local development. Major examples of 
such policy fields / sectors are:
•	 Local Economic Development,
•	 Social aspects of local development, 
•	 Legal and institutional framework, administrative and financial instruments,
•	 Physical environment and infrastructure development.
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Local Economic Development (LED) during recent decades has been 
raised to the level of a discipline in its own right. It covers the elaboration and 
implementation of local strategies for job creation and investment promotion by 
promoting entrepreneurship, facilitating the establishment of business networks, 
launching initiatives to establish industrial districts, clusters, business support 
centres and incubation houses, promoting ecological tourism and offering micro 
finance in order to support the start up of small and micro enterprises.
What it is not. While all courses on local development courses include the 
teaching of economics and economic policies, development practitioners are 
not required to become experts of local finance, or to manage a support service 
of the local government. Instead, the aim of local development courses is to 
prepare development specialists for understanding and activating the driving 
forces of local economic development, to elaborate strategies and concepts of 
local economic development, and to implement them in the framework of inter-
disciplinary teamwork.
Social aspects of local development.  The target group of those policies, 
programmes and projects which are aimed to improve welfare, alleviate poverty 
and improve education is the local population. Without understanding its 
demographic features, without being able to describe the stratification of local 
society according to ethnic, religious, educational and ownership features it is 
impossible analyse the impact mechanism of development oriented interventions, 
to plan and to implement effective measures. Also, the proper knowledge of 
local stakeholders is a pre-condition of involving them into decisions about local 
development. An important part of this knowledge is to measure poverty, to 
understand the attitudes of various social strata towards poverty and illnesses 
and to understand how local institutions and attitudes may support but also 
prevent local development. Students of social aspects of local development must 
understand the functioning of the financial funds for poverty alleviation and 
the eradication of illnesses, the cultural factors in local development, the role of 
education, national and international migration, the concept of social capital, local 
social networks and trust. The respective courses must conceptualise and analyse 
the interests of households, enterprises and public / non-profit organisations, their 
conflicts and the traditions of interest representation and reconciliation. 
Moreover, local development policy is subjected to various moral norms and 
values. The interventions of decision makers obtain their proper meaning only 
if they serve the overarching aims of better quality of life, human development, 
sustainable environment, equal opportunity for social strata and genders, the 
inclusion of vulnerable strata of the society, a lively and pleasant settlement and 
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an accountable leadership. For the above reasons the study of local development 
must also rely on the traditions of ethics.
What it is not. While courses on local development courses must convey some 
elements of sociological knowledge, development specialists are not required 
to apply the theories of social stratification or the rigorous methods of social 
research in their everyday work. Moreover, these courses do not aim to offer 
training in social work, in health sciences or in the resolution of local conflicts 
between ethnic, religious groups, interest groups or classes. Instead, the aim of 
these courses is to prepare development specialists for being able to successfully 
co-operate with professionals of the above disciplines, to plan the relevant tasks 
in the framework of inter-disciplinary co-operation and to professionally contract 
out the respective specialised services.
Legal and institutional framework, administrative and financial instruments. 
Development initiatives and projects are implemented by particular public, private 
and non-profit organisations which must obey certain administrative rules. The 
study of local development must pay proper attention to the general principles 
of governance and procedures as analysed in various sub-disciplines of public 
administration studies and political science. Special attention must be given to 
citizen participation in policy making, to the principles of good governance, to the 
roles of non-governmental organizations, to local strategic partnerships, to public-
private sector partnerships and to local impacts of decentralization reforms. 
What it is not. While courses on local development courses must convey 
some elements of the above knowledge, they do not aim to offer specific legal, 
administrative or financial training. Instead, the aim of these courses is to prepare 
development specialists for being able to successfully co-operate with public 
servants and professionals applying the above disciplines in their daily work, and 
to build up inter-disciplinary co-operation with them. 
Physical environment and infrastructure development. Courses and research 
efforts on local development inevitably include components dealing with the 
spatial – physical environment of human settlements, covering subjects such as 
urban development, infrastructures of transport, energy, communication and 
water management, moreover environment protection and the preservation of the 
landscape in rural and urban settings. The respective courses and research projects 
rely on the traditions of economic geography, regional development and rural 
development. The following special topics are to be addressed: feasibility and 
impact of cross-border nature reserves, local energy management and comparing 
various institutional and technical solutions for waste management. 
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What it is not. While courses on local development courses must convey 
some elements of the above knowledge, they do not aim at offering engineering, 
ecological or agricultural education. Instead, the aim of these courses is to 
prepare development specialists for being able to successfully co-operate with 
professionals of the above disciplines, to outsource specialised research and 
planning tasks and to interpret the results in the framework of inter-disciplinary 
co-operation.
Local development strategy in the planning process. While sector-specific 
plans may be narrowly defined by specialists or even enhance the role of some 
specific services out of proportion, local development strategies or concepts 
have the role of integrating sector-specific plans into a coherent document and 
demonstrate a certain vision on local development in the future, by harmonising 
diverse policy fields and vested interests. Development professionals preparing a 
development strategy or concept for a particular settlement or region must adapt 
the application of the above sectoral disciplines to the conditions and challenges 
of the particular locality. In most places of the world development resources can 
be allocated only if such documents are jointly prepared by specialists and local 
stakeholders, and the plan is subsequently approved in a democratic process. One 
of the most important aims of local development studies is to train specialists who 
can play a leading role in the management of the preparation of such documents, 
by preparing or by contracting out studies, and by facilitating consultation and the 
implementation of these concepts / strategies.
16
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A possible conceptual framework of local development („The Matrix Approach”)
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Methodology of local development research. The term “Comparative local 
development” denotes the study of local development by using the preferred 
method of comparison. This approach acknowledges the uniqueness of every 
country, region and settlement, nevertheless it accepts the tacit agreement that 
the challenges arising in different locations can be tackled within a common 
conceptual framework, and that the communalities and differences are best 
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explored by applying the comparative method of social science research. Most 
frequently, the aim of the comparative research effort is to reveal why in certain 
local settings certain development policies work, and why others fail. 
Empirically supported comparative studies have certain advantages over 
descriptive case studies that are devoted to a single settlement, to a single policy 
or to a single project (“N=1 studies”). By extending the research to several 
comparable cases, the findings can be generalised, some hypotheses accepted or 
rejected and theoretical traditions can be supported or challenged. A long series of 
research projects, in particular of dissertations in local development has delivered 
proof that the comparative study of local economic systems and institutions 
may reveal the weak and strong points of resource allocation by markets or 
governments. 
Quantitative approach. Besides the application of qualitative methods, if 
survey data or other micro-data are available, statistical instruments and models 
can be applied to reveal collective behavioural patterns of households, companies 
or settlements, moreover to assess the impacts of interventions. 
Methods of development consultancy. Local development courses must also 
introduce the students into various methods and genres that are widely used by 
development practitioners. In particular, the planning and implementation of 
aid policy relies extensively on the knowledge of preparing feasibility studies, 
managing and evaluating development oriented projects, moreover on the ability 
of development consultants to assess the impacts of regulations and other policy 
interventions. 
Thus, local development as a field of study is a branch of development studies, 
a particular conceptual framework which is structured along the lines and sectors 
of its constituent policy fields and disciplines. Its aim is to understand, interpret 
and improve the factors that shape collective well-being in human settlements. 
Local development as a policy approach aims at balancing global and local 
forces by harmonising top-down and bottom-up traditions of governance. Local 
development professionals must be able to co-operate with the representatives of 
a wide range of specific professions, and while relying on their expertise, to focus 
on the development perspective.
Notes
1 Affiliated Professor, Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Corvinus 




The ConsTiTuTional Premises  
of subnaTional self-GovernmenT  
in new DemoCraCies
The paper discusses the significance and role of subnational democracy in 
the context of new European democracies in flux. In a context of fragile 
democratic traditions, the displacement of national sovereignty, and increasing 
civic adverseness to national politics, local forms of representative and direct 
democracy might – in advantageous circumstances – help to re-attach citizens 
to the democratic process.  What is more, enhanced civic input into the local and 
regional policy-making may further local capacities and strengthen forms of local 
cooperation. Subnational democracy might therefore work as a partial antidote 
to efficiency (output legitimation) and legitimacy (input legitimation) problems 
of European democracies. In this, local forms of democratic interaction have 
particular significance in the new democracies in that legacies of paternalism, 
centralized politics, socialist legality, and a generalized distrust towards politics 
have tended to discourage the democratic participation. Democracy on the local 
and regional levels is of a particularly intricate nature in that it is dependent on 
the way it is institutionalized and constitutionalized, and thus on legal guarantees 
of autonomy as well as on distinct values of self-government as communicated by 
constitutions. 
The paper starts with a discussion of the significance of decentralization, 
subnational self-government, as well as civic participation in the European 
context, and the argument will be made that firm constitutional foundations 
are one necessary condition for viable subnational self-government. In a second 
step, the constitutional orders of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland will 
be briefly reviewed, focusing on their definitions of state and entrenchment 
of subnational forms of government and democracy. In the conclusion, it will 
be argued that significant forms of decentralized government and democracy 
have emerged in all three countries, but also that reforms have not been of an 
unambiguous nature and that important tensions and problems persist as a result.
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The significance of subnaTional democracy in Times  
of democraTic change
In the post-Second World War period, democracy in Europe referred predominantly 
to representative democracy, firmly situated and organized on the national level. 
Indeed, democratic theory was often explicitly against forms of decentralized, 
and in particular direct or participatory democracy. This is particularly evident 
in the widely influential statement on democracy as a competitive elite affaire by 
Joseph Schumpeter (Loughlin, Hendriks, and Lindstrom 2010: 2).
With the crisis of Keynesianism and the advent of neo-liberal anti-statism 
and evermore influential globalization, however, the relationship between the 
national state and democracy has become a growing object for discussion. It is 
now increasingly argued that local or subnational democracy matters, and can 
in effect play an important role in revitalizing and reinvigorating democratic 
systems. However, while in the neo-liberal dictionary that became dominant in 
the 1980s, local democracy would mostly relate to diminishing the influence of 
the centralized state and enhancing the role of civil society, notably economic 
agents, from the 1990s onwards, it was now also increasingly realized ‘that 
political decentralization and local autonomy were important elements of 
democracy itself’ (Loughlin, Hendriks, and Lindstrom 2010: 5). Strengthening 
local government and local democracy could thus for a number of reasons be seen 
as potentially enhancing the quality of a democratic state, for instance, resulting 
from the proximity of local politics to the citizens, the higher accessibility of local 
politics to participation, in particular if in the form of direct and deliberative forms 
of democracy (Schiller 2011), and the shorter reaction time of local government to 
policy issues (Bailey and Elliott 2009: 436).
In political-theoretical terms, the local democratic narrative that emphasizes 
the democratic surplus value of local democracy can be understood as a kind 
of amalgam of republican political thought (emphasizing civic virtue, public 
autonomy, and civic engagement), communitarianism (politics close to the 
citizens), as well as ideas of deliberative democracy (politics as based on inclusion, 
deliberation, and consensus-building). It seems undeniable that at least in 
superficial terms this narrative has become increasingly important in addressing 
problems of policy-making in European democracies. One clear sign of this is 
the emphasis on regionalization in European integration and the adoption of the 
European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985).
The increased attention for forms of decentralization, public participation, 
and forms of participatory and direct democracy comes, however, exactly in 
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a period in which constitutional democracy is increasingly subject to great 
tensions and transformations. First, there is – in Europe - the evident shift in 
political and constitutional weight towards the European level. In other words, the 
overlap and concentration of a jurisdiction, a territory, and a people is increasingly 
less evident as important decisions and politics regarding a variety of political 
communities are taken outside of those communities. Second, in a related way, 
there is the increasing complexity and arcane streak that matters of governance 
and democratic politics display. Third, there is the increasing civic disattachment 
– in both East and West – vis-à-vis representative democratic politics. National 
political elites and institutions are profoundly lacking in civic trust and legitimacy. 
subnaTional democracy as anTidoTe?
In normative terms, it can be argued that local self-government can provide 
a partial anti-dote to democratic deficits and disengagement in a number of ways. 
First, the strengthening of local democracy will make constitutional democracies 
more pluralistic, in that political power becomes divided and diffused on the 
vertical level, which helps to avoid, on the one hand, the political hegemony 
of central governmental institutions (a salient objective in former totalitarian 
societies), and, on the other, might help recover some of the lost grasp of democratic 
sovereignty on politics. Second, local self-government makes it easier for citizens 
to participate in democratic politics and governance in a meaningful way than 
it would be when politics is completely centralized. Third, and as is probably 
most famously argued by J.S. Mill, local possibilities for democratic participation 
might help to foster sentiments of public autonomy among the citizenry:
It is necessary, then, that, in addition to the national representation, there should 
be municipal and provisional representations; and the two questions which remain 
to be resolved are, how the local representative bodies should be constituted, 
and what should be the extent of their functions. In considering these questions, 
two points require an equal degree of our attention: how the local business itself 
can be best done, and how its transaction can be made most instrumental to the 
nourishment of public spirit and the development of intelligence (Mill 2004: 512).
Fourth, local self-government might in some instances also be a more effective 
type of government, in that it is more likely to have a capacity of responsiveness, 
in terms of responding to local problems according to local views.
Local self-government is then seen by many as a kind of antidote to at least 
some of the problems of modern democratic regimes, not least that of civic 
engagement, but also regarding the increasing complexity of issues of governance. 
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It can, however, be argued that local government and local democracy are no 
obvious panacea to democratic and governance problems. Stephen Bailey and 
Mark Elliott have for instance recently argued that local government is only likely 
to deliver the goods when a ‘virtuous circle’ is created, that is, a situation in which 
‘the obvious importance and responsiveness of local government incentivizes the 
participation of individuals in local politics and elections’ (Bailey and Elliott 
2009: 436). In other words, ‘[a]ttempts to strengthen local democracy must, on 
this view, go hand-in-hand with attempts to strengthen local government’. In 
reality, however, many central governments have failed to induce such a virtuous 
circle ‘within which strong local democracy and powerful institutions of local 
government enjoy a symbiotic, mutually constructive relationship’. Rather, 
governments have tended to contribute to a ‘vicious circle’ in which ‘extensive 
central control, the consequent limitations to local power and autonomy and the 
disengagement of individuals and communities are factors that are mutually 
reinforcing’ (Bailey and Elliott 2009: 437).
significance of subnaTional democracy in The new 
democracies
The importance of local government and democracy in the post-totalitarian 
context of Central and Eastern Europe is self-evident. The highly centralized 
systems of communism – indeed coined “democratic centralism” in Leninist 
systems – did not allow for any significant participation or voice by either 
stakeholders or the citizenry at large. What is more, the far-going centralization 
of communist political systems meant that no form of subnational autonomy or 
territorial self-government was allowed for. Not by coincidence the discourses of 
protest of many dissidents movements in the region contained a strong dimension 
of civic participation, decentralization, and local self-government (see Renwick 
2006; Blokker 2011). 
The past communist systems were detrimental to any idea of formal subnational 
self-government2 in at least two ways. First, subnational forms of government 
were always strictly controlled by the central state, and therefore merely consisted 
in institutions for the execution of centrally imposed policies, lacking any kind of 
space for autonomous action in the interest of local populations. Second, not only 
did democratic centralism mean that no democratic channels were available for 
civic participation, but also any kind of political pluralism within the communist 
political institutions was reduced as far as possible, in that the state was subjected 
to the communist party with its homogenous programme and ideological 
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principles, while alternative voices were stifled under the banner of “enemies of 
the people”. 
In addition, the “socialist legality” that underpinned the political structure 
of communist regimes was based upon “paper constitutions” that had very little 
to do with the rule-of-law and were rather a fiction or form of symbolism (in 
a pejorative sense) that displayed a huge discrepancy with the arbitrary nature 
of political-legal reality (cf. Skapska 2011). Rather than contributing to social 
integration and the constitution of political communities, the “paper” communist 
constitutions helped to enhance existing traditions of “us and them” , or, in other 
words, a deep distrust of society against the ruling elites.
The 1970s and 80s, as well as the early 1990s witnessed a fierce backlash 
against the centralism and political party-monism that had been imposed with 
communism. In particular in the early 1990s, radical steps were undertaken to 
undo the hypercentralization of the past. However, such reforms tended to run out 
of steam fairly quickly, not least due to increased disagreement about the exact 
nature of reforms, but the subnational reform process has continued in a more 
gradual manner in most societies in the post-communist region.
The consTiTuTionalizaTion of subnaTional democracy
This brings us to the process of decentralization, and of institutionalization 
and constitutionalization of subnational democracy in the two decades of 
post-communist transformation. An important question to ask is whether the 
transformation process has significantly contributed to the consolidation of vital 
constitutional democracies, which involve robust dimensions of pluralized and 
decentralized politics and promote active citizenship, or whether constitutional 
democracy has largely remained a fiction (cf. Skapska 2011: 9)? Any attempt at 
answering this question will need to take into account the foundations of these 
new democracies, and whether these are conducive or not to civic democracy. 
Indeed, with regard to subnational self-government, the assessment of a “virtuous 
circle” of local government and democracy as identified by Bailey and Elliott 
above needs a holistic view of the place of local government and democracy in 
the wider democratic-constitutional order. This means that the problems related 
to stimulating a virtuous form of local democracy ‘can be fully faced up to only 
if important questions about the legal and constitutional role of local government 
are squarely addressed’ (Bailey and Elliott 2009: 437). In other words, the 
foundations of decentralization and devolution are significant and need to be 
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explicit and clear-cut if a virtuous type of local government and democracy is to 
be expected to emerge. 
The rest of the paper will then engage in primis with the constitutional 
premises of subnational-self government and in particular of local democracy, in 
terms of the constitutionalization of subnational government (municipal, county, 
regional) and of forms of representative and direct democracy. The constitutional 
dimension can itself be broken down into two meta-dimensions – an instrumental 
and a symbolic one. These meta-dimensions can themselves be differentiated into 
a range of functional dimensions of constitutions (see Blokker 2010). A primary 
functional dimension regarding the instrumental rationality of constitutions is that 
of an instrumental, power-ordering and limiting dimension. Here, the function of 
the constitution is to arrange for the mapping and division of political power, in 
terms of institutional prerogatives and competences, and forms of checks and 
balances. Regarding the local level, this largely negative function (in terms of 
the limitation of political power) includes the level of decentralization in terms 
of division of competences and oversight between central, regional, and local 
levels, as well as fiscal autonomy. A further dimension is the formal-participatory 
dimension which arranges for the possibilities of formal-procedural participation 
by citizens in terms of representative institutions on the local and regional levels. 
With regard to the symbolic or sociological rationality of constitutions 
(cf. Skapska 2011), at least two further dimensions are relevant for local 
government and democracy. The first is the normative dimension, which relates 
to the axiological nature or constitutional morality that constitutions express. 
Of importance for local government and democracy are here the constitutional 
inclusion of notions such as subsidiarity, the right to local self-government and 
autonomy as foundational values, and the value of direct and indirect civic 
participation. The second is the substantive-participatory dimension, which 
relates to effective forms of civic participation in democratic politics in terms of 
direct and deliberative democracy.
consTiTuTionalizaTion of subnaTional democracy in The 
new democracies3
Ideas of local self-government and local (representative and direct) democracy 
have had a visible impact on the post-1989 constitutional and legal orders of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and while the initial radicality of changes 
of the early 1990s did not continue in later years of transformation, the three 
democracies analyzed here all display significant levels of decentralization. 
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At the same time, though, the constitutional and legal developments demonstrate 
a variegated impact of ideas of local democracy and direct forms of democracy. 
Below I will briefly trace the constitutional trajectories of the three new 
democracies with regard to the overall definition of the state, forms and definitions 
of decentralization, and forms and definitions of subnational democracy. 
The czech republic 
The constitutional state in the Czech Republic can best be defined as 
a predominantly centralized, unitary state, based on a parliamentary-democratic 
system (cf. Illner 2010). This does, however, not mean that the local and regional 
levels of government are not important, nor that more direct forms of democracy 
or active citizenship are inexistent or not part of the constitutional order. This 
becomes, for instance, already clear from the symbolic-substantive reference to 
civil society in the preamble of the 1992 Constitution: “a free and democratic 
state based on the respect for human rights and the principles of civic society”. 
However, some have argued that while some forms of decentralization and self-
government are part and parcel of the Czech system, its main logic is that of “state 
administration” (Bryson 2008). 
Below, I will briefly trace the constitutional contours of both local self-
government and local democracy as these have emerged in the 1990-2010 period. 
It will become clear that there is a tensional relation both between state-centralistic 
and decentralized views of the Czech polity as well as between representative and 
direct views of democracy.
Constitutional Design of local Government
The Czech state as it emerges from the 1992 Constitution is a sovereign, unitary 
and democratic state: “The Czech Republic is a sovereign, unitary and democratic, 
law-abiding State, based on respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen” 
(art. 1(1)). The constitutional state allows, however, also for decentralization at the 
local and regional levels. The 1992 Czech Constitution states in Chapter 1 on 
“Basic Provisions” that “[t]he autonomy of units of territorial self-administration 
shall be guaranteed” (art. 8), while Chapter 7 on “Territorial Self-Administration” 
stipulates the decentralized, “basic units of territorial self-administration” as 
municipalities, and higher units in the form of lands and regions (art. 99). Article 
100 states that “communities of citizens, inhabiting a particular area … have the 
right of self-government”, while article 101(3) underlines local autonomy in that 
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“[s]elf-governing territorial divisions are public-law corporations which may have 
their own property and which operate according to their own budget”.
While the value of subnational self-government and civil society, and related 
institutions, are entrenched in the constitution, significant (political as well as 
social) obstacles to the realization of principles of local self-government seem not 
have been overcome in two decades of transformation, and the centralistic nature 
of the Czech state can only partially be said to be ‘corrected’ by local and regional 
autonomy. However, at the same time, it would be hard to deny the continuing 
importance of decentralization and ideas of self-governance for democratization 
in the Czech Republic.
Throughout the 1990s, the latter was particularly visible in the form of a 
conflictive debate between Václav Havel (and the Czech left) and Václav Klaus 
(and the Civic Democratic Party or Občanská demokratická strana (ODS)) on the 
role and form of in particular regional government. Klaus opposed issues of reform 
and decentralization on grounds of neo-liberal scepticism towards bureaucracy 
and intermediary institutions, and held off the implementation of article 99 
of the Constitution. Eventually, though, at the end of the 1990s, significant 
decentralizing steps and the creation of a regional layer were effected, not least 
due to EU pressure (cf. Calda 1999). The constitutional act of 3 December 1997 
on the “Creation of Higher Territorial Self-Governing Units” changed article 99 
into “[t]he Czech Republic is subdivided into municipalities, which are the basic 
territorial self-governing units, and into regions, which are the higher territorial 
self-governing units”. And indeed, there are indications that the regional level 
has grown in importance since its establishment. Recently, Baun and Marek have 
argued that the “new regions have begun establishing themselves as legitimate 
and important political actors” (425).
The constitutional status of subnational self-government was further 
entrenched by a number of rulings by the Czech Constitutional Court. For 
instance, in 2003 the Constitutional Court ruled that
The guarantee of territorial self-government in the Constitution is laconic. 
Alongside the differentiation of the local and regional levels of self-government 
(Art. 99) territorial self-government is conceived as the right of a territorial 
association of citizens, arising from its characteristics and abilities, as the 
Constitutional Court stated in its finding of 19 November 1996, file no. Pl. ÚS 
1/96 (Collection of Decisions of the Constitutional Court, volume 6, p. 375).
The Constitutional Court considers local self-government to be an 
irreplaceable component in the development of democracy. Local self-government 
is an expression of the capability of local bodies, within the bounds provided by 
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law, to regulate and govern part of public affairs on their own responsibility and 
in the interest of the local population. (CC 2003/02/05 - Pl. ÚS 34/02: Territorial 
Self-Government; emphasis added)
Later in 2003, the constitutional court further underlined the importance of 
fiscal autonomy of regions and municipalities:
According to the starting thesis, on which the concept of self-government 
is built, the foundation of a free state is a free municipality, then, in terms of 
regional significance, at a higher level of the territorial hierarchy a self-governing 
society of citizens, which, under the Constitution, is a region. With this concept 
of public administration built from the ground up, the following postulate must 
be immanent to self-government, as an important element of a democratic state 
governed on the rule of law: that a TSU must have a realistic possibility to 
handle matters and issues of local significance, including those which by their 
nature exceed the regional framework and which it handles in its independent 
jurisdiction, on the basis of free discretion, where the will of the people is exercised 
at the local and regional level in the form of representative democracy and only 
limited in its specific expression by answerability to the voter and on the basis of a 
statutory and constitutional framework (Art. 101 par. 4 of the Constitution). Thus, 
territorial self-governing units representing the territorial society of citizens must 
have – through autonomous decision-making by their representative bodies – the 
ability to freely choose how they will manage the financial resources available to 
them for performing the work of self-government. It is this management of one’s 
own property independently, on one’s own account and own responsibility which 
is the attribute of self-government. Thus, a necessary prerequisite for effective 
performance of the functions of territorial self-government is the existence of its 
own, and adequate, financial or property resources. (2003/07/09 - Pl. ÚSD 5/03: 
Territorial Self-Government Unit; emphasis added)
Constitutional Design of local Democracy
As mentioned earlier, the Czech constitution defines Czech democracy in a 
predominantly representative, parliamentary manner. This is, however, paralleled 
by constitutional foundations of subnational representative democracy as well as 
more direct forms of civic participation. 
It should be noted that the 1992 Constitution was predominantly designed 
by a government commission dominated by the ODS, which squarely favoured 
a centralistic state without intermediary levels. The articles on local self-
government that were ultimately included in the 1992 document were the result of 
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a compromise between the ODS, its coalition members (more favourable to local 
government), and the opposition. The compromise led to a fairly vague and open-
ended formulation,  and, as noted above, the regional level was not implemented 
before 1999, but the Czech Constitution does go some way in qualifying a fully 
centralistic as well as liberal-representative view of the Czech state. 
The Constitution arranges for representative democracy on the subnational level 
in article 101, which states that both municipalities and regions are administered 
by councils, which are “elected by secret ballot on the basis of universal, equal, 
and direct suffrage” (art. 102). The political status of subnational democracy 
is enhanced by the fact that, even if the turn-out rates for both the elections of 
regional and municipal councils are generally not very high, in particular the 
municipal institutions enjoy a very high level of political trust among the Czech 
citizens, much more so than those on the national level (Illner 2010: 519). 
Symbolic-substantive references to subnational democracy can be further 
found in the Czech Bill of Rights, – the “Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic 
Freedoms” –  which can be considered part of the constitutional constellation. 
The Charter invokes the Czech “ nations’ traditions of democracy and self-
government”, and also refers to the fact that “[c]itizens have the right to participate 
in the administration of public affairs either directly or through the free election 
of their representatives” (art. 21(1)) (emphasis added). 
Turning to forms of direct democracy, the institutionalization of civic 
participation is rather weak in the Czech Republic. Thus, in a fairly stark contrast 
to the intensity of republican ideas of Charter 77 of the 1980s (see Renwick 2006; 
Blokker 2011), post-1989 Czech democracy appears to display the least extensive 
form of constitutional and legal institutionalization of forms of direct democracy 
- at least regarding the instrument of civic consultation through referenda - in the 
region. To be sure, elements of direct democracy are not prominent in the Czech 
Constitution. And while, as a result of a compromise, the 1992 constitution does 
entail the formulation that “[a] constitutional law may stipulate the cases when the 
people exercise state power directly” (art. 2(2); emphasis added), to date no such 
law has been adopted, despite repeated attempts by pro-referendum groups (see 
for an extensive overview of such attempts, Adamova 2010).
But on a closer look, while it is clear that political forces sceptical of referenda 
and direct democracy have so far prevailed, the issue is clearly not settled yet and 
continues to re-emerge in Czech political debate. For instance, in 2002, in the 
context of debates over the referendum on EU accession, a constitutional act for 
a general, national right to  referenda was proposed, but was (once again) rejected 
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by right-wing parties. Ultimately, an act on referendum was adopted that related 
only to EU membership. 
But while a constitutionally guaranteed right to the holding of national 
referenda is still absent, referenda on the local level have become much more 
consequential (on the regional level, referenda are not permitted). Admittedly, 
during the 1990s referenda were only used for questions of secession from existing 
municipal arrangements. And while the original legislation regarding local 
government – the 1992 Law on Local Elections and Referendums – notably stems 
from the Civic Forum period, no referendum of general import took place on its 
basis in the first decade of democratization. However, following the amendments 
of the law in 2004 and 2008, clearing a number of ambiguities and strengthening 
the position of referenda proposers,  local referenda have become a much more 
significant – and binding - civic instrument in Czech democracy, and are used for 
much wider purposes than before (see Smith 2011; Adamova 2010: 53-4).  
hungary
The Hungarian democratic state can be defined as a “decentralized unitary” one 
– “[t]he Republic of Hungary is an independent, democratic constitutional state” 
(art. 2(1)) –  with a “strong and decentralized system of county governments” 
(Soos and Kakai 2010: 530). Local government is strongly entrenched in the 
Hungarian case, and enjoys a high level of autonomy in decision-making. Local 
democracy is mostly focused on representative, party-based democracy, while 
civic input and NGO participation are so far limited.
Below, I will describe the constitutional contours of both local self-government 
and local democracy as it has emerged in Hungary between 1990 and 2010. It will 
become clear that Hungary arguably has one of the strongest local government 
systems in the region, but equally that the democratic potential of such a system is 
not used to the full. What is more, current constitutional turmoil might seriously 
undermine past achievements.
Constitutional Design of local Government
In the constitutional changes of the early 1990s, local self-government enjoyed 
a high priority in that it was seen as an indispensable way of undermining the 
centralist institutions of “democratic centralism”. Thus, “the replacement of the 
council-based public administrative system with a sphere of independent local 
self-government was a key concern in administrative reform” (Balazs 1993: 76). 
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The amended Constitution of 1949 dedicates chapter IX to Local Governments, in 
which article 42 on the “Right to local government” now states: “Eligible voters 
of the communities, cities, the capital and its districts, and the counties have the 
right to local government. Local government refers to independent, democratic 
management of local affairs and the exercise of local public authority in the 
interests of the local population”. The main sub-national distinction is between 
the local level (villages, cities, capital districts, capital) and the county level. 
A regional level was added in 2000 to be able to attract EU Structural Funds, but 
its status so far is weak (Soos 2010: 113-14). In contrast, local governments of the 
municipal type, and to a lesser extent counties, are the entities with most political 
significance on the subnational level.
Democratic reforms towards decentralization involved mainly two stages. In 
1990, the parliamentary Act No. LXV on Local Governments was adopted, which 
“established the legal foundation for the process of democratization and reform of 
the political system”. The Act LXV is introduced as follows:
Following the progressive local government traditions of our country, as 
well as the basic requirements of the European Charter on local governments, 
Parliament recognizes and protects the rights of the local communities to self-
government. Local self-government makes it possible, that the local community 
of electors – directly, and/or through its selected local government – manage the 
public affairs of local interest independently and democratically. Supporting 
the self-organizing independence of local communities, Parliament assists 
the creation of the conditions necessary to self-government, it promotes the 
democratic decentralization of public authority (Act No. LXV).
Moreover, the Act No. LXIV on Local Elections was adopted, arranging for 
local democracy to start functioning. In a second stage, in 1994, the existing 
local system was reformed by means of the Act on Local Governments (No. 
LXIII). These reforms included a call for broader constitutional guarantees of 
local government, steps towards more direct participation (the direct election of 
mayors), and the regulation of civic participation and publicity.  
These reforms have led some observers into saying that “[w]ithout doubt, the 
1990 local government reform established one of the most liberal systems of local 
government in Europe” (Balazs 1993: 85). Also others have argued that in 1990 
legislation was adopted that established a “very high degree of autonomy for the 
lowest, local level of government”, while the constitution enshrined the right to 




But while it has been acknowledged that this “rapid institutional reform was 
unique” (Fowler 2001), it needs at the same time to be recognized that the extensive 
nature of the reforms have led to a relatively high level of fragmentation and 
dysfunctionality of local democracy and government. In this, the counterreaction 
to the hypercentralization of the communist regime has not necessarily led to 
adequate decentralized structures. That said, the significance of an institutional 
dimension of local government in Hungary – even if in need of amelioration – 
seems evident enough.
Constitutional Design of local Democracy
Local democracy as a citizens’ right – in both indirect and direct ways – is 
entrenched in the Hungarian constitutional order, in that article 44 (1) stipulates that 
“[e]ligible voters exercise the right to local government through the representative 
body that they elect and by way of local referendum”.4 In Act no. LXV, a similar 
idea is expressed in art. 1(4) as “[t]he local government may – through the elected 
local body of representatives, or with the decision of local plebiscite – undertake 
independently and voluntarily the solution of any local public affair, which is 
not referred by a legal rule to the jurisdiction of another organ”. And also in the 
Hungarian case, it can be argued that local democracy enjoys a relatively high 
standing in terms of civic political trust. Local governments (with the institutions 
of the president and the constitutional court) tend to score significantly higher 
than both the parliament and the government (Soos and Kakai 2010: 541).
Institutions of direct democracy on the local level are fairly well-entrenched 
in the Hungarian case. In general, “demands for referendums were part of the 
movement for democracy” and since the transition, “no political party has denied 
that at least certain forms of direct democracy should be part of the Hungarian 
constitutional and political order”, Dezsö and Bragyova 2001: 63).  In the late 
1980s, the reaction of the Communist party to the opposition’s demand for 
referenda resulted in Act XVII, adopted unilaterally in June 1989. This legal act 
was the basis for referenda and popular initiatives until 1997, when it was renewed 
and partially replaced by constitutional articles. The earlier act – according to 
András Sajó a “very poorly drafted document” (2006) – was widely contested 
because of various lacuna, not least in procedural terms. What is more, there was 
a strong suspicion of its unconstitutionality. 
In 1997, a new set of rules was constitutionalised through a constitutional 
amendment (Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedure), and can be regarded as at 
least partially the outcome of initiatives related to the democratization movement 
32
paul blokker
of the 1980s. Even if the “scope and conditions of referenda were gradually 
restricted since 1989”, the amendment of the constitution enhanced the status of 
direct democracy considerably (i.e. Chapter XV on local referendums and Chapter 
XVI on local initiative). The constitutional status of referenda was reiterated by 
a ruling of the Constitutional Court in which it argued that the “institution of 
referendum is closely related to the provisions of the Constitution. A referendum, 
as a typical form of direct democracy, is related to the sovereignty of the people, 
and, the practice of the Court interprets the right to referendum as a political 
fundamental right” (website Hungarian Constitutional Court; decision 52/1997; 
emphasis added).
While in general the Hungarian democratic system is a representative one, 
the constitutionalization of instruments of direct democracy has created a tension 
between direct democracy and the predominantly liberal, representative idea as 
constitutional principles. To some extent, “direct democratic institutions already 
have a foothold in Hungarian constitutional thought” (Dezsö and Bragyova 2007: 
82, even if the institutions are still not sufficiently well-defined.5
poland
Also the Polish constitutional state is defined as a unitary and centralized state, 
even if allowing for subnational government on the regional and local levels. In 
other words,  while, as expressed in article 3 of the 1997 Constitution,  Poland has 
without a doubt a unitary system, its constitutional order allows for  “relatively 
strong local autonomy” and tendencies towards strengthening regionalization 
are visible (Swianiewicz 2010: 482). The latter becomes already clear from the 
preamble – “… [h]ereby establish this Constitution of the Republic of Poland as 
the basic law for the State, based on respect for freedom and justice, cooperation 
between the public powers, social dialogue as well as on the principle of aiding 
in the strengthening the powers of citizens and their communities” (emphasis 
added).
Below, I will briefly describe the constitutional contours of both local self-
government and local democracy as it has emerged in particular in the Polish 
Constitution of 1997, as well as in the process of regionalization of the last few 
years of the 1990s.
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Constitutional Design of local Government
In the Polish case, local self-government was a prominent focus in the constitution-
making process, and has been amply arranged for in the 1997 Constitution. The 
process of decentralization already started in the early 1990s, and had in many 
ways been prepared by the political struggle of the Solidarność trade union 
for decentralized government (cf. Benzler 1994; also Blokker 2011). The Local 
Government Act of 1990 provided the fundamental legal underpinnings of the 
right to self-governance of local authorities. In addition, almost all of Solidarność’s 
demands for territorial self-government were enshrined in the articles 43-47 of 
the amended 1952 constitution, while these were later re-confirmed in the so-
called Small Constitution of 1992. 
The 1997 constitution has often been criticized for being rather unspecific 
with regard to notions of local self-government and decentralization, but it can at 
the same time be argued that the dimension of local self-government is strongly 
anchored in the text. As noted above, the symbolic-substantive dimension of self-
government and subsidiarity is reflected in the preamble, indicating their status as 
foundational-constitutional values. The constitutional text itself introduces local 
self-government as early as article 15 – “[t]he territorial system of the Republic 
of Poland shall ensure the decentralization of public power” (1) – and 16 –“[t]he 
inhabitants of the units of basic territorial division shall form a self-governing 
community in accordance with law”(1) – and “[l]ocal self-government shall 
participate in the exercise of public power. The substantial part of public duties 
which local self-government is empowered to discharge by statute shall be done 
in its own name and under its own responsibility” (2). The constitution arranges 
for local self-government in a detailed way in chapter VII. It should be noted (cf. 
Swianieqicz 2010: 484), however, that only the local, municipal level (gmina) is 
arranged for in the constitution (art. 164(1)), while the other, regional and county, 
levels are to be arranged for by statute (164(2)). In substantive-symbolic terms 
therefore, local self-governance at the municipal level is prioritized. 
The process of decentralization and the creation of local self-government has 
arguably been a success in Poland, and is one of the most effective – even if 
continuously contested – reforms in the region (contestation regards in particular 
to the status of the subnational levels other than that of municipalities). The 
attention for local self-government and civic participation can be clearly related 
to the dissident legacy of Solidarność, even if the latter’s original idea of a “self-
governing republic” has never been realized in any extensive way. On the one hand, 
it can then be argued that “local self-government in Poland found a permanent 
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place within the post-transformation political landscape”, not least through its 
constitutionalization, but at the same time, it can be said that there are clear 
tendencies at recentralization and state disregard for local autonomy (Regulska 
2009). What is significant, though, is that tensions and contestations over the 
desirable form of local self-government, and appropriate relations between the 
centre and periphery continue to exist, indicating the unsettled nature of local 
democracy and the continuous relevance and discursive force of the notion of 
self-government.
Constitutional Design of local Democracy
Local government is underpinned by both representative and direct forms of 
democracy in Poland: “[e]lections to constitutive organs shall be universal, direct, 
equal and shall be conducted by secret ballot. The principles and procedures for 
submitting candidates and for the conduct of elections, as well as the requirements 
for the validity of elections, shall be specified by statute “(169(2)), and “[m]
embers of a self-governing community may decide, by means of a referendum, 
matters concerning their community, including the dismissal of an organ of local 
government established by direct election. The principles of and procedures for 
conducting a local referendum shall be specified by statute” (170). Local elections 
are arranged for by the 1998 Local Election Law. Also in the Polish case, turnout 
for local elections tends to be relatively low (it has never been higher than 50 
percent since 1990, see Swianiewicz 2010: 497), but public opinion polls show 
consistently higher civic trust towards local institutions than towards central 
political institutions. 
In terms of direct democracy as a dimension of post-1989 Polish local 
democracy, it is clear that it has become a “common element of democratic decision-
making” (Přibáň & Sadurski 2006: 218; cf. Piasecki 2011: 136).  Dimensions of 
participatory democracy – in particular through the form of referenda – have 
taken on a certain significance in the Polish democratic architecture in their own 
right, and already from the late 1980s onwards (see Piasecki 2011).
The institutionalization of instruments of direct democracy started early on in 
the Polish transformation. Two constitutional amendments in late 1989 and early 
1990 introduced a change of the 1952 constitution so that sovereignty was now 
vested in the nation, and could be exercised in a representative as well as a direct 
way. The Local Government Act of 1990 included the option of popular vote, next 
to that of regular elections, and identified three types of referenda: mandatory 
(recall), mandatory (self-taxation), and facultative (matters of importance to the 
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commune (Piasecki 2011: 126-7). The Local Referendum Act of 1991 further 
stipulated the implementation of referenda.
Instruments of direct democracy were also articulated forcefully in most 
constitutional drafts proposed throughout the early 1990s, and in the newly 
adopted Constitution in 1997 even gained somewhat in importance. The Polish 
constitution invokes a notion of direct civic participation as early as in article 4(2), 
and the strengthening of citizens power is alluded to in the preamble. The 1997 
constitution codifies the citizens’ right to direct participation through referenda 
in constitutional matters, national referenda regarding ordinary legislation, and 
referenda on the local level. Article 170 stipulates that “[m]embers of a self-
governing community may decide, by means of a referendum, matters concerning 
their community, including the dismissal of an organ of local self-government 
established by direct election. The principles of and procedures for conducting 
a local referendum shall be specified by statute”.
It seems fair to argue that the 1997 Constitution, “unlike all its predecessors, 
contains a relatively wide range of provisions concerning direct democracy”, 
which is a “fact worth stressing, especially as such solutions are rare in Polish 
history” (Szmyt 1999: 128-129). This interpretation is confirmed by the legal 
scholar Ewa Popławska, who has argued that the “increasing value of direct 
democracy is reflected in its extended forms, in particular in the extension of the 
scope of facultative application of a referendum to include matters of fundamental 
importance to the state” (Popławska 1999: 189). As for instance argued by a 
current judge of the Constitutional Court, Stanisław Biernat, the referendum 
instrument does have particular significance on the local level (Biernat 2005). 
This observation is corroborated by the sociologist Paweł Swianiewicz, who in 
the early 2000s observed some positive trends in terms of more frequent and 
widespread use of local referenda, and a higher success rate (Swianiewicz 2001). 
conclusions
Following, among others, Bailey and Elliott, I have argued that a “virtuous circle” 
of subnational government and democracy mutually enforcing each other is only 
likely to come about in a constitutional context of sufficiently decentralized and 
autonomized local self-government with a variety of democratic channels, and the 
unambiguous endorsement of constitutionalized subnational self-government by 
relevant political and legal actors. The concise review of the relevant foundational 
legal structures as have been adopted in the cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland since 1989 shows that, on the one hand, significant steps towards 
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subnational self-government have clearly been made, but also that, on the other, 
subnational equilibria and state-local relations are in some instances fragile, 
and do not always enjoy sufficient legal guarantees or the protection of clear-cut 
constitutional principles. Furthermore, distinct problems with decentralization6 
await further steps of reform.
In the Czech Republic, both the local and the regional level are part of the 
constitutional make-up. The 1992 Constitution indicates both levels as basic 
and higher units of territorial government respectively. The regional level was, 
however, only implemented in the later 1990s, after protracted political conflict 
over its necessity, and following sharp critique by the EU on the lack of an 
adequate regional administrative structure. The belated implementation of the 
regional level has, according to some observers, resulted in a lower level of civic 
trust in regional institutions and less political prominence. This is exacerbated 
by a limited autonomy in financial matters as well as the continued existence 
of regional structures directly administered by the state (Illner 2010: 522-3). 
Regarding local and regional democracy, democratic institutions and mechanisms 
are clearly available on the subnational level. The local level is, however, the 
only level on which direct democracy is provided for in terms of referenda, 
an instrument that is increasingly put to use (Smith 2011). 
In Hungary7, the constitution identifies various levels of subnational self-
government, but the local, municipal (and county) levels are clearly the ones that 
are more significant, not least because of the stipulation of a relatively wide set of 
responsibilities and a relatively high level in the independence of finance (Soos 
& Kaki 2010: 532). Also in Hungary, local, municipal-level self-government has 
enjoyed priority throughout the transformation period. As Soos has argued, ‘[l]
egally speaking, the rights of local governments are well protected’ (2010: 125). 
The middle-tier (including that of counties) has, in this, become somewhat more 
important only later on. In terms of local democracy, representative mechanisms 
are well-established while direct forms (referenda as well as a citizens’ initiative) 
have only been constitutionally enshrined in 1997, while referenda have been 
endorsed by the Constitutional Court as a “fundamental political right”. Despite 
such legal safeguards, however, local democratic politics is – according to some 
observers – not of high quality, even if participation through elections is increasing 
(Soos & Kaki 2011: 549). 
In Poland, the constitution prioritizes both subnational government and 
democracy on the local, municipal level. Only the latter has constitutional 
status (as the “basic unit of local government”), although its status is subject to 
political conflict and attempts at recentralization by the central state (Regulska 
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2009). Since 1998, county and regional levels have been added to the subnational 
picture, but regional self-government is paralleled by regional decentralized state 
institutions. Despite their limited functions and financial autonomy, regions do 
seem to have created a “new political dynamism” and are slowly becoming more 
robust, according to some observers (Swianiewicz 2010: 501).
Aforementioned political conflict over decentralization tends to undermine 
subnational forms of democracy in Poland (cf. Regulska 2009). Such conflict 
negatively influences the potential of local self-government, but also that of local 
democracy and civic participation. While local democracy is well-entrenched 
in both its representative and direct (local referenda) forms, the parameters for 
local autonomy seem not always unambiguously respected by the central state 
institutions, political parties, as well as local elites, and a functional, rather than 
a democratic-participatory interpretation of local self-government seems to 
prevail so far (Swianiewicz 2010: 484). At the same time, civil society institutions 
are mostly not strong enough to provide sufficient counterthrust. 
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Temporary and lasTing effecTs  
of a deliberaTive evenT:  
The Kaposvár experience4
IntroductIon 
In June 2008 a deliberative event5 was organized in the South-West Hungarian 
Kaposvár district with the participation of the residents of Kaposvár and 
the surrounding 53 villages. The deliberative research was part of a broader 
comparative FP6 project called IntUne (Integrated and United? A Quest for 
Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe), based on elite and public opinion surveys, 
interviews and media analysis. The core issues of the research were different 
aspects of the perception of integration:  identity formation, scope of governance 
and representation. On the other hand the greatest immediate problems for the 
local society in the Kaposvár region were unemployment and related issues of the 
local economy, that is why these two topics – economy and European integration 
- were discussed during the deliberation.
Deliberative Polling (DP) is a technique which combines traditional random 
sampling public opinion polls with deliberation in group discussions. It turned 
out that participants changed their mind significantly on several questions. 
They proved to be better informed on average after the event and their opinion 
became more balanced in the evaluation of unemployment. Attitudes concerning 
economic competitiveness became more open while solidarity and tolerance 
towards the unemployed also increased. We detected some paradoxical effects as 
well: support for the EU increased after the event despite the fact that a decreasing 
proportion of participants felt that the EU integration has had an impact on their 
life. As for the evaluation, the majority was enthusiast after the event and declared 
future interest in the discussed topics and in participation in public debates6. 
One year later, as part of a follow-up survey we visited the participants again 
(as well as a control sample of non-participants) and measured the stability and 
change of their knowledge, opinions and evaluation of the event. This paper 
sums up some results of the follow-up survey. It argues that the majority of the 
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opinion changes proved to be temporary after the event, but some of them were 
lasting. It investigates the social characteristics of those who changed their mind 
temporarily and more permanently. 
Below we first provide an overview of the theoretical issues that deliberative 
models and methods address and the problematic areas of the subject followed by 
the presentation of the methodology and design of our project. We then show a 
summary of the opinion, attitude and knowledge changes that occurred after the 
deliberation and whether this was a lasting change one year later. At the end, we 
try to describe the socio-demographic characteristics of the short and long term 
changes with regression models.
Models and Methods of delIberatIon 
Deliberation is discussed in two ways in the literature: in one as a social model 
of collective decision making, and in the other as a method based on organized 
discussions of smaller or larger groups. While there is a common core of them 
- discussion of relevant public issues in order to reach the ideal type of properly 
informed and involved citizens – it seems to be reasonable to distinguish between 
models and methods for the sake of highlighting the proper place of this paper. 
The deliberative social model belongs to the family of normative thinking 
that conceives participative forms of collective decision making as being able 
to substitute for (or correct) the model of representative democracy. While 
representative democracy refers to a form of government in which citizens vote 
to elect the leaders, in the participative models citizens have an active role in 
governance, although the border between the two types is somewhat vague: 
deliberation as a method of communication is present in both forms. The 
difference lies in the fact that in the representative form deliberation is mostly 
a privilege of the selected elites, while in the participative model in principle it 
directly reaches all participants.
Cohen and Sabel (1997) suggest that the model of directly-deliberative 
polyarchy is “an attractive kind of radical, participatory democracy with 
problem-solving capacities useful under current conditions and unavailable to 
representative systems. In directly-deliberative polyarchy, collective decisions 
are made through public deliberation in arenas open to citizens who use public 
services, or who are otherwise regulated by public decisions.” In addition, ideally 
“directly-deliberative polyarchy combines the advantages of local learning and 
self-government with the advantages (and discipline) of wider social learning and 
heightened political accountability”. They argue that the above mentioned aspects 
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of polyarchy strengthen participatory forms and explain advantages of directly-
deliberative decision-making as against representative-aggregative one (Cohen 
& Sabel 1997: pp 313-317).
Forms of participative democracy – such as deliberative or associative 
– overlap in many respects. Associationalism, emphasizing the values of 
voluntarism, self government and cooperation, as Piotr Perczynski put it, “could 
provide concrete arenas of deliberation, and, in fact, the overall associative 
system could also be seen as an arena of negotiating, competing and co-operating 
associations” (Perczynski, 1999:13). 
The common characteristics of deliberative and associative models are that 
they put emphasis on direct deliberation among citizens in collective decision 
making. In the representative model of democracy the emphasis is on the 
sequence of selection, deliberation among the selected few and voting. It is 
normally accompanied with asymmetric communication within the media and 
ex post deliberation among the cognitively mobilized groups of the society. This 
model is criticized mostly on the ground of failures of the sequence’s steps. That 
leads to a situation in which people are under-informed about and not interested 
in public affairs. They become alienated from the selected elites, care less about 
the public good and the very selection may lead to suboptimal results. Selection of 
representative elites happens in circumstances where people know little about the 
programme of the selected and about the major social problems these programmes 
are supposed to deal with. Public opinion formation relies upon similar conditions. 
Deliberative methods lie on a scale of different solutions of civic discussions 
aiming at involving citizens into public discourse. At one pole there is the 
Deliberative Poll where the aim is deliberation itself (information for and 
involvement of stakeholders). On the other pole there is the citizens’ jury where 
the emphasis is on aiming at consent seeking and forming suggestions. Another 
important distinction within deliberative methods concerns the very aim of the 
action: on one end of the scale the aim is pure research on the other the aim is 
triggering social action. Most frequently deliberations lie between the two: these 
are researches which combine the aims of triggering and studying social action. 
The participants of deliberative events, in a quest for the public good, argue and 
debate freely. The arguments may change individual preferences, and raise the 
level of knowledge of the participants. While public debates have educational 
effects and make the citizens better, they also create a communication and public 
policy forum dominated by mutual respect of the participants. Deliberation is 
a certain learning process, during which deliberating citizens gather relevant 
information, reflect on arguments, and exchange opinions (Fishkin 2005). 
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The participants take into consideration balanced, appropriate information 
and articulate arguments pro and contra. The very essence of deliberation is 
consideration and the competition of arguments. The Deliberative Poll as Fishkin 
put it “attempts to model what the public would think, had it a better opportunity 
to consider the questions at issue” (1997 p. 162). It seeks to promote awareness, 
consideration and responsibility during election, to build better citizens, to 
increase the decision making competence of citizens, to create a more transparent 
public life, to increase the participation of the people in public matters, and to 
support well grounded public opinion forming through information and discourse 
(Luskin and Fishkin 2002). 
The method of Deliberative Polls amongst others tries to provide answers for 
problems related to the public opinion and its measurement as well (Ackerman 
& Fishkin 2003). The main problem addressed by Deliberative Polling relates 
to the problem of rational ignorance (Downs 1956) which applies to the social 
phenomenon when it is not felt to be worthwhile or of importance for people to 
devote time and effort to gather the necessary information in order to elaborate a 
well-grounded opinion. However, the lack of information or elaborated opinion 
does not prevent the interviewee to formulate an opinion when asked, during a 
public opinion research. One may argue that citizens are rarely well-informed 
enough on public issues, therefore public opinion polls represent a superficial 
reality. Another problem of public opinion is that as information and cognitive 
skills are not equally distributed, not everyone has an elaborated opinion on every 
public issue (Zaller 1993) and this problem raises the question of the equivalency 
of opinions (Bourdieu 1997). The less elaborated opinions or attitudes may also 
be less stable over time, can easily be changed, furthermore, less consistent, even 
contradictory opinions can also coexist in one person’s mind (Zaller-Feldman 
1992). 
Beside the problem with public opinion itself, there are several other technical 
problems related to its measurement. Some have reproached it as not only does 
it seek to measure public opinion but it generates it through the way and time 
issues are presented and the way questions are formulated, phrased and in which 
order (Zaller-Feldman, 1992). Beside the inconsistency of opinions present at the 
individual level, another problem of public opinion polls is whether a collective 
decision can be reached by a simple aggregation of individual opinions (Hardin 
2003). Opinions that are still consistent at the individual level do not necessarily 
lead to a consistent opinion at the collective level (Pettit 2003). Those who deal 
with collective rationality enhance that collective decisions where deliberation of 
the issue is allowed are often more rational from the point of view of the group 
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than those decisions obtained by simple aggregation of individual opinions – this 
would correspond to a deliberative model of democracy. 
As the main aim of a deliberative poll is to produce an informed public opinion 
it is interesting to analyse the changes that occur in the level of knowledge, and 
in the attitudes of the participants of the deliberative event. In order to achieve 
this, survey data before and after deliberation are to be analysed. To see whether 
these changes are a product of a cognitive process of elaboration of opinions it is 
very useful to measure the long term effect of a Deliberative Poll , however, this 
kind of follow-up research is conducted in relatively few cases (Luskin-Fishkin 
1998, Attitudes to Crime 2002, Hansen-Andersen 2004). Furthermore, opinions 
and attitudes can change due to impacts other than the deliberative event itself – 
in order to control for the effect of other factors with simultaneous influence the 
usage of control groups is needed.
research desIgn and saMples 
As was mentioned above in May 2008 a representative sample of the inhabitants 
of the Kaposvár Small Area has been polled (n=1514) on the themes of 
unemployment, economy and the European Union (T1). The respondents of the 
survey were invited to participate in the deliberative weekend. As a briefing 
material, a booklet containing information and facts about employment, economy 
and the EU, pros and cons about the possible measures and policies that could 
facilitate the discussion, was sent out for all of those 435 persons who were willing 
to come. At the end 108 persons participated to the event held at the Kaposvár 
University on the 21-22 of June 2008. During this weekend the participants 
discussed the themes with each other in small groups of 5-10 and with invited 
experts during plenary sessions and were asked to complete a questionnaire, 
similar to the first one at the end (T3). A year later, in August 2009 we went back 
to the field (T4)7 and interviewed both the participants and a control group who 
have not participated to the event but had initially answered the survey. This way 
we ended up with a sample of 90 persons who have participated to the deliberative 
event and have taken part in all survey measuring both short and long term effects 
of the deliberation, and a control group of 96 persons. People of the control group 
were selected from the participants of the initial representative survey (T1), this 
way these people have completed the initial survey (T1) and the one conducted a 
year later (T4) but have not participated in the event. The current paper deals with 
these two groups (see Table 1).
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Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample (%)
Representative 
sample Participants Control group
N 1514 90 96
  100.0 100.0 100.0 
gender Male 43.2 46.7 43.8 
Female 56.8 53.3 56.3 
education primary or less 27.1 23.3 19.8 
Vocational 28.5 31.1 26.0 
high school 32.0 33.3 38.5 
college/university 12.5 12.2 15.6 
age -44 37.0 25.6 29.2 
45- 63.0 74.4 70.8 
settlement Kaposvár 66.9 77.8 70.8 
Other 33.1 22.2 29.2 
present 
occupation
Employee 34.0 24.4 37.5 
entrepreneur, own business 4.8 2.2 5.2 
doing casual work .8 1.1 2.1 
Unemployed 9.8 17.8 8.3 
pensioner 40.1 47.8 37.5 
on maternity leave 5.3 4.4 3.1 
Student 3.8 2.2 5.2 
Other 1.4 .0 1.0 
Cramer’s V measures: Gender: n.s., Education: n.s., Age: 0.07***, Settlement: 
0.06**, Occupation: n.s. Statistical significance: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1
suMMary of teMporary and lastIng changes
In this part of the paper we present the changes in opinion, attitudes and the 
level of knowledge that occurred right after the deliberative event and whether it 
lasted a year later. One of the main aims of a Deliberative Poll is to produce an 
informed public opinion, therefore, one possible measure of its success is the gain 
in terms of participants’ knowledge. Before the event the participants are sent 
an information booklet where they are provided with information regarding the 
theme, but they can gain further knowledge during the small group discussions 
from each other and from the experts at the plenary sessions. Our questionnaire 
contained nine multiple-choice knowledge questions out of which five were 
related to actual numbers such as the unemployment rate in the area, in Hungary, 
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in the EU and another four were rather related to legal rules such as eligibility for 
social welfare and support and were more of a textual character. Overall it can be 
said that the knowledge index8 was significantly higher both after the deliberation 
and a year later than before the event. Although there was a slight drop in levels 
of knowledge a year later, we can still talk about both a short term and a lasting 
change in information gain. The qualitative and quantitative questions didn’t 
follow the same trends: information about numbers didn’t increase significantly, 
while the change rather occurred due to the higher level of knowledge in terms of 
qualitative information about the industrial profile of the area and the legal rules 
(see Graph 1). 
Graph 1: Knowledge gain (T1 – T3 – T4 )(n=90)  
(probability/item of knowing the correct answer) 
T-tests: Textual Items: T1T3 t= 3.29***, T1T4 t= 2.15**,  
Numerical Items: T1T3 t= n.s., T1T4 t= n.s.
Interestingly, however, when we look at the control group, a similar trend is 
detectable: there was a significant increase of knowledge during the year between 
the pre-deliberation survey (T1) and the follow-up survey (T4), but in their case the 
change was rather due to the increase in knowledge of the numerical facts. As no 
significant differences existed between the participants and the control group in 
the long term regarding knowledge-level, we can’t say that the changes occurred in 
information gain were clearly due to the deliberative event. Deliberation resulted 
in a short and long term knowledge gain in terms of qualitative information. This 
knowledge gain however is contingent since in the meantime members of the 
control group also became more knowledgeable about facts and especially figures 
of unemployment, that is about quantitative information. In the long run therefore 
according to our results deliberation has to do with the type and not with the level 
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of knowledge-gain.9 It would have been interesting to investigate whether it was 
the case in the short run too. At that time (T3) however we didn’t have a control 
group.
Regarding the changes in terms of attitudes and opinion two themes were 
addressed in our questionnaire: attitudes towards (1) unemployment with related 
issues of the economy (market, foreign investments, the role of the government 
and personal responsibility in providing jobs, etc.) and (2) European integration 
processes. Changes in opinion and attitudes showed different patterns in the case 
of the different questions10. Regarding attitudes towards unemployment issues 
(see Graph 2) the share of those who thought that it’s the government’s duty to 
provide jobs for everyone (as opposed to one’s own responsibility) significantly 
decreased in short term (from 38% to 17%) but increased over the original level 
a year later (43%). A similar pattern could be detected regarding opinions about 
allowances that should be paid to everyone in need: solidarity increased after 
the deliberation (from 53% to 80%), but it didn’t last a year later (59%).  In both 
cases the control group showed very similar attitudes before the deliberation and 
a year later which means that both the increased solidarity and the increased self-
responsibility were an effect of the deliberative event and did only generate a 
temporary change. Nevertheless, long term effects could be detected in the case 
of the opinion about government’s increased role even at the cost of increased 
taxes. Positive opinion increased from 28% to 34% and was 42% a year later.  A 
similar trend could be detected in case of the governments’ role in the regulation 
of the second economy.
Overall, among the 7 questions concerning employment issues, in the case of 
4 there were significant short term changes, and there were long term changes in 
the case of 2 questions.
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Graph 2: Changes in attitudes towards employment issues (T1 – T3 – T4)
Significant changes:
Providing jobs for all citizens is the government’s responsibility:  
T1T3 t= -4.429***, T3T4 t= 6.286***
Allowances, aid  and benefits should be paid for everyone in need:  
T1T3 t= 3.503***, T3T4 t= -3.628***
Government should not do anything against second economy: T1T4 t= 1.872*
Unemployment should be avoided at any cost: T1T3 t= -1.989*
Government should spend more: T1T3 t= 2.632***, T1T4 t= 3.569***
In terms of the attitudes towards the market economy participants became 
more positive towards the idea of an open market right after the deliberation, but 
this change didn’t have a significant lasting effect a year later according to the 
average of the answers (see Graph 3). However, when looking at the distribution 
of the answers there are some realignment over time.
Attitudes towards foreign investments showed a different pattern: a slight 
positive change after the deliberation and significant drop a year later. Initially 
24% of the participants of the deliberation were against encouraging foreign 
investments (1-2 answers on a 1-5 scale) that decreased somewhat to 13% after the 
deliberation but grew again to 38% a year later. In parallel with this trend, initially 
48% thought that foreign investments help Hungarian economic development that 
increased somewhat to 56% after the deliberation and dropped back to 39% a year 
later. 
Overall, among the 7 questions concerning economic issues, there was 
significant short term (T1T3) change in case of one question, and there was no 
significant long term (T1T4) change in this respect.
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Graph 3: Changes in attitudes towards market economy (T1 – T3 – T4)
Significant changes:
Market should be made as open as possible: T1T3 change t= 3.864***
Investing in new technologies: T3T4 t= -1.858*
Encouraging foreign investment: T3T4 t= -2.187**
Foreign economic investment helps Hungarian economic development:  
T3T4 t= -3.046***
Regarding the perception of the European integration project the attitudes 
were more changeable over time which could be a sign that opinions or attitudes 
in this subject are not that crystallized yet due to the distant, abstract and 
complicated character of the subject of the European Union that generates low 
public interest (see Graph 4). There was only a short term change in terms of 
opinions on the integration that should be strengthened, on the perception of the 
benefits of the EU for Hungary and on the need to make the EU more competitive 
in world markets. Compared to the control group the pattern of the answers before 
the deliberation and a year later was very similar among the two groups, which 
means that in the case of these questions the temporary changes are also to be 
drawn back to the deliberation. 
There were however long lasting changes too, in terms of the increased tax 
level to be distributed at the EU level and the decreased share of people thinking 
that what happens at the EU level has a consequence on their life. In terms of 
tax redistribution, the initial 10% to be attributed to the EU level has increased 
to 23% and a year later was still 19%. Regarding the perceived consequences 
on one’s life there was an important decrease due to the deliberation among the 
participants (from 28% to 8%) which went back to some extent a year later but still 
represents a drop (20%). In terms of opinions before the deliberation and a year 
after, the general trends of participants’ opinion are in line with the control group 
where there was significant decrease as well (from 28% to 15%). 
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Besides these trends, better social security as the main aim for the EU showed 
a changing pattern independent from the deliberation as there was no immediate 
effect, it decreased only after it. 
Among the 6 questions concerning European integration issues nearly all 
were affected by a short term change with the exception of one question, and 
there were lasting changes in case of three of them.
Graph 4: Changes in attitudes towards the European integration (T1 – T3 – T4)
Significant changes:
European integration should be strengthened:  
T1T3 change t= 2.458**, T3T4 t= -2.324**
Making the European economy more competitive:  
T1T3 change t= 3.191***, T3T4 t= -4.021***
Provide better social security for everyone:  
T3T4 change t= -3.66***, T1T4 t= -2.14***
EU tax redistribution: T1T3 change t= 3.005***, T1T4 t= 2.707***
What happens to Europe in general has important consequences for people like me: 
T1T3 change t= -2.901***, T1T4 t= -2.135**
Hungary has on a balance benefited:  
T1T3 change t= 2.634**, T3T4 t= -2.304**
Overall there were short term changes in half of the investigated 20 attitude/
opinion items and long term changes in a quarter of them. 
To set up a typology, four patterns of attitude and opinion change can be 
discerned. Due to partial overlapping between short and long term changes 
there was no significant change whatsoever in the case of 8 questions (such as 
keeping strategic industries in national hands, increasing taxes on imported 
products, investing in new technologies, that Hungarian enterprises should be 
privately owned, that it should be made very difficult for employers to fire staff, 
that unemployment should be avoided at any cost, that unemployment improves 
labour discipline and that government should not do anything against illegal work). 
In the case of 6 questions the deliberation had an immediate effect on opinions 
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but this was not lasting and opinions went back to close to their initial levels a 
year later. This was the case of the attitudes towards an open market, that it’s the 
government’s duty to provide jobs for everyone, that allowances should be paid 
to everyone in need, that European integration should be strengthened, that the 
EU should become more competitive and that Hungary has benefited from its EU 
membership. In most of these cases the control group confirmed that the changes 
were only temporary as there was no change among them and the differences 
between the participants and the control group were not significant either. 
In the case of another 3 question, however, a lasting change could be detected. 
Attitudes towards government increased spending with increased taxes, increased 
EU redistribution and decreased consequences of the EU in one’s life all showed 
a durable change. In the case of these questions it is interesting to see whether the 
effects are to be drawn back to the deliberation or an overall change in the opinion 
climate (see Graph 5). In the case of the government spending and the consequences 
on EU events on one’s life the changes were in line with changes occurring among 
the control group, which means that these changes can’t be directly associated 
with the deliberation but rather with a change in the overall context. As opposed 
to these trends, the case of the question of EU tax redistribution showed a different 
pattern. There was an initial gap between the participants and the control group 
which decreased to some extent after the deliberation. Before the deliberation the 
participants were significantly less open to the EU level redistribution than the 
control group (10% vs. 15%) - by this change the participants did exceed the level 
of the control group where the opinions on the matter remained unchanged after 
the deliberation (19% vs. 16%).
Graph 5: Lasting changes among participants and the control group (T1 – T4)
Significant changes among the control group:
Government should spend more: T1T4 change t= 3.146 ***
What happens to Europe in general has important consequences for people like me: 
T1T4 change t= -2.249**
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The last group of changing patterns is when there was no immediate effect 
of the deliberation but opinions still changed a year later, that is only long term 
change could be detected. This was the case of 3 questions: on encouraging foreign 
investment, that foreign investments help Hungary and that the EU should stand 
for better social security. In these cases comparison with the pattern followed 
by the control group is also important. It can provide an explanation why these 
changes happened, whether it was due to a change in the overall opinion climate 
or the national/ international environment as the spring of 2009 was especially 
difficult in Hungary due to both the world financial crisis and the Hungarian 
economic crisis and people’s attitudes towards the foreign investments and social 
security might have changed (see Graph 6). Attitudes about encouraging foreign 
investments showed a very similar trend among the participants and the control 
group with only a slight drop back over one year, which was nevertheless not 
statistically significant, so in this case we might talk about the effect of the changing 
environment. Regarding the opinions about how helpful foreign investments are 
for the Hungarian economy there was an initial gap between the participants and 
the control group with participants being more positive in this respect. A year 
after the opinion of the two groups became closer. However, regarding these two 
latter questions, the slight increase followed by the significant drop back of the 
support for foreign investment among the participants mentioned earlier might be 
the effect of the deliberation. Regarding the wish for a social Europe the opinions 
remained unchanged in the control group, while participants experienced a 
decrease during the year after the deliberation – they followed a different trend in 
this respect, but still, there was no significant difference between the participants’ 
opinion and the control group’s opinion. 
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Graph 6: Comparison of participants and the control group (T1 – T4)
Significant change  within the control group:
Market should be made as open as possible: T1T4 change t= -2.145**
Another interesting case is the attitudes towards an open market where 
only immediate change happened with no lasting effects of the deliberation as 
mentioned earlier. However, comparing this trend to the control group is seems 
that while no significant change happened in the long term among the participants 
(in terms of the average answers), the control group became significantly more 
reluctant towards the open market. While there was no significant difference 
between the groups at the beginning, a year later DP participants were more 
positive towards the idea of an open market than the control group. In this sense, 
we might hypothesize that after a short positive change followed by a drop back, 
the stability of the opinions of the participants on the long run was the effect of the 
deliberation – without this, opinions would have negatively changed. 
Taking all changes and differences compared to the control group into account 
that has been already analysed so far it can be said, that there were two questions 
where the significant change was probably due to deliberation itself, although 
with a different pattern. In case of the share of tax to be allocated to the EU level 
the initial opinion of the participants was significantly different from the control 
group with allocating a lower share of taxes, however, a year later, with no changes 
among the control group, the participants’ opinion on the matter increased to their 
level. As for the other question on the open market, as detailed previously, there 
was no significant difference at the beginning between the two groups, but the 
gap became significant a year later with the opinion of the control group showing 
a great drop while the opinion of the participants remained relatively unchanged.
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evaluatIon of the event 
Another interesting result of the deliberative event is the evaluation of its 
effects and efficiency by the participants themselves. In terms of what skills 
or knowledge was improved by the event participants mentioned first of all the 
increased motivation to participate actively in the public debate (75%), but it 
also served to better communicate with other people and better understand their 
attitudes and behaviour (68-69%). A lower number of participants mentioned that 
the event served to assist in comprehending the public debate on employment or 
to improve their knowledge on employment issues or on the EU. A year later, 
a significantly lower number of participants mentioned that the event served to 
improve their factual knowledge on the EU or employment issues just as their 
ability to understand and participate in public debate in these issues (see Graph 7). 
Graph 7: Evaluation of the deliberative event – perceived improvement of 
knowledge/skills (T3 – T4) (average on a 0-10 scale)
Significant changes:
Factual knowledge on the EU: t= -3.328***
Factual knowledge on employment issues: t= -1.967*
Ability to understand the public debate on employment: t= -2.067**
Motivation to participate actively in the public debate: t= -3.302***
As for their motivation to participate to the event, learning about employment 
issues was significantly less mentioned a year later than right after the event, and 
more importantly the financial incentive they got gained more importance (see 
Graph 8).
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Graph 8: Evaluation of the deliberative event – motivation for participation  
(T3 – T4) (average on a 0-10 scale)
Significant changes:
Learning about employment issues: t= -2.246**
Financial incentive: t= 2.300**
factors InfluencIng the changes
In the previous part we saw how the different aspects of the opinions and attitudes 
changed after the deliberation and whether these changes were lasting. In this 
part the question is what factors are affecting the overall change in opinions and 
attitudes. In order to analyse this, linear regression models are used testing the 
effect of information and social-demographic factors on the opinion and attitude 
changes. The dependent variables used are opinion change indices where first 
the opinion changes are calculated from the pre-and post deliberation answers 
(T1T3) and from the pre-deliberation answers and the answers given a year after 
the deliberation (T1T4) to the set of 20 questions described previously. Then 
the absolute value of these variables is summed up in two additive indices that 
stand for the short and long term changes. These indices sum up the intensity of 
opinion change, however, they contain no information on the direction of these 
changes. Our original aim being to provide explanation on the socio-demographic 
background of opinion changes, these indices are suitable.
As for the explaining variables, we have included several socio-demographic 
variables such as gender, age, education. In order to include information on one’s 
material resources we used a proxy measuring the quality of the neighbourhood 
recorded by the interviewer. Besides these variables knowledge change indices 
were also used in our models as a more substantial determinant of the opinion 
change based on the assumption that opinion change occurs due to the increased 
level of information and knowledge gain.
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Four regression models were built, three among the participants of the 
deliberative event measuring short term and lasting changes and one model 
where the control group was also included in order to measure the effect of the 
deliberation itself on the long term opinion changes (see Table 2).
Regression models show that men were more open to change their opinion 
than women (see Model 1), however, this is only true in case of short term 
opinion changes, it doesn’t determine lasting effects of the deliberation. Besides, 
the unemployed changed their mind less frequently than employed. According 
to table statistics gender had, and unemployment had no significant effect 
on short term opinion change. When these impacts were controlled for other 
variables (education, knowledge gain, material conditions) both gender and being 
unemployed have significant effects on the short term. If we take into account 
the general trends of opinion change during the deliberation, that solidarity has 
overall increased, it is not surprising that the unemployed changed their opinions 
less than non-unemployed who might have become more socially sensitive in 
the matter. On the other hand, the other main trend of the opinion changes, the 
increasing level of self-responsibility regarding finding a job should have affected 
the unemployed themselves. Regarding why men are more affected by opinion 
change a possible explanation can be that men participate more in public debate 
and they are also more likely to hold extreme opinions than women – but these 
explanations can’t be directly verified here. At the same time, those who changed 
their opinion more were also those who found the event as a whole more valuable 
in helping them clarify their position on the issues and those who felt more active 
during the informal and social parts of the event. In parallel with this, men were 
also more likely to find the event more valuable in this sense than women with an 
average of 7.51 vs. 5.96 on a 0-10 scale.
In the longer run there is a similar trend, however, this connection is not 
significant (see Model 2). Higher education, i.e. university degree was against 
opinion change, which could be explained by more established opinions and 
cognitive mobilization skills. 
If we include the immediate (T1T3) impact of the deliberative event into the 
explanation of the long run (T1T4) opinion changes of the participants (see Model 
3) it proves to be the single most important explanatory factor, it overwrites the 
effects of gender and education as well. Even the impact of knowledge change 
proves to be unimportant when investigated together with the short run opinion 
change index.
If we investigate the long term impact of DP-participation on opinion change 
(see Model 4) it proves to be all in all insignificant. None of the explanatory 
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variables prove to be significant, except for education which counter-indicates 
opinion change. Interestingly there was no significant difference between the 
participant group and the control group in terms of the intensity of opinion change. 
In this sense it seems that in the long term, the deliberation had no lasting effect 
– opinions have changed anyway and that was not explained by the participation 
in the event. Overall, although it is not a significant association, it is still the most 
important –negative - finding of our paper.
Table 2: Linear regression models (unstandardized regression coefficients)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4








Constant 5.044 *** 5.579 *** 3.019 *** 6.021 ***
Male .790 ** .611 .220 .205
Unemployed -.870 * -.116 .313 -.146
University -.693 -1.022 * -.659 -.712 *
Wealthy neighbourhood -.010 .233 .248 -.156
T1T3/T1T4 knowledge 
change 
-.058 -.089 -.076 -.037
T1T3 opinion change .509 ***
Participated to the 
deliberation
-.183
R Square .094 n.s. .062 n.s. .249 *** .028 n.s.
n= 90  90  90  186  
Statistical significance: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1
However, the models presented here are not significant ones, with the exception 
of the one where previous opinion change is included among the explaining 
factors. This means that the variables included are not the one determining the 
intensity of opinion change. The included variables explain 9% in the case of the 
immediate opinion change, but only 3-6% of the long term changes.
Besides technical issues concerning the low base size and the construction of 
the additive opinion change index, the inclusion of other substantial explanatory 
variables could be considered. It seems that age, activity/inactivity or media usage 
don’t have a significant impact on opinion change either. On the other hand, when 
trying to build models on the opinion change in separate questions without any 
aggregation, the results are similarly insignificant. The opinion change concerning 
a question is mostly defined by the previous opinion on that matter – without any 
effects of the mentioned socio-demographic or substantial variables. 
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Level of education had a negative effect on opinion change in the first models, 
but other basic socio-demographic characteristics don’t influence it significantly. 
conclusIon 
In the literature there is much criticism of the applicability of the deliberative 
social model therefore the debate on deliberation should be supplemented with 
empirical testing. The deliberative methods may offer many advantages but they 
also have several problems. Reviewing the empirical studies on deliberation it 
turns out that there are relatively few quantitative and reliable analyses, there are 
many questions e.g. how does deliberation really work. It was found that opinions 
do frequently change, but “most empirical analyses do not explain the patterns of 
opinion change or lack of change” (Barbaras 2004: pp 688).
The protocol of Deliberative Polling suggests follow–up research to 
determine if the opinion changes are temporary or lasting. The control sample 
surveyed simultaneously allows an assessment of the effect of deliberation and 
the effect of other factors e.g. public discourse or crisis. Similarly to the Kaposvár 
Deliberative Poll  participants of follow-up research conducted in Denmark 
“reverted somewhat to their initial opinion position” and measured persisted 
“increase among the participants in the level of knowledge” (Hansen&Andersen 
2004: pp 271-276). As for knowledge change after the deliberation, the Kaposvár 
experience shows significant and lasting knowledge gain with two important 
qualifications. First, this is true only in the case of the textual items, because 
knowledge about numerical items didn’t grow in the short run. Qualitative and 
quantitative information had different chances to influence the knowledge 
of Deliberative Poll participants (Fishkin et al. 2009). Second, in the long run 
knowledge level grew within the control group as well. While the impact of 
Deliberative Polling   had mostly to do with textual knowledge, in the control 
group of the local population the knowledge about quantitative information grew. 
It might be thought that it was the impact of the crisis: information about the 
numeric facts of unemployment became known. However, in this case the growth 
should have been detected among Deliberative Poll participants as well. The 
difference may have to do with the Deliberative Poll discussions and with the 
age composition of the samples. Due to the self-selection of the Deliberative Poll 
sample, elderly were over-represented among the participants. 
As for information gain all in all there is a significant lasting growth in 
knowledge level. This level however doesn’t differ significantly from that of 
the control group. What does differ is the type of the changes: Deliberative Poll 
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participants knew more about qualitative, while control group members about 
quantitative facts of unemployment.
In terms of attitude change, in two out of five items there was no change at 
all. In every third items the changes were temporary only. In two cases out of the 
twenty were the changes lasting, due to the effect of the Deliberative Poll. The two 
items were ideologically sensitive ones: the higher proportion of tax redistribution 
on the EU-level and the open market. 
The empirical results of the Kaposvár follow-up survey show that the 
Deliberative Poll had minor lasting effect on people’s mind. In the short run, 
immediately after the event the knowledge of participants grew significantly, 
they changed their mind in several issues, among others they became more 
tolerant towards the unemployed and their opinion became more balanced. They 
evaluated the event enthusiastically and they felt that they would be more ready to 
participate in further public debates. One year later, in the long run most of these 
effects disappeared:  the level of knowledge and most of the opinion change didn’t 
differ from that of the control group, while the evaluation of the event – although 
remained positive in most of the dimensions – became less enthusiastic. 
Deliberative Polling does not permanently change people’s mind according 
to our results. For those who want to experiment with the forms of participative 
democracy it may sound like bad news. But it may contribute to the improvement 
of the methods of decision making. Even if temporarily, it can efficiently 
contribute to providing better information for citizens and it can enhance 
the readiness of laymen in the short run to participate in public affairs. Prior 
to important collective decisions it may help to counterbalance the two major 
problems of voting practices and other forms of decision making: ignorance and 
disinterest. Better informed and motivated citizens will be ready and more likely 
to participate after these events. 
There is one additional aspect however which is worthwhile studying carefully. 
Deliberative Polls are not only about knowledge gain and arguing. Emotions and 
stories count as well. In our case the side effects of the emotional dynamics of the 
event were mostly positive: tolerance and trust grew (even if temporarily). More 
evidence is needed if it is always (or typically) the case. It looks likely that arguing 
and being informed help to form balanced opinions. But it is to be studied how 
emotional dynamics of these events influence the passions of the majority and of 
opinion leaders in the short and in the long run.
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Formal and inFormal volunteering in 
Hungary: similarities and diFFerences
IntroductIon
The paper focuses on formal (organizational) and informal (non-organizational) 
voluntary work from a comparative approach. The relevance of the topic comes 
from the fact that 2011 had been proclaimed as the European Year of Volunteering 
by the European Commission and the Council. The timing is not accidental, ten 
years have past since the United Nations announced the International Year of 
Volunteers in 20012. Another factor highlighting the importance of the present 
research is that in Hungary scarcity of representative statistical analysis is 
documented on formal and informal voluntary work.
ExplanatIons on voluntEErIng: prEvIous rEsEarch 
outcomEs In a nutshEll
The key explanatory variables of my research on formal and informal voluntarism 
are human, cultural, social capital; traditional (old or rather altruistic) and 
new (modern or rather instrumental) motivation. Within this present research 
voluntary work is defined as non-paid voluntary activity doing a favor by non-
family members or social groups, thus contributing to the strengthening of a 
community (Czike - Kuti 2006:13). This description first calls our attention to 
the fact that voluntary activity – no matter whether formal or informal – as a way 
of individual community participation per definition, contributes to meso level 
community development. Secondly, contradicting many definitions emphasizing 
organizational outlines, this one widens the frames with extra-organizational 
assistance. Moreover, sharing Wilson and Musick’s (1997:694) opinion, volunteer 
work is a productive and collective work that requires human, cultural and social 
capital at micro level. The majority of international research focuses on formal 




Education is commonly applied to measure human capital. The positive impact 
of education on voluntary participation has been confirmed in many previous 
studies (Smith 1994:248). The evidence of research coming from the US National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (Caputo 2009) highlights that the probability of 
activist and non-activist (mixed) voluntarism increases alongside with educational 
levels. Multinominal logistic regression is chosen to examine determinants of 
civic engagement activities. Wilson and Musick (1997) delivered a research based 
on two-waves of (1986 and 1989) data of Americans’ Changing Lives panel. They 
also confirm that education has a positive effect on helping others.
At the same time Smith (2006) revealed a very weak correlation between 
education and volunteerism in 2002 and 2004 data of the American General 
Social Survey (Smith 2006). Similarly, results of Van Ingen and Dekker (2011) 
indicate almost disappearing differences between voluntary participation of 
lower and higher educated people in the Netherlands.
It is generally accepted that volunteerism is more common among the 
economically active citizens. This fact is confirmed by the Eurobarometre 
(2010): based on a frequency table, three-fourths of helpers are employed, nearly 
half of them work in the public sector and more than one-third in business or 
the private sector.  Approximately, a fifth of the volunteers are homemakers 
or are unemployed. A recent study underlines that voluntary work has become 
more widespread among the economically inactive inhabitants (pensioners or 
homemakers) in the Netherlands (Van Ingen - Dekker 2011) from 1997 to 2005. 
Similarly, an American longitudinal data analysis (1978-1991) on young women’s 
cohort underlines that “…homemakers are more likely to volunteer than are full-
time workers, followed by part-time workers.” (Rotolo - Wilson 2007:487). Within 
the present research education and economic activity are also used as human 
capital indicators.
A positive relationship has been found by numerous researchers between 
income and helping others (Clary - Snyder 1991; Hayghe 1991; Hodgkinson 
- Weitzman 1992; Pearce 1993; Smith 1994). Poor people are three times less 
likely to be asked to volunteer than the wealthy people (Hodgkinson 1995; 
Wilson - Musick 1997). Reverse impact was also measured: based on a Canadian 
research data, volunteers earn 7% more than those who have never participated 
in such activity (Day - Devlin 1998). Smith (2006) found only a weak correlation 
between income and volunteerism. Education and income as indicators of human 
capital feature the so called dominant status of an individual which empowers 
69
formal and informal volu nteering in hu ngary
stakeholders for volunteer work (Smith 1994; Wilson - Musick 1997). The 
Hungarian questionnaire did not contain any data on personal or family income 
in 2004, thus instead of this, occupational group is used as the third human capital 
indicator in my research.
cultural capItal
In “volunteer” studies religiosity is the most frequently mentioned indicator of 
cultural capital. Taniguchi (2010) found out that religiosity was one of the most 
significant variables influencing voluntarism in the Japanese General Social 
Survey (2002). Various dimensions of religiosity are connoted with volunteering, 
e.g. individual belief, prayer, affiliation, church attendance. Impact of church 
attendance on volunteering increased by time (1975-2005) in the Netherlands, “...
churchgoers increase their volunteering for religious organizations on average.” 
(Van Ingen - Dekker 2011:682).  Wilson and Musick’s (1997) regression and 
correlation results revealed a significant relationship between church attendance, 
and both formal and informal volunteering. According to the research findings of 
US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (Caputo 2009), there is a significant 
relationship between religious participation and activist, non-activist (mixed), and 
exclusive voluntarism. Wilson and Musick (1997) indicate that prayer as a private 
form of religious practice has a negative effect on informal voluntary activity. In 
some concepts of helping, religious participation represents not cultural rather 
social capital (e.g. Paik - Navarre-Jackson 2011). Regarding religious values, 
Jendrisak et al. (2006) observed that kidney and liver segment living donors do 
not possess traditional religious values. Religious belief and theological thoughts 
seem not to be the best predictors for the quantity of voluntary work (Cnaan et al. 
1993). Nonetheless, religious behavior is considered to be a better predictor for 
volunteering (Wilson - Musick 1997), but there is no data on public religiosity 
in examined Hungarian data sets. Therefore, subjective religiosity is used as a 
cultural capital indicator within this study.
Ruiter and De Graaf‘s (2006) comparative research in 53 countries monitored 
both individual religiosity, national religious context and their interaction on 
volunteering. By their findings regular churchgoers do voluntary work more 
frequently. If only devout countries are observed, church attendance is hardly 
a relevant factor for volunteering, and there is only a slight difference between 
religious and secular people. They reported a spillover effect of religious 
voluntarism, “…implying that religious citizens also volunteer more for secular 
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organizations. This spillover effect is stronger for Catholics than for Protestants, 
non-Christians and nonreligious individuals.” (Ruiter - De Graaf 2006:191).
Parental patterns as a possible way of incorporated or embodied social 
capital [Bourdieu 2006 (1983)] may also contribute to volunteering. Fitzsimmons 
(1986) concludes that parents affect their children’s future voluntary activity 
differently. Whilst the father’s involvement has a positive impact, the mother’s 
participation has a negative effect on it. The analysis was conducted by multiple 
regression (N=424 baccalaureate graduates). Outcomes of Caputo (2009) expose 
that parental religious affiliation, fundamentalism and socialization influence 
American exclusive voluntarism. Besides, parental voluntarism and socialization 
have an impact on mixed (activist and non-activist) voluntary activities, parental 
devotion also affects activist voluntarism. In my research family tradition is used 
as one item of traditional motivation for volunteerism. 
Wilson and Musick (1997) apply the variable ‘how much the respondent values 
helping others’ to measure one aspect of social capital. Their results delineate 
that this value-oriented item has a positive effect on both formal and informal 
voluntary activity. In the Hungarian database a similar question is recorded, and 
involved into analysis: it is a moral obligation to help people in need (1993) or poor 
people (2004).
socIal capItal
Among others, Taniguchi (2010) underlines that social capital variables are 
stronger predictors of how much voluntary work is done than demographic 
or socioeconomic ones (Japanese General Social Survey 2002). One of the 
influencing variables, having a positive effect on voluntarism is the frequent 
face-to-face contact with friends; especially people, in contact with foreigners, 
volunteer more than those who do not exercise such activities. Likewise, Wilson 
and Musick (1997) also found that informal social interaction has a positive effect 
on both formal volunteering and informal helping. On the basis of the ‘contact 
frequency’ hypothesis (McPherson et al. 1992) people who interact more with 
friends and acquaintances, more probably become volunteers.
The number of children in the household is used as a familial social capital 
indicator in Coleman’s (1998) well-known study on the role of social capital in the 
creation of human capital. Smith (1994) found a positive relationship between the 
presence of children and volunteering. Wilson and Musick (1997) indicate that 
the number of children determinates the formal type voluntarism. Rotolo and 
Wilson state the following: “Mothers of school-age children are the most likely to 
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volunteer, followed by childless women and mothers of young children. Mothers 
of school-age children are even more likely to volunteer if they are homemakers, 
and mothers of pre-school children are even less likely to volunteer if they work 
full-time.” (Rotolo -Wilson 2007:191; American database on Young Women’s 
Cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey 1978-1991). The presence of children 
in a household is a key variable in the analysis of US National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (Caputo 2009) too: this variable affects the likelihood of all 
type of voluntary activities: exclusive activism, exclusive voluntarism and mixed 
motivation voluntarism.
In Paik and Navarre-Jackson’s model (2011) social and associational ties, 
religious involvement, and recruitment contacts represent diversity of social 
networks (US Giving and Volunteering Survey 1999). In their estimated model, 
recruitment is a significant factor of voluntarism. Recruitment itself is linked 
with social contact diversity, the number of organizational ties and religious 
participation. Concerning single variables: “Religious involvement is associated 
with higher probabilities of volunteering conditional on being asked, whereas 
social tie diversity and the number of associational ties increase volunteering 
among those not asked.” (Paik - Navarre-Jackson 2011:476).
Brown and Ferris (2007) select two measures of social capital – individuals’ 
associational networks and trust in others and in their community –  when 
analyzing US  Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey’s data (2000). They 
highlight that social capital explains the philanthropy of individuals very well. 
In addition, social capital decreases the direct influence of education (human 
capital) and religiosity (cultural capital) on giving and volunteering. From the 
measures listed above, the number of children in the household and organizational 
membership is incorporated into my analysis.
In Hungary there is a scarcity of casual models on voluntary work. Concerning 
descriptive statistics, average volunteers – no matter formal or informal – 
completed secondary education, and work as employed manual workers (human 
capital). They are privately religious, and agree with the principle that ‘it is a 
moral obligation to help people in need’ (cultural capital). They live in a childless 
household, and are not affiliated to any social organization (social capital). 
However, members of organizations help others more than those not belonging to 




Principal factors for volunteer motivations include rather altruistic and rather 
egoistic or instrumental driving forces (Smith 1981; Frisch - Gererd 1981; 
Gillespie - King 1985), however, the primacy of altruism is an observable fact. 
After creating and testing the Motivation to Volunteer Scale – composed of 28 
reasons –, Cnaan and Goldberg-Glen (1991) note that mixed motivations describe 
better human service agency volunteers than egoistic or altruistic ones (N=258). 
Two more meaningful scales have been introduced: Volunteer Functions Inventory 
(35 statements, 6 factors) (Clary et al. 1992) and Volunteer Motivation Inventory 
(40 statements, 8 factors) (McEwin and Jacobsen-D’Arcy 2002). The latter scale 
was improved and tested on large sample data by Esmond and Dunlop (2004), 
thus motivation dimensions increased to ten. The most important motivation 
elements of Australian volunteers would be: values, career development, personal 
growth, self-esteem and social interaction. The improved Volunteer Motivation 
Inventory was implemented into the Hungarian situation by Bartal and Kmetty 
(2010) (N=2319). According to previous research outcomes (Czakó et al. 1994; 
Czike - Kuti 2006), the authors conclude that Hungarian volunteerism is altruistic 
value-oriented. Moreover, organizational recognition, social interaction and 
environment factors appear to be influential. 
In case of Israeli National Service volunteers, primarily parents and friends 
affect decision making. This fact indicates the importance of strong and weak 
ties. The three strongest motivations are: altruism, environmental pressure and 
idealism (Sherer 2004) (N=40). Turkish community volunteers are also moved 
by altruism; furthermore, by affiliation and personal improvement (Boz - Palaz 
2007) (N=175). An American-Canadian comparative representative research 
(Hwang et al. 2005) differentiates collective and self-oriented causes. “Findings 
show that Americans are more likely than Canadians to mention altruistic rather 
than personal reasons for joining voluntary organizations, and Canadians are 
slightly more likely than Americans to emphasize personal reasons for their 
volunteer work, but this difference is not significant after controls.” (Hwang et 
al. 2005:387). Hustinx et al. (2010) compares 5794 students in six countries. They 
argue that while volunteering is a personal decision at individual level, it is partly 
influenced by macro-social factors too.
From the motivations cited above, altruistic values (good feeling of helping 
others), strong and weak ties, social interaction and community are labeled as old 
or traditional motivation. In addition, career development and personal growth 
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are implemented as new or modern variables in the present research (Czike - 
Bartal 2005; Czike, Kuti 2006).
rEsEarch quEstIons, hypothEsEs, mEthodology
In order to understand the research questions more deeply, at first data sources 
should be outlined. Empirical evidences of the study come from secondary analysis 
of two Hungarian representative surveys’ data conducted in 1994 and 2005. In 
1994 nearly 15 thousand adult respondents were interviewed on individual giving 
and volunteering. The 2005 data collection referred to a section of the Hungarian 
population aged above 14 years. This sample contained nearly 5 thousand people. 
The basis period of the questionnaire was the previous year in both cases: 1993 in 
the first and 2004 in the second wave.
Some researchers argue that formal and informal volunteering is strongly and 
positively correlated (Smith 1994; Gallagher 1994; Wilson - Musick 1997). The 
general question to answer within this paper is whether qualitative differences – 
in activity, composition, motivation – can be observed between Hungarian formal 
and informal volunteers or not. Using the word “qualitative” is reasonable because 
the proportion of formal and informal volunteers is more balanced in Northern and 
Western Europe than in Hungary and Central and Eastern European countries in 
general. For instance, whilst 10% (900 thousand people) of the population above 
14 years was registered as formal volunteer, the proportion of non-organizational 
volunteers reached 30% (2.6. million people) in Hungary in 2004 (Czike -Kuti 
2006:33-34.). This means that a quantitative inequity already exists between the 
two groups. The second comprehensive question would be the following: if such 
qualitative difference exists, which is the more up-to-date form contributing to 
community development and local development.
The first concrete research question would be that, (1A) Does the way of 
volunteerism (formal or informal) have an effect on frequency of activity? If 
yes, (1B) Is there any change by time? I expect that the form of helping does 
affect regularity: formal or organizational volunteers work more frequently than 
informal ones in both period of time (H1.a). Moreover, I assume that the role of 
organizations strengthens by time (H1.b). A dependent variable of this hypothesis 
is the frequency of helping, an independent variable is the formal and informal 
volunteering dummy. The dependent variable is actually measured on a 7 point 
ordinal scale (1: on a special occasion, 7: every day). The measurement level of this 
variable originally would not allow using linear regression, but this scale offers 
a possibility to “overestimate” it, and handle it as a numeric variable. In order 
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to compensate this statistically not perfectly correct procedure, I do introduce a 
dummy variable – where 0 represents ‘volunteers rarely’, and 1 means ‘volunteers 
frequently’ – thus besides linear regression logistic regression is applied as a 
complementary method. Formal volunteers’ stronger activity (H1.a) requires 
positive b1 coefficient and Exp(b) coefficient above 1 in hypothesis testing either 
in 1994 or 2004. The increasing role of organizations (H1.b) implies higher b1 and 
Exp(b) coefficients in 2004.
The second research question concerns the respondent’s social status and form 
of volunteering. Namely: (2) Which way of voluntary activity is chosen by those 
with higher social status? I suppose that high-status people prefer organizational 
helping (H2). Verification of this hypothesis would mean that formal volunteers 
are recruited from more prestigious members of the Hungarian society than 
the informal ones. Dependent variable of the second hypothesis is formal and 
informal volunteering dummy. 
Higher social status is conceptualized by human, cultural and social capital, 
each of them measured with a composite index. These independent variables 
are inspired by Wilson and Musick (1997). According to the Hungarian 
questionnaires’ features, there are three items indicating human capital, and four-
four variables referring to cultural and social capital. The second hypothesis is 
tested by the statistical method of logistic regression. If the hypothesis is verified, 
Exp(b) coefficients above 1 should be observed in both years.
The third research question is related to the motivation of volunteers: (3) Are 
there any differences in motivations of formal and informal helpers? I assume 
that formal volunteers are derived by modern or new motivators (H3.a), whereas 
informal volunteers are moved by traditional impulses (H3.b). Similarly to the 
second hypothesis, dependent variable would be the form of volunteering as a 
dichotom variable. Regarding explanatory variables, a good feeling of helping, 
family tradition, community, acquaintances, and gratitude specify old (Czike - 
Bartal 2005) or traditional (Czike - Kuti 2006) motivations. Goal achievement, 
useful leisure activity, experience, self-recognition, professional improvement, 
and new workplace are labeled as new or modern impulses (Czike - Kuti 2006). 
Motivations are measured on a 5 point Likert scale. In view of the fact that 
traditional and new motivations are not derived from multivariate statistical 
analysis, confirmatory factor analysis is used to oversee the relevance of these 
two types. Then the factors are involved into logistic regression as independent 
variables to explain informal and formal volunteerism. Only the 2004 database 
is involved into the analysis because it contains eighteen statements related to 
motivation. The 1993 questionnaire includes only nine such questions, but not all 
of them have their equivalent in 2004.
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If the expectations above are confirmed, we can state that formal volunteering 
is the more up-to-date form contributing to community development and local 
development.
maIn fIndIngs
First hypothesis on frequency of activity and form  
of volunteering
The first expectation’s zero hypothesis (H0) would be the following: formal or 
informal way of volunteerism has no effect on the frequency of activity. Observed 
significance level of t-quotient in both linear and logistic regression is under 5%, 
so that coincidence as an alternative explanation and H0, are rejected (Table 1). 
This low significance level attests that relationship between frequency and way 
of voluntary work is valid to the whole population. The first part of the hypothesis 
(H1.a) is confirmed either in 1993 or 2004: formal volunteers work more regularly 
than informal ones. At the same time the difference is not so large: in 1993 the 
estimated value of dependent variables is by 10%, in 2004 by 4% higher among 
formal volunteers in a linear regression model. The latter outcomes point out 
that the second part of first hypothesis (H1.b) is rejected: the intermediary role 
of organizations does not increase by time.3 The reason for this phenomenon 
could be that along with increasing publicity, prestige of volunteering, and 
strengthening of civil society in Hungary, people do not need organizations as 
intermediary tools to volunteer. This possible “explanation” is supported by the 
fact that in 2004 informal volunteers worked more intensively than eleven years 
before (b0=2.74 in 1993, b0=3.86 in 2004). A more persuasive answer requires 
further statistical analysis.
Table 1 H1: Results of linear and logistic regression on frequency and way of 
voluntary work in volunteer subsample in 1993 and 2004
Frequency of voluntary work








b1 Formal 0.14* 1.36**
Source: Database on donation and voluntary work 1994 (KSH) and 2005 (National 
Volunteer Centre, Non-profit Research Group Association), own calculation. 
p* <  0.05 < p** < 0.01 p*** < 0.001.
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Regarding frequency and the form of volunteerism, a logistic regression 
model proves similar results: the likelihood of regular voluntary work is a bit 
bigger among formal volunteers than among informal ones either in 1993 or 
2004. Thus, the first part of the first hypothesis (H1.a) is verified by a logistic 
regression model too. Since coefficients are not far from 1, meaning no effect, in 
this case, also, only a weak probability is observed. From another aspect, logistic 
regression coefficients contradict linear regression model results: the difference 
between informal and formal volunteers’ work intensity slightly strengthens by 
time. Transferring this into hypothesis testing, H1.b hypothesis is verified. Due to 
contradictory findings, H1.b cannot be convincingly confirmed.
second hypothesis on form of volunteering and human, 
cultural, social capitals
In the second hypothesis capital indices as independent variables are simple 
sums of item scores. Human capital index (HCI, 0-9) is represented by recoded 
education (0-2), economic activity (0-3) and occupation (0-4). The lowest score (0) 
goes to those who have a basic educational background, are dependants (students, 
homemakers) and – logically – do not work (Table 2). This group represents 
reference category in the analysis. Respondents completing higher education, 
being active workers and independents, get the highest score (9). The index 
elements are correlated with each other (correlation coefficients range between 
0.27-0.69). 
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Table 2 H2: composition and distribution of human capital index 
in volunteer subsample, in 1993 and 2004 
Human 
capital index








Low: primary school or less 0 29.4 24.4
Medium: vocational or secondary school 1 51.2 58.4




Dependant: student, homemaker 0 2.7 13.6
Unemployed 1 6.9 6.7
Pensioner, person on child-care leave 2 35.3 31.5
Employed 3 55.1 48.2
HC3 
Occupation
Does not work 0 44.4 51.8
Employed manual worker 1 22.3 20.8
Employed non-manual worker, no diploma 2 12.0 11.1
Employed non-manual worker with 
diploma
3 15.7 8.9
Runs his/her own business 4 5.6 7.4
Source: Database on donation and voluntary work 1994 (KSH) and 2005 (National 
Volunteer Centre, Non-profit Research Group Association), own calculation. 
Human capital index is derived from a simple sum of items above: 
HCI=HC1+HC2+HC3.
The cultural capital index (CCI, 0-7) is composed of cultural events as 
information sources about social organizations (cultural information source, 0-1), 
sharing of the opinion that ‘it is a moral obligation to help people in need’ (0-
3), subjective religiosity (0-2), and religious events as information sources about 
social organizations (religious information channel, 0-1) (Table 3). The reference 
group of cultural capital is represented by those rejecting cultural and religious 
events as an information channel, not agreeing with the principle of helping the 
poor as a moral obligation, and not being religious. Respondents sharing the 
opposite opinions, belong to the fraction having 7 points. Not surprisingly, the 
highest correlation (0.4) between subjective religiosity and religious event as an 
information source is measured.
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Table 3 H2: composition and distribution of cultural capital index 
in volunteer subsample, in 1993 and 2004 
Cultural capital 
index









No 0 82.3 85.3
Yes 1 17.7 14.7
CC 2
It is a moral 
obligation to help 
people in need.
Does not agree (1-3) 0 2.1 18.8
Partly agrees, partly disagrees (4-6) 1 30.6 25.4
Rather agrees (7-9) 2 41.7 26.4
Absolutely agrees (10) 3 25.6 29.3
CC 3 
Subjective religiosity
Non-religious 0 27.6 28.4
Privately religious 1 39.9 49.3




No 0 72.6 77.8
Yes 1 27.4 22.2
Source: Database on donation and voluntary work 1994 (KSH) and 2005 (National 
Volunteer Centre, Non-profit Research Group Association), own calculation. 
Cultural capital index is derived from a simple sum of items above: 
CCI=CC1+CC2+CC3+CC4. 
The social capital index (SCI 0-6) contains the number of children in the 
household (0-2), organizational membership (0-1), interpersonal relations as 
information sources about social organizations (0-1), and acquaintances as 
motivators to volunteer (0-2). All who have no children, do not affiliate to any 
organization, are not informed by their personal relations, and are not motivated 
by acquaintances, get 0. The highest score goes to respondents having two or 
more children, belonging to an organization, motivated by acquaintances, and 
using personal connections to get informed. Social capital index constituents are 
the most independent ones, no substantial correlation is observed between them.
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Table 4 H2: composition and distribution of social capital index 
in volunteer subsample in 1993 and 2004 







Number of children in the 
household
0 0 47.8 45.7
1 1 22.9 25.3
2 or more 2 29.3 29.0
SC 2
Organizational membership
No 0 62.2 71.7
Yes 1 37.8 28.3
SC3 Interpersonal relations 
as information sources
No 0 57.3 52.3
Yes 1 42.7 47.7
SC4 
Acquaintances as motivators 
to volunteer
Does not agree (1-2) 0 63.4 47.1
Partly agrees, partly 
disagrees (3)
1 12.2 20.9
Agrees (4-5) 2 24.5 31.9
Source: Database on donation and voluntary work 1994 (KSH) and 2005 (National 
Volunteer Centre, Non-profit Research Group Association), own calculation. 
Social capital index is derived from a simple sum of items above: 
SCI=SC1+SC2+SC3+SC4. 
In order to examine the separate effect of index elements – e.g. education, 
occupation, religiosity or number of children – on formal or informal volunteering, 
all of them are also involved into analysis. Index dummies seemed to be rational 
to introduce because increasing scores in one item are sometimes accompanied 
by rising scores in one or more items. This is particularly true in case of human 
capital: higher levels of education means probably higher levels in economic 
activity and/or occupation group. 0 stands for small amount of capital, whilst 1 
replaces a big amount of capital. Dummy recoding is determined by mean and 
standard deviation of every single capital index. Values ranging from 0 to 4 in 
case of human capital, and scores between 0-2 in cases of cultural and social 
capital are defined as low level capital. Respondents possessing more scores 
belong to high level capital holders.
Zero hypothesis (H0) of the analysis would mean that human, cultural and 
social capitals do not affect the probability of formal or informal volunteering. 
If capital indices – no matter dummy or not – are taken into account, H0 is 
rejected: these three forms of capitals have a significant positive effect on the way 
of volunteerism (Table 5). We can conclude that the more capital a respondent 
has, the higher probability of formal volunteerism exists either in 1993 or 2004. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is verified in case of capital indices. The highest 
impact belongs to social capital index dummy in 2004: big amount of social capital 
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(SC dummy=1) represents 2.5 times higher probability of formal volunteerism. In 
1993 social capital’s effect was weaker, cultural capital’s one was stronger than 
eleven years later. In 1993 odds of becoming a formal volunteer is more than two 
times larger among those who own “much” (CC dummy=1) cultural capital. The 
role of personal networks rises by time, whereas cultural capital slightly loses 
its importance. Human capital has only a weak positive effect on the form of 
voluntary work, and no considerable change is observed between the two periods 
of time.
Table 5 H2: results of logistic regression on form of volunteering and capitals in 
volunteer subsample in 1993 and 2004 
informal and formal 
volunteering 0-1
Logistic regression, Exp(B)
1993 N=3799 2004, N=1379
Human capital (Hc) index 0-9 1.04** 1.08***
Human capital index 0-1 1.20** 1.23*
    HC1 Education 0-2 (1.08
0.11) 1.42***
    HC2 Economic activity 0-3 (1.09
0.07) 1.15***
    HC3 Occupation 0-4 1.08** 1.12**
HC1 + HC2 + HC3 at max. 5% sign. level 1.08 3.69
cultural capital (cc) index 0-7 1.38*** 1.31***
cultural capital index 0-1 2.14*** 1.80***
    CC1 Cultural information source 0-1 2.37*** 5.45***
    CC2 Moral obligation to help people in need 0-3 (1.07
0.12) (1.080.21)
    CC3 Subjective religiosity 0-2 1.63*** 1.60***
    CC4 Church as information channel 0-1 2.78*** 4.06***
CC1 + CC2 + CC3 + CC4 at max. 5% sign. level 6.78 10.03
social capital (sc) index 0-6 1.29*** 1.45***
social capital index 0-1 1.93*** 2.48***
    SC1 Number of children in the household 0-2 1.19*** 1.19**
    SC2 Organizational membership 0-1 1.87*** 3.62***
    SC3 Interpersonal relations as information sources 
0-2 
1.22*** 1.42***
    SC4 Acquaintances as motivators to volunteer 0-1 1.47*** 1.78***
SC1 + SC2 + SC3 + SC4 5.75 8.01
Source: Database on donation and voluntary work 1994 (KSH) and 2005 (National 
Volunteer Centre, Non-profit Research Group Association), own calculation. 
p* < 0,05, p** < 0,01, p*** < 0,001. Values in brackets represent insignificant 
coefficients. Their upper indices show the significance level of the given variable.
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Shifting to the index components, no significant effect can be proved in case 
of education and economic activity (human capital) in 1993, and obligation of 
helping poor people (cultural capital) in 1993 and 2004. Education’s insignificant 
impact in 1993 supports Smith (2006) findings on 2002 and 2004 data of American 
General Social Survey, and partly confirms Van Ingen and Dekker’s conclusions 
(2011)4. Insignificant outcomes on economic activity in 1993 contradict previous 
expectations (Van Ingen - Dekker 2011; Rotolo - Wilson 2007). As we can see, 
human capital components delineate weak or insignificant probabilities. From 
this fact we understand more human capital index’s low effect. An additional 
explanation could be that comparing the elements of the three different capitals, 
human capital indicators are the most unchangeable, objective or tough ones.
The sum of significant coefficients5 (6.78) outlines that still cultural capital 
has the strongest effect in 1993. From separate index constituents, religious 
information source (Exp(B)=2.78) is the most influential item, not only within 
cultural capital but among other capitals too. Although this item does not describe 
religious practice very well, no better indicator is found in the questionnaires. 
Thus, to some degree we can state that religious behavior’s anticipated positive 
effect is affirmed (Musick 1997; Caputo 2009; Paik - Navarre-Jackson 2011). 
The religious information channel variable is followed by cultural information 
sources about social organizations (Exp(B)=2.37). The effect of subjective 
religiosity is the weakest one among significant cultural capital variables in 1993 
and 2004. Based on Cnaan et al. (1993) and Wilson and Musick’s (1997) findings, 
we expected the same results. The altruistic value-oriented variable does not 
show a significant effect either in 1993 or 2004. This finding contradicts Wilson 
and Musick’s (1997) outcomes who indicate a positive effect of valuing help on 
both formal and informal voluntary activity.
After religious and cultural events the third important variable in 1993 
was the membership in an organization (Exp(B)=1.87) as a social capital item. 
Organizational affiliation was assumed to be a reasonable item strengthening 
volunteering (Czakó et al. 1994; Czike - Kuti 2006). These three leading factors’ 
weight is even larger eleven years later. Contradicting capital index outcomes, 
not social, but cultural capital’s impact is the highest in 2004 (sum of significant 
coefficients=10.03). The primacy of cultural capital is probably due to two pulling 
items, namely cultural (Exp(B)=5.45) and religious (Exp(B)=4.06) information 
sources. Another dominant variable, strengthening social capital would be 
organizational membership (Exp(B)=3.62) in 2004. In comparison with other 
social capital components, in this variable considerable growth is measured by 
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time. This fact is particularly noticeable because organizational membership has 
been lower among volunteers than eleven years before (Table 4).
All in all, since human, cultural and social capitals are defined by the capital 
indices and they have a significant positive effect on probability of formal 
volunteering, the second hypothesis is confirmed. If capital components are taken 
into consideration, four insignificant coefficients are measured.
third hypothesis on form of volunteering and motivations
In the third hypothesis confidence of Likert-scale is measured with Cronbach 
alpha. Its result above 0.8 attests good confidence of the scale. Originally all eleven 
items –  supposed to be traditional and new – were involved into confirmatory 
factor analysis. Four variables had to be excluded because they belonged to both 
factors or had low extracted communalities. Finally seven variables remained in 
the factor structure satisfying all criteria.
According to expectations (Czike - Bartal 2005; Czike - Kuti 2006), factor 
analysis6 indicates that the importance of self-recognition, experience, professional 
challenges, community and personal connections, and useful leisure activity 
are labeled as new or modern impulses. Community and personal connections 
originally were expected to belong to traditional motivation. I consider that 
this new classification is also acceptable because making friends or joining a 
community, and “using” them as personal resources, play a crucial role, not only 
in a traditional but in a modern person’s life too.
Table 6 H3: results of linear regression on form of volunteering and motivation in 
volunteer subsample in 2004 







Source: Database on donation and voluntary work 2005 (National Volunteer 
Centre, Non-profit Research Group Association), own calculation.
All other new motivations are rather instrumental and related to gaining 
knowledge, experience and personal improvement. Standard deviation of this 
factor equals 0.91 which predicts satisfactory fit of the model. Skewness is 
0.47 which means a relatively balanced distribution. Only two items belong 
to traditional motivation: the altruistic impulse, such as the good feeling of 
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helping others, and family tradition. This altruistic motive is the most popular 
one among all volunteer respondents. Except for these, joining a community, 
getting acquaintances, and gratitude were supposed to belong to the traditional 
group. Goodness of fit in this factor is worse (0.78) than what we saw in the 
case of new motivation. This outcome is responsible for the weak fit of the entire 
model as well. The traditional factor’s skewness is quite high (-1.59), the negative 
sign means that a majority of respondents agree with the questions representing 
traditional items. As Table 6 illustrates the first part of the third hypothesis (H3.a) 
is confirmed: the likelihood of organizational volunteering is significantly and 2.7 
times higher among new motivation holders. No significant relationship is found 
between traditional motivation and non-organizational volunteering: the second 
part of the third hypothesis (H3.b) is refused. Not only the effect of independent 
variables is insignificant, but the entire informal model too. However, the good 
feeling of helping others (Czakó et al. 1994; Czike - Kuti 2006; Sherer 2004; Boz 
- Palaz 2007) and parental pattern (Fitzsimmons 1986, Caputo 2009 on father’s 
volunteering) seem to be influential variables on volunteering, they do not affect 
the probability of non-organizational helping together.
conclusIon
The main findings of the research are the following. In the first hypothesis 
volunteerism has a significantly positive effect on the frequency of work in both 
linear and logistic regression models. So the regularity part of the first expectation 
is verified: formal volunteers work more often than informal ones. Regarding 
the expanding role of organizations, results are ambiguous, as no convincing 
evidence is produced to accept hypothesis verification.
According to the results of logistic regression in the second hypothesis, odds 
of formal volunteering as a dependent variable significantly increases alongside 
with human, cultural and social capital index scores. Consequently, the second 
hypothesis is confirmed. It is the cultural capital which has the strongest positive 
effect on the probability of formal volunteering. Outcomes of logistic regression 
in the third hypothesis point out that according to expectations, the likelihood of 
organizational volunteering is significantly higher among those respondents who 
vote for new motivations. Regarding informal helping and old motivations, there 
is no significant relationship between these two. This underlines that the first part 
of the third hypothesis is confirmed whilst the second one is rejected.
Summing up the findings, data analysis has confirmed that the group of 
formal and informal volunteers is significantly different in at least three fields, 
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such as frequency of activity, prestige and motivations of participants. The main 
consequence of the study would be that within this present research framework, 
organizational volunteerism is a more modern and effective tool of community 
participation and local development for three reasons. First, it fosters better 
regularity of the activity. Second, organizations as intermediary tools to volunteer 
are chosen exactly by those with higher social status. Third, formal volunteers are 
moved by new or instrumental motivations which could activate masses of people 
not only in 2004 but in present times too.
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well. Standard error of regression coefficients is even smaller (1993: 0.035 
and 0.054; 2004: 0.033 and 0.063). Adjusted coefficient of determination 
(adjusted R2) is unfortunately low in both cases (1993: 0.7%, 2004: 0.2%) 
such as explanatory force of independent variable is quite modest. This shows 
that informal or formal way of volunteerism by itself is not able to predict 
frequency of activity. In further analysis other explanatory variables need to 
be involved.
4 Present and previous research outcomes only partly can be compared in the 
sense that numerous results featured before concern voluntary activity itself, 
not formal or informal type of it. Thus, comparison of research findings 
should be handled with this limitation.
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5 Sum of Exp(B) coefficients is not really correct statistically; it is used only to 
illustrate weight of  indexes, summing up its elements.
6 Extraction method of the analysis is maximum likelihood; rotation method is 
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization (Kaiser 1958). Total variance explained 
exceeds 49%. Results of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO=0,823) and Bartlett-
test (Sign=0,000) point out that there is a latent structure behind the set of 
variables and the items are not independent. Unfortunately, goodness-of-fit 
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0. This means that factors do not replace the original variables in an adequate 
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factors; running explorative factor analysis on eighteen traditional, modern 
and neutral motivation items. Within this short paper there is no opportunity 
to continue the analysis.
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Big Bang LocaLism and gypsies  
and TraveLLers
IntroductIon
Gypsies originally descended from India and arrived in the UK in the fifteenth 
century (Fraser, 1995). In the UK they prefer to be termed Gypsies, Romany 
Gypsies or Romanichel. Irish Travellers, like Gypsies, are classified as an 
ethnic group and have travelled and resided in the UK for centuries (Ryder and 
Greenfields, 2010). New Travellers are not an ethnic group but have taken up 
travelling traditions (Clark and Greenfields, 2006). The provision of Gypsy and 
Traveller sites (pitches where Gypsies and Travellers can station their caravans) is 
a major social policy challenge in the UK, which to date successive governments 
have failed to remedy.
One fifth of the caravan dwelling Gypsy and Traveller population in the 
UK do not have an authorized place to live, instead occupying unauthorized 
developments or encampments (Cemlyn et al, 2010). It has been estimated 
that only one square mile of land is needed to address the present shortfall of 
approximately 5000 pitches (EHRC, 2009). However, despite the relative small 
scale of the problem it has proven to be one of the biggest challenges facing local 
and national politicians, where a lack of political will in the face of localized 
opposition to site development has often stalled progress. This paper draws 
the conclusion that the localist policies being advocated by the UK Coalition 
Government hold the potential to exacerbate existing shortages and further 
strain community relations. To emphasize these dangers it is worth considering a 
statement by the Gypsy Council which gives an insight into what it describes as 
the “dark side of localism“:
“Whenever proposals come up local residents and parish councils object 
vociferously. The levels of abuse and objection to development for our people 
are hard to understand but almost universal. Language and attitudes that 
have been unacceptable since the 1970s to black people, Jews and gays are 
commonplace in regard to Travellers, particularly when it is proposed that they 
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should live within a community. This is why the planning system is at the heart 
of the inequalities from which Travellers suffer. Councillors are put under huge 
local political pressures to oppose sites “(The Gypsy Council, 2010).
The paper will explore how the planning system has impacted on Gypsies and 
Travellers and is partly based upon evidence and conclusions made by the Panel 
Review of Coalition Government Policy on Gypsies and Travellers. The Panel 
Review was organized by the Travellers Aid Trust and was funded by the Joseph 
Rowntree Charitable Trust. The author of this paper acted as the lead researcher 
to the Panel Review, where a panel of politicians from the main parties together 
with academic experts took evidence in the UK parliament over a two day period 
from a range of participants including:
•	 Gypsies and Travellers 
•	 Local authorities and Parish Councils
•	 Service providers
•	 The police
The Panel Review adopted a deliberative approach by including a wide range 
of stakeholders, who have not always agreed or held common positions on this 
issue, in the hope of finding consensus and common agreement. It was hoped 
that the formation of a consensus might facilitate influence on the outcome of 
the Localism Bill progressing through parliament through the Panel Review 
report ’A Big or Divided Society?’. A large number of the participants welcomed 
the extension of local democracy but expressed the view that for a sensitive and 
controversial issue like Traveller site provision that a form of central duty is 
needed to overcome local opposition. This paper sets out that case.
the context
Following the 2010 election and the emergence of a hung parliament the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats formed a Coalition Government. A joint 
plan of governmental policy and action was set out in the document (The Coalition: 
our program for government, 2010). Of relevance to the planning framework and 
Gypsies and Travellers, the report states:
“The Government believes that it is time for a fundamental shift of power from 
Westminster to people. We will promote decentralisation and democratic 
engagement, and we will end the era of top-down government by giving new 
powers to local councils, communities, neighbourhoods and individuals” 
(Cabinet Office, 2010, 11).
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In July 2010, Eric Pickles, the Secretary of State at the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (CLG), announced that he was using his 
power under section 79(6) of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and 
Construction Act 2009 to revoke Regional Strategies in order “to put greater 
power in the hands of local people rather than regional bodies“ (Ryder et al, 
2011). Traveller sites as well as housing had formed part of the Regional Strategy 
targets; the abolition of these could thus have a major impact on site provision.
BIg Bang LocaLIsm and Before
There are differing interpretations of what ’localism’ is but one adherent of 
localism has described the brand as espoused by a section of Conservatives as ’big 
bang localism’ (Jenkins, 2004). A dogma of radical decentralization which some 
would argue has permeated the Coalition Government. As will be evidenced, the 
Coalition’s localist policies could have a profound effect on Gypsy and Traveller 
site provision and race relations. However, localism is not a new phenomenon; it 
is a policy which has been applied to Gypsy and Traveller site provision in the 
past and has alternated with more centralized measures which could be described 
as ’statist’.
Figure One – Localist and Statist Approaches to Gypsies and Travellers
A purely localist approach existed prior to 1968 as no central policy existed 
on site provision apart from measures which placed greater restrictions on 
where Gypsies and Travellers could reside and locate sites. Thus it was very 
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much up to local authorities whether they chose to help support Traveller site 
development, and many chose not to (Hawes and Perez, 1996). Consequently, 
there was a growing shortage of sites and stopping places leading to an increasing 
number of unauthorized encampments and a corresponding strain in relations 
between Gypsies and Travellers and the settled communities in housing. The 
Labour MP Norman Dodds had argued for some form of central directive on site 
provision since the 1950s but had largely been ignored but by the late 1960s the 
Labour Government concluded that such a measure combined with enforcement 
measures might be the solution to growing community tensions (Acton, 1974). 
The Government indicated to the Liberal MP Eric Lubbock that it would support 
his proposal for such a duty which he hoped to steer through parliament as a 
private members’ bill. The resulting piece of legislation (the1968 Caravan Sites 
Act) placed a duty on certain local authorities to provide sites and by the date 
of its abolition in 1994 had created a network of 350 sites which were largely 
council-owned and managed and on which residents paid rents (Richardson and 
Ryder, 2009). 
One of the factors that contributed to this expansion of site provision was that 
there was political consensus in the 1970s and 80s on the need for a statutory duty 
on councils to provide sites which meant there was governmental consistency 
which ensured the policy was not derailed through rapid policy changes every 
time there was a change of government. Although the Act had created a relatively 
large number of sites, in fact many more than later measures were to deliver, 
the Act contained some of the traits of an over centralized statist policy in the 
sense that it took little account of the aspirations of Gypsies and Travellers and 
how and where they wanted to live. Sites often occupied marginal space, being 
located near canals, rail lines, busy roads, industrial areas and even municipal 
rubbish dumps, in spaces where Gypsy and Traveller settlements were unlikely 
to provoke opposition from the settled community (Clark and Greenfields, 2006). 
Furthermore, sites were governed by what residents deemed to be authoritarian 
management regimes where they did not enjoy the same rights concerning tenure 
as other residents of social housing, which led to some Gypsies and Travellers 
referring to these sites as ’reservations’ (Johnson et al, 2010).
In 1994 the duty to provide sites was abolished and in its place Department 
of the Environment Circular 1/94 was introduced in which local authorities were 
encouraged, but not obliged, to assist Gypsies and Travellers to develop sites and 
endorsed the private provision of sites by Gypsies and Travellers themselves. 
However in this very localist approach many councils chose not to support 
planned site provision and the number of unauthorized encampments continued 
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to grow as did tensions in community relations. The Labour Government 
concluded that Circular 1/94 was not addressing the growing shortage of Gypsy 
and Traveller sites. In 2003 the Labour Government initiated a policy review on 
Gypsy and Traveller site provision which culminated in the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister (ODPM) Circular 1/2006. This placed an obligation on local 
authorities to carry out a Gypsy Traveller Accommodation Needs Assessment 
(GTAA) which would identify the need for sites and feed into regional targets set 
by Regional Spatial Strategies (now known as Regional Strategies following the 
Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009). Where 
local authorities failed in their new responsibilities, the Secretary of State had 
powers of direction to make councils identify land for site development if they 
had failed to do so by the deadline set of 2011. Although containing a central 
and statist obligation to provide sites, this only came into action where at a local 
and regional level councils had failed to identify land for the requisite number 
of pitches allocated to them through the benchmarking of local assessments and 
allocation of a target (which sometimes involved an element of redistribution) 
by regional assemblies (Ryder et al, 2011). Hence, the policy could be described 
as a hybrid of local, regional and centralized approaches which placed a strong 
emphasis on consultation and which accorded Gypsies and Travellers (unlike the 
1968 Act) some say as to the location and design of sites (CLG, 2007). 
In the two years prior to the introduction of Circular 01/2006, 68% of appeals 
relating to Gypsy and Traveller sites were dismissed. In the following two years, 
65% of appeals were granted planning permission (CLG, 2009, 4). Despite some 
modest progress it has been estimated that at that rate of pitch provision it would 
take local authorities 18 years to meet the targets specified in relation to permanent 
pitch requirements set for a 5 year period (Brown and Niner, 2009). The secretary 
of State, Eric Pickles, has seized upon this fact as a sign that the policy was failing 
(CLG, 6th July 2010). However, it should be noted that the success of the policy 
was skewed by the approaching general election; with some councils aware that if 
the Conservatives won then the policy would be scrapped, it appears they decided 
to drag their feet on site delivery (Richardson and Ryder, 2009). In fact, Pickles 
whilst in opposition had encouraged such a process by calling upon Conservative 
Councils not to comply with New Labour Government directives which fell under 
his categorization of “nanny state, politically correct or vanity projects.” (The 
Guardian, 2nd July, 2009). 
Pickles also argued that the policy created perceptions of ‘unfairness’ by 
the general public concerning the outcomes of planning cases by Gypsies and 
Travellers. A CLG press release (13th April, 2011) said: “... the old planning rules 
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created a perception of special treatment for some groups, undermining the notion 
of fair play in the planning system and further harming community cohesion.” 
However, research by Panel Review member Dr Jo Richardson into planning 
appeals before and after the introduction of Circular 1/2006 has noted that the 
percentage of cases allowed prior to Circular 1/2006 was 40%, rising to a peak of 
70% during the established phase of implementation of Circular 1/2006) but that 
there has been a reduction in the number of appeals allowed since the Secretary 
of State’s announcement on the replacement of the Circular and the revocation of 
RSs (Richardson, 2011, 8). Richardson notes that there was a perception prior to 
Circular 1/2006 that Gypsies and Travellers were disadvantaged in the planning 
system and that, proportionately, more applications for Traveller sites were 
refused than there were refusals for bricks and mortar planning applications in 
the wider community. There was hope that Circular 1/2006 would redress the 
balance and give a more even footing to applications for sites (Richardson, 2011, 
8). In this sense Circular 1/2006 can be seen as a tool which levelled inequality 
in the planning system rather than one that created ‘unfairness’ and one which 
acted as a tool of ’positive action’ which has generally been accepted by the main 
political parties and the European Union as a legitimate tool to address inequality 
(European Union, 2009). It is of concern though that the new planning statement 
is being driven by what are, in fact, unfounded perceptions of unfairness. Previous 
research has demonstrated that clear and informed public perceptions together 
with firm and fair leadership and reporting are key factors in ensuring support 
for site delivery (Richardson, 2006; 2007). The real test of the regional strategies 
propounded by Labour would have come into play in 2011 when councils were due 
to reach the deadline set for identifying land and at which point the government 
could have intervened, but as has been noted, the policy was repealed before the 
deadline was reached.
The Localism Bill which at the time of writing is progressing through parliament 
is expected to become law in the later part of 2011. The policy will abolish 
Regional Strategies and targets for homes (including housing and Traveller sites) 
and give parish councils (council bodies based on small geographic areas such as 
villages) and neighbourhood forums a greater say in the planning process. Local 
communities will also be given the power to trigger local referenda on issues and 
decisions by councils that they are concerned about. The fear has been expressed 
that these powers could present a ’nimby’ (not in my back yard) charter which 
will frustrate and block developments which do not meet with popular support, 
Gypsy and Traveller site provision is likely to be prominent amongst projects that 
will attract strong opposition in which opponents can take advantage of localist 
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measures to frustrate such development (Ryder et al, 2011). Although local 
authorities are being encouraged to continue to assess local Gypsy and Traveller 
needs, that process is not to be prescriptive and unlike the previous policy will 
not contain benchmarking by regional assemblies to correct assessments which 
have under-estimated need. Steve Staines of the Traveller Law Reform Project 
reported to the Panel Review that a survey of 34 councils (excluding London) 
indicated a pitch loss of 360 when compared to the targets that had previously 
been set by Regional Assemblies. Where councils were proceeding with some 
site development it was overwhelmingly based on figures established by their 
own Gypsy and Traveller Accommodation Needs Assessments (GTAA) which 
in many cases identified lower levels of need than that set by regional assemblies 
(Ryder et al, 2011). Furthermore where councils do not achieve the targets which 
they can set for themselves, under a localist agenda there will be no prospect of 
government intervention. 
A number of participants in the Panel Review felt that site provision as with 
affordable housing had come to a virtual standstill. Sections of the building industry 
have already expressed concern at this situation. At the CLG Select Committee 
inquiry into the abolition of Regional Strategies, David Orr, chief executive of 
the National Housing Federation (which represents housing associations) said the 
decision to get rid of the targets was “a hasty and damaging move, which has 
already seen plans for over 180,000 homes scrapped” (BBC News, 10, 11, 2010). 
This could be attributed to the lack of detailed policy proposals in the present 
policy vacuum whilst the new planning circular is being developed and legislation 
passed through parliament. However, the reluctance of many councils to act on 
the issue of site provision is a key factor in development coming to a standstill. 
In a survey of the East, South East and South West of England, the Irish Traveller 
Movement in Britain (ITMB) found a significant drop in planned site provision 
when compared to targets set under the previous regional strategy.
The ITMB study focused on three regions in England and had returns from 
100 of the 152 local authorities (66%). The response rate varied: 91% in the East 
of England, 68% in the South West and 47% in the South East. The now abolished 
Regional Strategies had allocated pitch targets to every local authority; the study 
found that 63 (63%) of the 100 local authorities who responded had targets for 
additional residential pitches, while 37 (37%) did not. 74% of East of England 
councils had residential pitch targets, 80% in the South West, but only 34% in 
the South East. This constitutes a drop of 52 per cent in councils’ targets for 
additional residential pitches from the 2,919 that had been identified as needed 
under the previous policy. Only one (1%) of the authorities contacted saw the 
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Localism and Decentralization Bill as likely to make planning for Gypsies and 
Travellers easier while 40 (40%) expected it to make it more difficult. 13 (13%) 
thought it would make no difference, 25 (25%) weren’t sure and 15 (15%) said they 
weren’t sure but made comments indicating it would be more difficult. 40% of 
respondents expressed concerns about increased local opposition to development 
for Travellers under the localist planning regime (ITMB, 2011).
The Coalition Government believes that the New Homes Bonus once 
introduced will reward local authorities that deliver housing as well as public and 
private Traveller sites. Councils will receive council tax matching funding for six 
years. New local authority pitches will attract additional money in the same way 
as affordable housing. Rather than meeting targets, the Government argues that 
local authorities will instead have real incentives to provide Traveller sites and 
communities will see the benefits of development (Ryder et al, 2011). However, 
there is a strong fear that this plan to incentivize construction will not overcome 
what will be intense opposition to site construction (Ryder et al, 2011). Roy 
Donson, Regional Planning & Strategic Land Director, Barratt Developments Plc 
has said of the New Homes Bonus:
“That is a completely novel approach, and we cannot put our hands on 
our hearts and be certain it works. I am absolutely certain in my own mind 
that Ministers are sincere about their desire for more housing and that they 
believe the New Homes Bonus-type structure will work, but it is quite a high-
risk strategy because nothing like that has ever been tried before. I think 
there must be a plan B, and probably that plan is that if the New Homes 
Bonus as currently outlined - we do not have much detail on it at the moment-
does not do the trick something must be added to it to make it work and we 
must keep at it until it does“(CLG uncorrected oral evidence, 8th November, 
2010). 
An in depth analysis of how a localist agenda failed to deliver sufficient new 
sites in 1994 may give important indications as to why the Coalition Government’s 
localist policies may inevitably fail.
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LocaLIsm In focus
Figure Two – How Commonly Held Beliefs stalled Site Provision  
Post Circular 1/94 and Contributed to Community Tensions
every one Lost
         sites were in inappropriate places   
High cost of enforcement 
community relations strained
During the late 1980s and early 1990s a public furore developed over a group 
known as New Travellers, a non ethnic group which took up a nomadic lifestyle 
which grew out of the festival movement (Clark and Greenfields, 2006). This led 
to a public furore, often fuelled by an intemperate media, in which New Travellers 
became ’folk devils’ (Richardson, 2006). This resentment crystallized into the 
decision by the Conservative Government of John Major to restrict unauthorized 
(i.e. roadside) encampments in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 
1994 but also to repeal the duty on local authorities to provide sites and in effect 
privatize site provision through Planning Circular 1/94 (See above). Action which 
much to the chagrin of ethnic Gypsies and Travellers fell upon the entirety of the 
Gypsy and Traveller community (Hawes and Perez, 1996).
In order to reveal the pitfalls of a localist approach in terms of increasing site 
provision and contributing to community cohesion the paper will look in depth 
at the localism policy which was introduced through Planning Circular 1/94. 
The lack of compulsion meant few local authorities initiated serious measures 
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to provide sites. Instead, prejudice and fears, mainly articulated through public 
opposition, made many councils reluctant to help (Richardson, 2007). Councillors 
were often fearful that support for sites would lead to local electorates punishing 
them at the ballot box; those who were to some degree sympathetic bemoaned 
the fact that they were not being compelled to act by a statutory duty as this 
enabled them to direct the blame at central government and declare they had no 
choice. Another impediment to local authorities being proactive in increasing site 
provision was the fear of the ’honeypot’ effect, a belief that if they acted and 
neighbouring local authorities did not then their authority would attract larger 
numbers of Gypsies and Travellers who would become an accommodation and 
service ’burden’ (ODPM, 2004). Clearly such fears are more pronounced under 
a localist planning regime as opposed to one where all authorities are compelled 
to act in unison.
In rare cases where councils did act or where Travellers decided to initiate an 
unauthorized development (going outside of the planning system by moving onto 
land and then submitting a retrospective planning application) opposition could 
be vociferous. Local residents’ would invariably form action groups and large 
public meetings would be held – one such meeting in Crawley attracted 1000 
opponents (Richardson and Ryder, 2009). The language and behaviour of such 
campaigning was highly derogatory and in some cases statements made by the 
public impinged race relations codes and left a spirit of disharmony and ill will 
to Gypsies and Travellers which percolated into every aspect of local community 
life, including schools, and left a legacy of mutual fear and mistrust which lasted 
for years (Richardson, 2007).
The localist policy of Planning Circular 1/94 left many Gypsies and Travellers 
feeling that the planning system and local authorities were set against them. The 
growing shortage of local authority sites following the repeal of the duty, combined 
with a lack of support from local authorities and trust in them to be fair inevitably 
led to stark choices for many Gypsies and Travellers. They could either live on the 
side of the road and be subject to a constant cycle of eviction which was facilitated 
by new enforcement powers in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, 
or move into housing and face the risk of assimilation (Ryder and Greenfields, 
2010). A third choice was to buy land and move on to it and over a period of a 
few days develop a site and then retrospectively hand in a planning application 
to the local authority (Richardson 2007). However, such a path was fraught with 
difficulty. To gain permission to reside on their land Gypsy and Traveller families 
would need to defend their application in quasi legal planning hearings and even 
high court actions, while often these applications were bitterly resisted by local 
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authorities and residents. For a minority group often characterized by low levels 
of formal education such litigation was often highly traumatic to families and 
also costly, running up large legal bills and being a distraction from economic 
activities (Ryder and Greenfields, 2010). 
For some Gypsies and Travellers their gamble with the planning system 
ultimately failed and in some cases led to the forcible eviction and demolition of 
Gypsy and Traveller sites by private bailiff firms contracted by local authorities, 
scenes which received scant media attention but which were highly emotive 
for Gypsies and Travellers. The UK Association of Gypsy Women (2009) 
articulates concerns about forced eviction: “Over the years, heavy machinery has 
been deployed with no duty of care to the children, sick or elderly on the sites 
and on occasions the elderly and the sick have been beaten and manhandled 
as they are evicted. Homes have been destroyed and sometimes, with families 
still inside. Bailiffs violate health and safety policies of the UK without fear 
of prosecution”. The Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
in its fourth periodic report on the UK expressed concern about the levels of 
enforcement and forced eviction used against Traveller sites (ECRI, 2010). Media 
attention instead, largely through the tabloid press, has depicted families living 
on unauthorized developments as lawbreakers flouting the planning system; 
sensationalist reporting which culminated in the Sun Newspaper articles entitled 
’Stamp on the Camps’ which led to Gypsies and Travellers becoming an election 
issue in the 2005 General Election where opposition Conservative leader Michael 
Howard unveiled a 7 Point Charter on Gypsies and Travellers which focused on 
enforcement with no reference to provision and called upon Travellers to ’play 
by the rules’ in the British tradition of ’fairness’ (Richardson and Ryder, 2009). 
The cost to local authorities and the wider community was also great. In 
2002 the cost of eviction and enforcement was estimated to be 18 million pounds 
per annum (Clements and Morris, 2002), a cost which may escalate given that 
one large eviction at the Dale Farm Site in Essex will cost the local authority 
an estimated 10 million pounds, or 117,000 pounds per family to be evicted 
(BBC, 11th July, 2011). Localism was also costly to the settled community by 
the inconvenience caused by unauthorized sites being placed in inappropriate 
locations, sometimes in locations which could impact negatively on house prices, 
though such price declines were often a result of publicity and residents in effect 
talking down their own house prices by voicing their fears about the consequences 
of a nearby Traveller site development. Hence, it is evident that a wide range of 
stakeholders including Gypsies and Travellers, the wider community and local 
authorities suffered to varying degrees under a localist policy. There is a fear that 
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the Coalition Government’s localist policies will lead to a return to the failures of 
localist policies that were established in 1994 (Ryder et al, 2011). 
WIn-WIn sItuatIons
A long-standing view of campaigners for Traveller law reform is that the 
drawbacks as outlined above of a localist planning regime for a vulnerable 
minority can be mitigated through some form of central government intervention. 
Such a concept has often been supported through the ’win-win’ potential of 
providing more sites. The Gypsy campaigner Len Smith stated that “More 
sites for Gypsies and Travellers is a win-win situation, not only does it give 
Gypsies and Travellers a decent home and access to services but it reduces the 
inconvenience of unauthorized sites for the settled community “(Cited in Ryder 
et al, 2011). To emphasize this point campaigners placed great store in building 
up a broad alliance for the return of an obligation to provide sites, which included 
local authorities and politicians from the main parties and residents affected 
by unauthorized encampments. This lobbying was one factor which eventually 
prompted the New Labour Government to act through its regional policies but it 
could be argued that it failed to convincingly take these arguments to the wider 
public, hence creating a state of affairs where the Coalition Government can 
effortlessly remove interventionist policies on this issue.
Increasing local democracy has many merits, but there are many interpretations 
and forms of localism. Coalition Government policy may merely empower 
a section of the community who already are vocal and active in community 
politics. Not just Gypsies and Travellers will be the potential losers under this 
form of localism, a sizeable minority that could be affected are those struggling 
to get ’affordable housing’ (namely low cost home ownership or access to social 
housing). The privatization of council housing and the marketization of the 
construction industry as well as a housing bubble which has seen price inflation 
make home ownership unattainable for a large number of not just low but also 
middle income families are factors that have contributed to the housing shortage. 
However, another factor contributing to the shortage has been local authorities 
and residents, primarily in affluent areas who oppose provision of affordable 
housing. Opposition which stems from a desire to retain the existing class profile 
of an area or merely having no interest in affordable housing because of their own 
well positioned economic status. The New Homes Bonus (see above) may lack 
the strength to overcome this opposition. An alternative would be to have a duty 
on local authorities to provide affordable housing which would include Traveller 
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sites/social housing/low cost homes. The merit of this idea is that it could force the 
hand of reluctant councils. In the past, when campaigners called for the return of 
a duty to provide sites, opponents would turn around and say “But no such duty 
exists for housing for the settled community!”. Also at public meetings which 
opposed sites the point was raised that homeless Traveller families had been forced 
to initiate unauthorized developments, to which local people responded “But we 
have young couples in this area who cannot afford a home and they are in the same 
boat!”. A duty on affordable housing would overcome these arguments but also 
unite Gypsies and Travellers with the many people in the wider community who 
need somewhere to live and could create a powerful lobby and a clearer and more 
populist ’win-win’ policy scenario. It could also be argued that such a large scale 
affordable housing program would create a stimulus to the construction industry 
and economy. However, such an idea is unlikely to gain favour in the present 
political climate in which localism is in vogue with the present government. A 
prerequisite for change is a realization by the general public that state intervention 
can be for the greater good and that equality warrants checks and balances in local 
democracy, which may lead to a state of affairs where a duty to provide affordable 
housing is one day popularly embraced.
concLusIon
The Coalition Government has embraced localism with a fervour which has led 
to the Government labelling these reforms ’revolutionary’ (CLG, 10th December, 
2010). Such localism is not out of character with the political make-up of the 
right, given the coupling of localism with a process of marketization which will 
see services put out to tender and strategic decision-making undermined and 
potentially vetoed, hence localism appeals to ’rightist’ notions of individualism, 
the free market and laissez faire social policy and a belief that these reforms will be 
cost cutting, an attractive proposition in an age of deficit reduction. The vacuums 
that are left are to be filled by forms of nineteenth century philanthropism and 
volunteerism and welfare strategies based on business models which constitute the 
’Big Society’, or what could equally be termed the ’small state’. The conclusions 
drawn in this paper are that Gypsies and Travellers could be further marginalized 
in this policy framework. 
Gypsies and Travellers are ’insular minorities’, being systematically 
disadvantaged and having little bargaining power (Rostas and Ryder, 2012). The 
fundamental weakness and moral flaw of localism is that the weak and vulnerable 
in society will be left in some cases to the mercy of local majorities that have little 
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care or regard for unpopular or politically weak minorities or interests. Hence, 
alongside opposition to Traveller sites, some communities will choose to oppose 
wind farms, care homes, affordable housing and so forth for a number of ’nimbyist’ 
and self interested or prejudicial reasons. This scenario, which reflects the notion 
that the views of the majority in a local area should always be of ultimate import, 
can be questioned on the grounds that it can conflict with the interests of the 
’greater good’. A principle which is accepted by many when applied to transport, 
energy and environmental protection (Parvin, 2011) but not so readily when 
applied to minority interests, in particular the needs of Gypsies and Travellers. 
Here local majorities or majorities stirred up by small oligarchies and chorus 
leaders of parochialism can form a tyranny and driven by prejudices can deny a 
minority fundamental rights such as a decent place to live and access to services 
(Fung, 2002). This is a fear noted by the Communities and Local Government 
Select Committee inquiry into localism “A range of organisations representing 
the interests of vulnerable, marginalised or minority groups expressed fears that 
a decentralised system in which ‘bureaucratic accountability’ mechanisms had 
been dismantled would leave services for such groups at the mercy of the vagaries 
of local politics and funding choices made under the pressure of cuts“ (CLG, 2011 
point 59). There is therefore the potential for illiberal actions in localism if one 
accepts that an important part of the liberal tradition is the protection of minority 
rights. As Parvin notes: 
“..the centralisation of decision making power also fulfills another function 
of liberal democratic political systems – namely the protection of minority 
groups from the tyranny of the majority……liberal democratic principles may 
not always be best served by devolving decision making power down to local 
communities because it is entirely possible that local communities might use 
this power to enact policies or initiatives that violate liberal principles and 
make the lives of certain members worse“ (Parvin, 2009).
It was to avoid and break the log jam of nimbyist opposition to strategic projects 
that notions of civic leadership have been accepted in the past, where councillors 
for example were prepared to face and oppose the views of the majority in the 
interests of a greater good. In the case of Gypsies and Travellers that has been to 
achieve a reduction in enforcement costs and better life chances for a vulnerable 
minority. In one parliamentary debate one MP captured the motivation of such 
civic leadership in the past:
“I can remember as a child that my father, who was then a senior councillor 
on Havering council, sought to resolve the deep unhappiness that unregulated 
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and illegal Traveller sites caused in that area. He took the view that it was 
important to find sites that could be properly managed and where the Gypsy 
and Traveller families were better able to access education for their children, 
health care and advice on what were and were not acceptable actions when 
living in the locality. That was an enlightened view at the time, but we are 
now some 40 years down the line, and successive Governments have failed 
to provide a solution that works for the settled communities, who face 
unacceptable levels of illegal and unauthorised sites. It also fails to deal with 
the needs of travelling communities and Gypsies“. (Alison Seabeck MP ,7 
Dec 2010: Hansard Column 15WH).
Firm and strong civic leadership, not afraid to challenge prejudice or take 
seemingly unpopular decisions for the greater good has been recognized as a 
key component in Traveller site delivery (Richardson, 2006). However, in many 
cases, past and present civic leadership has buckled and backtracked in the face 
of strong local opposition to sites. Hence, although strong and central safeguards 
are needed to deliver equality they can only be guaranteed if a process of public 
persuasion and education can also take place in tandem. The regional strategies 
attempted this by placing a strong emphasis on dialogue and consultation in site 
delivery and some notable converts were made in particular at councillor level 
but this dialogue often failed to percolate down to and inform communities at a 
grassroots level (Ryder et al, 2011). Such a process may be a long term proposition 
involving more positive images of this minority in the media and curriculum but 
also for Gypsies and Travellers to be known and to be accepted in communities. 
This can be a long process, as is evidenced by the experiences of one Gypsy at the 
Panel Review of Coalition policy. After failing in his first attempt to secure a site 
through the planning system, Mr. Tom McCready initiated a planning application 
for the second time, retrospectively. Tom found that the council was initially 
strongly opposed to his application. Tom noted:
“...that attitude relaxed when the attitude of the local people relaxed. And 
at the end of the third temporary permission I went and applied again for a 
permanent permission and there was one person protesting who it turns out 
is a member of the British National Party.... And a lot of people supported 
me, a lot of people said we’d like Mr. McCready to stay. So now after 10 
years, I  got a permanent planning permission. I’ve got a lot of friends in the 
village, my children have received an education in the village, medical help, 
I’m paying the taxes, my children, two of them are working now and paying 
the taxes. So it’s a success story. But at the cost of 10 years of mental anguish 
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to my wife and I. If I had not been able to make a retrospective application, 
had the inspector not been able to say you have a duty towards this family, 
that wouldn’t have happened, and it would have been an entirely different 
story” (Ryder, et al, 2011, 25).
However, as indicated by this statement such persuasion and mind changing 
processes cannot take place in the short term or even before a site is built. In some 
cases civic leadership may have to force through site development measures in 
the courageous hope and belief that they are doing the right and humane thing 
and that with time local populations will accept such need (Richardson, 2007). 
Part of this process involves accepting elements of positive action but also human 
rights principles. Where special mechanisms exist on site delivery these should 
not be viewed as unfair advantages but instead as a form of ’positive action’ which 
is enabling Gypsies and Travellers to catch up, and for the huge inequality of 
underprovision of sites to be addressed (Richardson, 2011). Such mechanisms 
should be viewed as part of a minority rights framework where the state recognizes 
that for minorities to receive protection and equality then special frameworks can 
be warranted and counted as part of a liberal tradition that values group rights 
as well as those of the individual and which for proponents of minority rights 
can entail policies to combat racism and discrimination which can incorporate 
positive or affirmative action (Kymlicka1995). A model that avoids the pitfalls 
of the oligarchies and tyrannies of localism and centralism may be contained in 
’Empowered Participatory Governance’ which is both ’bottom up’ and ’top down’; 
through which decentralization can create public buy-in and support and tailoring 
of policy to meet local needs and circumstances and be informed by expert local 
knowledge but be combined with a form of centralism which checks parochialism 
and inequity and ensures marginalized groups’ needs and aspirations are taken 
account of (Fung and Wright, 2001). Empowered Participatory Governance 
is a model that could be successfully applied to social policy for Gypsy Roma 
Traveller communities and in a wider context at both a national and European 
level with those who are the focus of policy being given effective involvement in 
design and delivery of services and policies that affect their lives.
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Assessing the co-operAtion willingness 
And Ability within hungAriAn smAll 
business networks And clusters
Justification and aims of the research
Justification of the research topic. Inter-firm co-operation and competition are not 
antagonistic to each other, rather co-operation is just as an important ingredient of 
competitiveness as competition. On the global, national and local markets not only 
individual firms compete with each other; frequently it is the competitiveness 
of entire networks that decides the outcome of business decisions.3 International 
and Hungarian experiences have shown that the co-operation of firms is rooted 
not only in tangible and transparent advantages that can be easily analysed by 
rational profit-maximising logic. Increasingly, inter-firm linkages are also based 
on company attitudes and other intangible components of entrepreneurial culture 
such as trust and the ability and willingness to co-operate.4 
Substantive aims. The present research is aimed at the description of those 
tangible and intangible factors that determines the strength and stability of inter-
firm networks and clusters in Hungary and contributes to competitiveness at the 
company level, at the level of networks and indirectly at the local and regional 
level. The findings will be used to evaluate the Hungarian policy of supporting 
entrepreneurial networks and clusters.
Methodological aims. The aim of this paper is to present a correct and feasible 
methodology for the investigation of the above issues, which relies on theoretical 
findings of network research5 and at the same time takes into consideration the 
specificities of the Hungarian landscape of entrepreneurial networks and clusters. 
The various components of the research design are planned according to the 
standard methodological principles of social inquiry.6
empirical evidence about inter-firm linkages in hungary
Since the mid 1990s the conditions of co-operative behaviour of companies, the 
culture of inter-firm co-operation, more generally the institutional framework 
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of inter-organizational co-operation was the subject of a wide range of research 
efforts in Hungary. 
research on strategic alliances
A questionnaire based survey on inter-firm strategic alliances of Hungarian 
companies7 was launched in 1996 by the Budapest University of Economics and 
Public Administration.8 The interviewers collected the responses of 325 firms. 
The sample consisted of a representative mix of smaller, medium sized and bigger 
firms, both from the state owned and private sector, including Hungarian and 
foreign owned companies. A selection of some of the results are listed below:
•	 Approximately one-third of the companies maintained long term relations 
with other firms, frequently with more than one strategic partner.
•	 State owned companies were developing typically horizontal alliances, while 
private companies have typically nurtured vertical (e.g. subcontracting) 
alliances along the value chain.
•	 In existing strategic alliances between foreign and Hungarian owned 
companies the foreign company was typically in the dominant position 
•	 Strategic alliances between companies with identical or overlapping owners 
were observed in only one-sixth of the cases of alliances, but almost all of 
these so-called “equity-based alliances” have claimed to implement some 
kind of joint innovation activity.
survey on small business networks
A questionnaire-based survey9 on small business entrepreneurial networks in 
2005 has shown that more than half of Hungarian small businesses were involved 
in some regular informal inter-firm co-operation, and that more than a quarter 
of Hungarian small businesses were involved in some formalised inter-firm co-
operation. In particular, medium sized companies claimed to be more frequently 
members of some inter-firm co-operation than smaller and micro companies. 
Companies selling their products to other firms or to public bodies, and exporting 
companies were more frequently parts of some inter-firm co-operation than 
companies selling only for the local population. Companies that were members 
of a network were more optimistic and more growth oriented than non-member 
(“atomised”) companies.
In spite of widespread complaints stating that the co-operation culture of 
Hungarian companies lags behind European standards due to a low level of trust 
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in the inter-firm domain, the 2005 survey delivered ample evidence that the 
number and variety of business networks is increasing. Inter-firm co-operation 
appeared in various forms, such as   
•	 Outsourcing – subcontracting
•	 Franchising
•	 Regional and / or sectoral clustering
•	 Joint ownership, co-ownership, holdings and other formations based on 
diversification-oriented investment strategies and “serial entrepreneurship” 
behaviour of groups of businessmen.
The content or agenda of inter-firm co-operation is based on various forms of 
exchange such as 
•	 Regularly buying products and services from each other
•	 Inter-firm bartering
•	 Exchange of information, provision of consultancy
•	 Exchange of tools and machines
•	 Providing occasional credits to each other
•	 Referring clients to each other
•	 Co-operation in purchasing from third parties 
•	 Co-operation in sales to third parties 
•	 Joint development of new products / technologies / services 
All of the above co-operation activities may appear both in:
•	 a contractually formalised form 
•	 and / or can be made under informal agreements, e.g. as a regular exchange 
of favours.
measuring the spatial-industrial agglomerations of firms
A series of research projects10 in 2008 to 2010 has tackled the issue of 
communication, knowledge transfer, and cooperative actions among Hungarian 
companies. The authors have clearly distinguished between vertical and 
horizontal types of co-operation, the former identified as becoming part of 
global value chains as regular suppliers, the latter interpreted as cooperation of 
predominantly small companies in industrial clusters in order to compete with 
larger multinational companies. 
One of the main objectives was to identify, map and evaluate the Hungarian 
clusters with the help of company census data. The research used the “wide”, 
“sectoral” concept of clusters, i.e. a group of companies engaged in similar 
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activities located in close proximity to each other. In this approach two companies 
may be classified as belonging to the same cluster, without any existing co-
operation. This approach is opposed to the “narrow” definition of clusters.11 Based 
on international experiences it was hypothesized that cooperation of Hungarian 
companies relies heavily on close, regular contact and face-to-face interaction, 
that significant synergies stem from co-location of cooperating market actors and 
that therefore the spatial concentration of actors, the geographic agglomeration 
of industrial activity in the same branch can improve the chances for success, i.e. 
improved competitiveness. The geographic mapping of these “widely” conceived 
clusters was based on annual census-type data of Hungarian firms, compiled 
from financial statements associated with tax reporting. The geographic density 
of firms of the same sector was measured with the help of Gini coefficients by 
using employment data disaggregated into the 20 spatial administrative units 
of Hungary and 37 branches (sectors) of the industry. The study has identified 
48 industrial clusters in Hungary and statistically evaluated their size, level of 
specification, innovativeness and export activity. Strong clusters were found in 
the automotive, food processing and information technology sectors. 
evaluations of cluster support measures
An interview-based survey on cluster development. In 2003 the Hungarian 
Ministry of Economy and Transport launched an empirical survey among 
Hungarian regional clusters and business networks.12 The aim of the research 
was to assess the impacts of a Government sponsored subsidy programme called 
“Széchenyi Plan” of 2001 which among other entities has supported regional 
clusters as well. The research used the  “narrow” definition of clusters, according 
to which a group of companies and other organisations is a cluster if they have 
entered and to some extent formalized their co-operation which is aimed at 
enhancing their joint competitiveness. Moreover, in this approach only those 
groups are considered which explicitly identify themselves explicitly as clusters.
The research produced 20 case studies: assessments of the performance of 
existing entrepreneurial networks. The study was based on interviews with cluster 
managers, with local, central government institutions and trade associations 
which have played an instrumental role in developing clusters. Regional clusters 
were defined as networks of co-operating companies, SME-support institutions, 
local governments, trade associations and technology transfer institutions such 
as University departments or technology consulting firms. In most cases clusters 
were project organisations with no legal identity. Their activities consisted of 
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training, transfer of know-how in order to become subcontractors, joint quality 
management, spreading information on European Union standards, product 
family marketing, regional marketing, interest representation, organisation 
of conferences, joint participation on fairs, organisation of business meetings, 
preparation of application and tender documents for various subsidised 
programmes financed by the Hungarian Government and / or the European Union.
The clusters of 2003 were only weakly institutionalised, the cluster 
organisation possessed no legal status, therefore the clusters as such could not 
be parties of a contract. Most of them had a temporary character and have used 
the organisational framework of an existing company or enterprise support 
institution.13 The functions of clusters have significantly overlapped with the 
activities of professional and trade organisations, chambers of commerce, industrial 
parks, incubator houses and SME and regional development organisations. 
A loosely, vaguely defined cluster concept has contributed to the inter-
changeability of these organisational identities.
The 2003 research has found two basic types of clusters: 
•	 Vertical clusters were based on the co-operation of companies belonging to 
the same industrial sector or sub-sector, related to each-other upstream or 
downstream. The dominant inter-firm relationships in vertical clusters were 
bridging ties between companies “along the value chain”, i.e. buyer-seller 
relationships between – subcontractors, integrator companies and assemblers 
– producers of the final product. Vertical clusters were observed in the 
automotive, electronic and the furniture industry.
•	 Horizontal clusters were based on the use of a particular regional resource 
such as a natural resource (e.g. thermal water), human resource (e.g. locally 
available craft skills). The dominant relationships of horizontal clusters were 
evolving by implementing projects facilitating joint market access, jointly 
introducing organisational innovations, or jointly hiring experts. Horizontal 
clusters were observed typically in the catering and touristic industry 
(thermal water utilization of a specific region), in the software industry and in 
regionally embedded handicraft industries.
Comparison of the two cluster types. In horizontal clusters the relationships 
between companies was less hierarchical than in vertical clusters, moreover the 
local organizing force was more dominant, i.e. a stronger sense of belonging to a 
settlement or micro-region was observed than in vertical clusters. Both vertical 
and horizontal types of clusters involved the co-operation of local business support 
organizations, financial and technology transfer organizations. Vertical networks 
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were stronger, more successful and more numerous, than the significance and 
occurrence of locally deeply embedded horizontal networks. While all clusters 
were first regionally defined, vertical clusters have shown a tendency to lose their 
regional character and strengthen their sectoral character by co-opting new cluster 
members from any region of the country. Vertical clusters were better channels of 
technology transfer than horizontal clusters; innovation activity referred rather to 
organisational innovation than product or technology innovation.
Although the 2003 study has revealed some weaknesses of the Government 
policy towards clusters, it has recommended intensifying the support of inter-
firm networking rather than supporting individual firms, in order to avoid the 
proliferation of interventionist subsidy schemes. 
A recent research effort14 has investigated industrial clusters in Hungary and 
evaluated the so-called “Pólus Programme”, which was an ambitious support 
scheme of the Hungarian Government to facilitate the birth and development of 
industrial clusters. The authors have defined a life cycle of clusters, with milestones 
such as attracting founding member companies, creating a cluster organization, 
obtaining finance, offering services for members by the management, achieving 
financial sustainability through membership and service fees and achieving the 
so-called “critical mass” of firms which is necessary for the long term viability 
of co-operation. There is a wide body of evidence supporting the thesis that inter-
firm trust is an intangible but necessary condition of long term co-operation, 
of network sustainability. The respective company attitudes can be improved, 
mistrust and “short-termist” attitudes can be reduced by well targeted efforts 
of the government and of the non-profit sector aimed at the improvement of 
entrepreneurial culture.
The evolution of cluster support. As early as in the 1990s the support of 
subcontracting networks was an important objective of Hungarian industrial 
policy.15 After 2000 the respective subsidy schemes and business support services 
have widened their target group and the support of entrepreneurial networks 
and clusters started, first with an experimental character. During the years 
between 2003 and 2011 these programmes have been repeated and significantly 
improved. The support of Hungarian clusters relies on a scheme of accreditation: 
self-proclaimed clusters that apply for subsidies are evaluated by a designated 
body. The evaluation is based on a quantitative and qualitative criteria, e.g. level 
/ extent / depth of cooperation within the cluster, prevalence of joint research/
development/innovation projects, volume of services jointly purchased by cluster 
member companies, volume of jointly financed common marketing actions of 
cluster member companies, number, size and turnover of member companies and 
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the dynamics of the above indicators, etc. As a result, clusters are classified in 
four stages according to their level of development, ranging from “clusters in 
initial phase” through “developing clusters”, “accredited clusters” up to the so-
called “innovation clusters”.16
design of the planned research
research questions
The research questions are rooted in the theoretical results of professional and 
academic literature on entrepreneurial networks and clusters. Moreover, the 
questions investigated in previous empirical research efforts on the drivers of 
inter-firm co-operation and linkages re-appear in the present research design. 
Questions directed at the description of inter-firm networking
•	 Which factors motivate or de-motivate inter-firm co-operation?
•	 What is the inter-dependence between (a) the structure of entrepreneurial 
networks and (b) the growth, competitiveness and sustainability of these 
networks?
•	 What are the major components of a culture of inter-firm co-operation in 
Hungary?
•	 What is the network structure of Hungarian clusters? 
Policy oriented questions:
•	 Do subsidies have any impact on promoting a culture of cooperation?
•	 To what extent are existing clusters products of spontaneous market forces, 
and to what extent are they created by subsidies?
•	 Should the state support clustering?
•	 What are the best practices of supporting inter-firm networking?
•	 What are the advantages of supporting inter-firm networking as opposed to 
other forms of subsidies? 
research hypotheses
The research hypotheses circle around the notion of strong and weak ties. Various 
statements hypothesising the factors determining the strength of inter-firm 
linkages shall be tested during the empirical work. 
Hypothesis 1: the benefits of strong & weak inter-firm ties. The primary 
benefit of creating and maintaining strong inter-firm ties is that they provide 
the necessary social “embeddedness”; promote cooperation and facilitate the 
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exchange of various tangible and intangible resources. The maintenance of strong 
ties creates a culture of relational governance based on social attachments, trust, 
and norms. On the other hand, the primary benefit of weak ties is that they provide 
flexibility in company operations and firms can avoid a lock-in situation when 
adverse market conditions necessitate a re-structuring of the company strategy 
and organization (re-engineering). This hypothesis is based on the classical 
sociological publications of social embeddedness, social capital and network 
theory as applied for the inter-firm domain.17 
Hypothesis 2: When managing the portfolio of inter-firm relations in a 
particular company, the finite resources must be assigned to alternative, 
competing ties.  The portfolio of ties of a particular company with other firms 
(ego-network) is composed of stronger and weaker linkages. Over time certain 
ties will strengthen, while others will weaken. Managerial interventions may have 
a significant role in keeping up or phasing out certain inter-firm relations, e.g. 
subcontracting ties or innovation oriented strategic alliances. In absence of such 
interventions inter-firm ties have a tendency of spontaneous weakening which is 
called “churning”. The strengthening of some ties may affect the weakening of 
other ties, e.g. because the weakening of a strong tie is what frees the manager 
to access new, weak ties by assigning resources to these relations. Networks 
consisting of a mix of strong and weak ties have the greatest adaptive capacity. 
The source of this hypothesis is organisational theory, with special respect to the 
formal study of inter-firm networks. 18
Hypothesis 3: Network dynamics depends on the type and range of resource(s) 
being exchanged between co-operating firms and on the momentum of inter-firm 
relations. The type of resource being exchanged between co-operating firms, 
(in other words the “agenda” of the inter-firm linkage) is defined by the fact 
whether on this linkage people, products, services, capital and / or knowledge 
are exchanged. The wider is the scope of resources exchanged, i.e. the scope of 
co-operation within inter-firm linkages, the easier is the further deepening of 
the co-operation by including new flows of exchange between the participating 
companies. This hypothesis was taken from certain findings of economic research 
on innovative clusters.19
Hypothesis 4. Uncertain market conditions have a tendency to de-stabilise 
inter-firm network structure. A major motivation of inter-firm co-operation in 
entrepreneurial networks is to reduce insecurity and risk resulting from demand 
fluctuation, technological uncertainty and regulatory instability. The volatility 
of demand and of technological uncertainty generates a volatility of network 
structure. In sectors where technological uncertainty is higher, the life span of 
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inter-firm ties is shorter, i.e. existing ties are being regularly replaced by new 
ones. Analogously, in epochs of higher volatility of demand, the life span of inter-
firm ties is shorter. The source of this hypothesis is organisational theory, with 
special respect to the formal study of inter-firm networks. 20
Hypothesis 5: If a company has invested certain resources into creating and 
maintaining its inter-firm linkages, and these investments cannot be easily re-
allocated, then the stability of the network increases but its flexibility decreases. 
Planning and investment are necessary pre-conditions of developing inter-
firm ties. Resources which can be re-allocated only at a high cost are called 
investments “with high asset specificity”. Such investments can easily result in 
a “lock-in situation”: in this case the company lacks the necessary flexibility to 
re-structure its tie portfolio. If the resource invested previously into inter-firm 
relations cannot be easily re-allocated to other purposes then stronger, rather than 
weaker ties characterize the network. The source of this hypothesis is identical 
with the source of the previous hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6. Higher transparency of inter-firm linkages enables the 
management to easier re-structure the portfolio of inter-firm ties. In other words, 
if it is difficult to measure the costs and benefits of inter-firm ties, this contributes 
to the prevalence of stronger, rather than weaker ties. The source of this hypothesis 
is identical with the above cited paper.
Hypothesis 7. Networks built on the exchange and diffusion transparent, easily 
accessible knowledge tend to be weaker than networks facilitating the exchange 
of sophisticated, elite, highly professionalised information. This hypothesis refers 
only to inter-firm ties where the major resource exchanged is knowledge (e.g. in 
innovation based clusters). The hypothesis is as follows: The transfer of tacit, 
complex, confidential knowledge requires strong social ties. On the other hand, 
weak ties are sufficient to the transfer of explicit, open knowledge which is easily 
accessible to a wide range of stakeholders (e.g. competitors). This hypothesis is 
based on historical observation and on the above cited paper.
Hypothesis 8. In times of crisis it can be disadvantageous to be a member of 
a cluster. Inter-firm networking and clustering helps firms to stay competitive in 
global competition under normal market conditions. However, this rule has the 
limits in terms of validity. In times of crisis the strengthened global competition 
weakens the benefits of being in a cluster, because existing strong ties cannot 
be flexibly replaced by other new inter-firm linkages. (Lock-in situation). The 
tendency underlying this hypothesis has been observed in various clusters.21
Hypothesis 9: Equity-based, knowledge-based networks and networks based 
on subcontracting linkages are stronger and more sustainable than networks 
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based on the exchange of business services. A major characteristic of networks 
is the nature of the resources exchanged between members. Inter-firm linkages 
can serve to exchange people, products, capital, services, and / or knowledge in 
the framework of the particular co-operation. The hypothesis goes as follows: 
Networks that facilitate the inter-firm flow of products, capital and knowledge 
are more sustainable than other networks in which only business services are 
exchanged. This hypothesis may help to explain why a few Hungarian clusters are 
sustainable and why most of them have a temporary character.
data collection
The methodology will use the instruments of qualitative social research. The 
empirical work will deliver a series of cluster case studies, all of which will be 
based in interviews and on document analysis. 
•	 Definition. The “narrow” definition of clusters will be used, in the following 
sense: any co-operating group of companies and other organisations (e.g. 
research organisations) is a cluster, which is recognised by a designated body 
(i.e. by the body for cluster support and accreditation) as such.
•	 Sampling. A stratified sample of 8 clusters of the Region Central Hungary 
will be investigated, covering 4 sectors (IT, Business Services, Life Sciences, 
Environment). 
•	 Population. The above sample is taken from the full population of 26 
accredited clusters functioning in the above mentioned region in the Spring of 
2011. These clusters are distributed among the following sectors / branches: 
The distribution of recognised clusters by sectors / branches22 Central Hungary, 2011
Health 3
Energy 1
Alimentary (food) industry 1
Construction 2
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Interviewing. Two personal interviews will be made per cluster (with the 
cluster manager and with a member company). The interview outlines are 
determined by the above research questions and hypotheses.
Desk research. The interviews will be complemented by document analysis: 
cluster websites, documents on cluster subsidy scheme and on the cluster 
accreditation programme will be collected along with the analysis of newspaper 
articles on clusters. The aspects of documentary research are determined by the 
above research questions and hypotheses.
inference methods
The findings will be compared across sectors and individual clusters. The 
responses will be checked with the results of previous research findings and with 
available documents. Subsequently a cautious generalisation will be used for 
answering the above research questions and qualitatively testing the above series 
of research hypotheses.
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Compensation for Commuting in the 
hungarian labor market
IntroductIon
One of the unique features of the Hungarian labor market is the persistence of 
regional differences in economic prosperity and unemployment. Unemployment 
rates are substantially higher in the villages situated in the North-Eastern and the 
Southern part of Hungary, and the rate of unemployment has been persistently 
high since the early 1990s. Similar to the logic of the well-known spatial 
mismatch hypothesis, which claims that the suburbanization of job opportunities 
accounts for the high unemployment rate among black inner-city residents (Kain 
1992, Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1998), it was proposed that the high costs of daily 
commuting to urban labor markets accounts for the high unemployment rates 
in villages (Köllő, 1997, 2006; Kertesi, 2000). Using a transportation database 
with settlements as units of observation, Köllő (1997, 2006) showed that in the 
absence of public transportation linkages, commuting with cars would use up a 
substantial part of the expected wages. Public transportation links are especially 
underdeveloped in regions where villages with high unemployment rates are 
typically situated. He also estimated lower-bounds of travel expenses. Kertesi 
(2000) relied on these estimates when analyzing the 1996 micro-census of the 
Hungarian Statistical Office and found that the probability of commuting 
decreased with commuting costs. 
In this paper, we make an attempt to estimate the compensating wage 
differential (Leigh 1986, Zax 1991) associated with costly commuting using 
individual-level data. The positive correlation between wages and commuting 
time is often explained with the help of search theory: prospective commuters are 
more critical towards low wage jobs, because the reservation wage is expected to 
increase in commuting distance or commuting time (Rouwendal 1999, Manning 
2003b). However, standard urban economic theory offers another explanation in 
terms of residential choices. There is a trade-off between costs of commuting 
and costs of housing, and high-wage employees might prefer residential locations 
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which are far away from their job (Dargay and van Ommeren 2008), while low-
income employees are forced to live close to their jobs. The relationship between 
commuting time and wages arises as a by-product of choosing the best residential 
location. The Hungarian labor market provides a unique opportunity to assess 
the explanatory power of the former approach. Labor mobility in Hungary is 
substantially constrained by the small housing rental market; the vast majority, 
more than 90 percent of houses are owner-occupied. Besides, housing transactions 
involve substantial transaction costs and a bad decision may put more than the 
annual income at risk (Hegedűs 1994). Moving is more characteristic for high-
income families, which is evidenced in the suburbanization process especially 
around the capital city Budapest but also around other larger towns. (Budapest 
lost about 15 percent of its inhabitants during the 1990s). Given the difficulties 
associated with changing residence, we expect that people who wish to improve 
their labor market situation will choose commuting, especially those who 
are unemployed or often face the risk of unemployment, and mostly think of 
commuting as the means of improving their economic condition. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of wage 
determination, which allows one to study the relationship between commuting 
distance and wages. The key hypothesis derived from the model is that the 
positive effect of commuting time on wages is conditional on unemployment 
rate at place of work. More specifically, the higher the unemployment rate, the 
larger are the returns for commuting. The remainder of the paper is devoted 
to empirical analyses. Section 3 describes the data and variables used in the 
subsequent sections. Section 4 begins with the examination of the relationship 
between commuting time, wages and reimbursement. Then we provide estimates 
for the returns for commuting time in terms of both wages and the probability of 
receiving reimbursement of travel expenses. Section 5 concludes.
theoretIcal background and hypotheses
the wage posting framework
In recent years, research into the relationship between commuting and labor market 
outcomes has been increasingly influenced by modern theories of monopsonistic 
labor markets (Manning 2003a, 2003b; Rouwendal and van Ommeren 2007). 
This line of literature argues that commuting costs are an important source of 
monopsony power. Theories of monopsonistic behavior rely on wage posting 
models, which assume that wages are posted by employers before workers and 
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jobs meet and that the respective rates at which worker-job matches are formed 
and terminated are related to wages.
Wage posting models elaborate the simple idea that even high wages may 
maximize profit, provided high wages guarantee a steady flow of applicants and 
reduce the probability of job separations. Employers wish to set a wage which 
maximizes the expected profit associated with holding a vacancy. If vacancies 
were always filled immediately, the profit would be maximized by paying the 
lowest possible wage, since profit in this case is the difference between the 
productivity of the worker and the wage. However, vacancies are not always 
filled immediately because workers are to some extent selective. Obviously, low 
wages are rejected if unemployed workers can find better jobs. Therefore, when 
establishing the wage offer, employers take into account that low offers are likely 
to be rejected, which results in holding the vacancy for a long period of time.
The analysis of the optimal wage offer requires the specification of the 
probability with which job seekers accept a wage offer. We refer to this probability 
as acceptance probability throughout this paper. Since the acceptance probability 
reflects the desirability of the job offer, it is assumed to depend on the wage 
offer, the reservation income and the unemployment rate. First, the better the job 
offer, the higher is the acceptance probability. Second, independent of the wage 
offer, the acceptance probability is an increasing function of unemployment rate. 
That is, unemployed people are more likely to accept a job if unemployment is 
serious; and they become more selective as unemployment decreases. Even the 
minimum wage is acceptable, provided that the unemployment rate is sufficiently 
high. Finally, the acceptance probability depends on the reservation income: job 
seekers reject all wage offers which are below the income they can earn while 
being unemployed. 
Under these assumptions, the profit maximizing wage depends on the 
productivity of the representative worker, denoted by y, the reservation income 
z, and the ratio of the number of vacancies to the number of unemployed job 
searchers, which is denoted by θ. More specifically, the profit maximizing wage, 
w* is the weighted sum of productivity and reservation income, and the weight 
attached to productivity is an increasing function of the ratio of the number of 
vacancies to the number of unemployed job searchers. Formally:
(1) w* = (θy+z)/(1+θ).
The study of the compensating wage differential paid to commuters relies 
on the simple assumption that the reservation income depends on commuting 
distance. The starting point is the assumption that workers living at distance t 
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evaluate jobs on the basis of the difference between wage w and commuting costs 
(Manning 2003b). That is, wt=w-ct where c captures both the monetary cost of 
travel and the monetary value of time associated with travel. It can be shown that 
distant jobs are evaluated as if the reservation income were an increasing function 
of commuting time, that is, zt=z+ct. In spatial labor markets, commuters behave 
as if their reservation income were the sum of the true reservation income and 
commuting costs. Thus, the profit maximizing wage in spatial labor markets is:
(2) w*t = (θy+z+ct)/(1+θ).
The implications are clear. The profit maximizing wage offer must be higher 
for commuters, since the optimal wage offer is a function of the reservation 
income. Since our model implies that the effect of reservation income on wages 
is conditional on unemployment, we hypothesize that returns for commuting are 
larger in labor markets where unemployment is high. Employers are willing to 
pay higher wages to commuters because they perceive the reservation income of 
commuters as the sum of the true reservation income and commuting costs. This 
is consistent with search theoretic models claiming that the reservation wage is an 
increasing function of commuting distance (Rouwendal 1999).
If employers were free and able to bargain wages on an individual basis, 
they would pay different wages to commuters and to local residents. The wage 
premium, denoted by Δw(t), is simply the difference between the optimal wage 
offers and , the later denoting the optimal wage as defined by equation (2). That is:
(3) Δw(t) = ct/(1+θ).
If employers were free to set different wages to workers with different 
commuting time, the theoretical compensating wage premium would be observable 
in wages. However, employers rarely pay different wages to workers with similar 
productivity but different residential location. Employers often avoid intra-firm 
wage discrimination because wage differences, often perceived as “unfair” by 
employees put team performance at risk (see, for example, Akelof and Yellen 
1986). Employers therefore aim at establishing a wage structure, which is relatively 
independent of the personal characteristics of the employed or prospective workers. 
Assuming that there are no systematic differences in the productivity of workers 
with different commuting time, employers cannot discriminate on a spatial basis. 
While employers are “spatially blind” during their decisions with respect to the 
wage structure, they might legitimately reimburse some of the travel expenses 
(Rouwendal and van Ommeren 2007). Indeed, employees of various European 
countries, including Hungary, receive explicit reimbursement of travel expenses, 
the extent of which being often stipulated in collective wage agreements or in 
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labor law. Our paper does not assume that such agreements and legal rules are 
binding. Instead, we argue that reimbursement equals the profit-maximizing 
compensating wage; that is, the theoretical compensating wage premium is paid 
in the form of explicit reimbursement. Similar to the argument developed in the 
previous paragraph, the effect of commuting distance on reimbursement must be 
larger in settings where unemployment is more pronounced. While employers 
should remain “spatially blind” during their decisions with respect to the wage 
structure, they can discriminate on a spatial basis and offer reimbursement to 
travel expenses. In short, the compensating wage premium, as defined by equation 
(3) is paid in the form of explicit reimbursement.
Whatever interpretation of equation (3) is adapted, the result is that returns 
for commuting depend on the ratio of the number of vacancies to the number 
of unemployed workers. Employers reimburse, either implicitly in the form 
of higher salaries or explicitly, the fixed fraction 1/(1+θ) of commuting costs. 
If the number of vacancies and the number of job seekers were the same, half 
of the travel expenses were reimbursed.2 Travel expenses are fully reimbursed 
when there are no vacancies in the labor market. Contrary to this, employers are 
not willing to reimburse travel expenses if there is substantial labor shortage. 
The logic is as follows. Labor shortage induces firms to increase wages up to 
the point where wages equal productivity. The side effect of wage competition 
is that wages become independent of the reservation income. In the eyes of 
employers, commuting costs are a component of the reservation income, and not 
of productivity. If firms compete with offering better reimbursement schemes, it 
is because there is an excess supply of labor. 
The negative effect of the improvement of labor market conditions on 
reimbursement can be illustrated by two additional results. First, keeping 
commuting time constant, the ratio of reimbursement to the wage becomes smaller 
as the relative number of vacancies increases. Second, employers are not willing 
to reimburse the costs of too long commutes. The largest commuting time eligible 
for reimbursement becomes shorter as the ratio of vacancies to unemployed 
workers increases. Thus the improved chances of earning high wages reduce 
the chances of receiving reimbursement for longer commutes. The surprising 
implication is that employers are more willing to reimburse travel expenses if the 




In this subsection, we elaborate the empirical implications of the wage posting 
model. To arrive at a tractable empirical model, we first propose a linear 
approximation of the fraction 1/(1+ θ), where is the ratio of the number of vacancies 
to the number of unemployed. Since this fraction increases with unemployment at 
a decreasing rate, we use the approximation 
θ = lnu0 – lnv,
where u0 is the number of unemployed at the place of work. Substituting this 
approximation into (2), we obtain
wt =(lnu0-lnv)(z+ct-y)+y.
In our dataset, which will be described in the next section, there is no 
information about the number of vacancies in local labor markets and search 
costs. Therefore, our empirical model is
(4) wt =lnu0(z+ct-y)+y.
The compensating wage approach to commuting time research usually boils 
down to estimating regression models which involve commuting time as well 
as personal and eventually firm-level and regional characteristics (Leigh 1986, 
Zax 1991, Manning 2003b). Our empirical model differs from earlier models 
in one important respect: it includes interaction terms between unemployment 
and human capital characteristics, meaning that an increase in unemployment 
should reduce the returns to productivity. The model implies that the higher the 
unemployment rate, the larger is the effect of commuting time on reimbursement. 
If our model is correct then previous regression models are misspecified and 
regression estimates of the compensating wage differential are biased.
Explicit reimbursement, denoted by Rt will be studied using the same logic. 
Using the above approximation, equation (3) implies: 
(5) Rt =lnu0(z+ct).
Again, the model implies that the effect of commuting time (and reservation 
income) on explicit reimbursement is conditional on the rate of unemployment 
at place of work: the higher the unemployment rate, the larger is the effect of 
commuting time on reimbursement.
Data
In April 2001, a survey was conducted among registered unemployed who were 
entitled to unemployment benefits (N=105,924) and eventually found a job 
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between the 18th of March and 7th of April 2001. The primary purpose of data 
collection was the evaluation of the effect of the dramatic rise of the minimum 
wage on changes in unemployment.3 In the above mentioned period, 9474 people 
got a job, out of which 8339 people completed the questionnaire (Köllő, 2002). The 
questionnaire contains both retrospective questions about the previous job and 
questions about the new job. This paper will use a subset of the data, consisting 
of 801 observations. 
Survey data are rarely free of data problems. In our dataset, two problems 
are of special interest. First, respondents who were reemployed by the former 
employee were not asked about the receipt of reimbursement. Since commuting 
costs cannot be assumed to remain constant, these cases must be excluded. 
Our sample therefore is restricted to job changers. Second, when asked about 
the prospective job, respondents were asked to estimate the lower and the upper 
bounds of the salary. Unfortunately the reported minimums and maximums differ 
substantially in a considerable proportion of cases. We omitted respondents where 
the difference between the maximum and the minimum exceeds 10 thousand 
HUF. 
Since our focus is on the effect of commuting, and migration might disturb 
the empirical relationship between commuting time and commuting decisions 
(Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998), we exclude those unemployed who changed 
their place of residence during their unemployment spell. Since we wish to 
generalize our results to the population of job seekers with low education, we 
omitted respondents with college or university education. The sample selected for 
analyses include full-time employees aged 15-74 in 2001, who travel to work and 
back no more than four hours. Note that the sample includes cases where none of 
the variables take missing values. As a result of these decisions, we are left with 
783 observations for further analyses. 
Our interest centers on the relationship between wages, commuting time and 
reimbursement. The hourly wage variable is the reported gross monthly salary 
and is measured in thousand HUF. Commuting time is the time spent on traveling 
on an average day. Reimbursement is a dummy variable indicating respondents 
who either received some reimbursement of travel expenses or were transported 
to work on the cost of the employers. Note that we do not know the exact amount 
of money received by the workers.
The productivity of workers is captured by gender, a dummy indicating 
general high-school education and experience. The latter variable measures the 
number of years elapsed since the first entry to the labor market, minus the years 
having been unemployed. The reservation income is captured by the last gross 
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wage (measured in thousands of HUF) and the unemployment rate at the place of 
residence. In our paper, all unemployment figures were computed using the 2000 
wave of the TSTAR database of the Hungarian Statistical Office. They actually 
measure the average number of registered unemployed divided by the size of the 
active population. The hourly wage variable is the reported gross monthly salary 
and is measured in thousands of HUF.
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables used in 
subsequent analyses. The average wage exceeds the minimum wage by 7.5 
thousand HUF among women and 12 thousand HUF among men. 44 percent of 
women and 52 percent of men receive some compensation for travel expenses. 
Average commuting time is 0.88 hours (53 minutes) among women and one hour 
among men, the grand mean being 56 minutes. The average commuter thus does 
not travel more than one hour per day. 







 mean sd mean sd mean sd
Dependent variables
gross monthly wage 47 .536 12 .333 55 .764 17 .658 52 .149 16 .064
log monthly wage 3 .836 0 .212 3 .978 0 .283 3 .916 0 .264
Receipt of reimbursement 0 .445 0 .498 0 .517 0 .5 0 .485 0 .5
Independent variables             
Commuting time 0 .881 0 .638 0 .987 0 .714 0 .941 0 .683
Commuting time squared 1 .182 1 .893 1 .483 2 .283 1 .351 2 .124
Last monthly wage 45 .163 48 .419 52 .417 28 .782 49 .23 38 .798
Unemployment rate at 
place of residence
5 .488 2 .77 5 .979 3 .512 5 .764 3 .215
Log unemployment rate 
at place of work
0 .74 0 .159 0 .753 0 .158 0 .747 0 .158
Interaction of log 
unemployment at 
workplace with
Commuting time 0 .631 0 .447 0 .722 0 .516 0 .682 0 .489
Commuting time squared 0 .82 1 .264 1 .06 1 .58 0 .955 1 .453
Last monthly wage 32 .595 33 .343 38 .674 21 .476 36 .003 27 .478
Unemployment rate at 
place of residence
4 .387 3 .284 4 .877 4 .246 4 .662 3 .858
Our theoretical assumption is that persistent unemployment is maintained by 
the lack of spatial mobility. A brief comparison of our estimates to estimates 
presented in other studies shows that Hungarian workers do not lack spatial 
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mobility in international comparison. Using Dutch aggregate statistics, van der 
Vlist (2001) reports an average commuting distance of 17.5 km among men and 
11.0 km among women (the gross average being 15.3 km) for 1997. In Hungary, 
traveling 15 kilometers using public transportation costs about 30 minutes, so the 
approximately one hour commuting time seems to be consistent with the Dutch 
findings. Using data from another Dutch survey conducted in 1998, Rouwendal 
and van Ommeren (2008) report an average of one hour for workers with 
reimbursement and half an hour for workers without reimbursement. Since 46% 
of the sample received reimbursement, the sample average is about 40 minutes. 
Almost the same figure, about 45 minutes is reported by Manning (2003) using 
the British Labour Force Survey for 1993-2001 and the British Household Panel 
Survey for 1991-2000. To summarize, the workers we study do not travel less than 
workers in Britain or the Netherlands. This is striking because our sample does 
omit people with good education and high earnings, who tend to commute larger 
distances (see, for example, van der Vlist 2001). 
empIrIcal analyses
the relationship between commuting time, wages and 
reimbursement
Before making any attempt to explain the relationship between commuting and 
wages, we first examine the question whether there is any relationship to explain. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of daily commuting time, as well as mean wages 
and the level of reimbursement of travel expenses as a function of commuting 
time. The distributions are presented separately for female and male workers. 
The vast majority of workers (80 percent of women and 74 percent of men) do 
not travel more than one hour, and the proportion of workers commuting more 
than 2 hours is very low. The distribution of commuting distances resembles the 
exponential distribution among women and the log-normal distribution among 
men. This pattern is not surprising: since the household is supposed to be run 
by women, they find longer commutes more costly than men. Our descriptive 
findings are similar to those reported in the literature on commuting4
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Table 2. Distribution of wages and reimbursement by commuting distance
Commuting time Women Men





N Mean wage % receive 
reimburse- 
ment
1-30 minutes 144  45 .94 15 .97 156  51 .97 19 .87
31-60 minutes 133  46 .99 55 .64 167  56 .49 58 .68
61-90 minutes 27  46 .59 70 .37 44  57 .31 72 .73
91-120 minutes 26  51 .6 92 .31 50  60 .3 90 .00
121-180 minutes 12  66 .04 91 .67 19  63 .45 94 .74
181-240 minutes 2  47 .5 100 .00 3  65 .67 100 .00
The distribution of commuting time is not surprising if we look at the 
relationship between wages and commuting time. While average wages are 
monotonically increasing with commuting time among men, an inverted U 
shaped pattern describes the relationship among women. Given our estimates, 
men and women should follow different commuting strategies in order to realize 
the highest marginal increase in wages. Men might find it rational to commute 
31-60 minutes instead of 1-30 minutes because this change improves the wage 
of the average male worker by about 10 percent. However, women do not gain 
anything from commuting 31-60 minutes or even one and half hours; if they wish 
to improve their wages substantially, they should commute 2-3 hours.
The proportion of people receiving any reimbursement is an increasing function 
of commuting time among both sexes. Especially commuters traveling more than 
one and half hours receive some reimbursement with a probability equal or larger 
than 90 percent. However, short travels, not exceeding the half an hour value, are 
not likely to be covered by employers. Unlike wages, the relationship between 
reimbursement and commuting time does not differ substantially between men 
and women. 
Table 2 also shows that reimbursement and wages are positively correlated 
among men. Keeping daily commuting time constant, the higher the wages, the 
higher the probability of receiving some reimbursement. This finding might seem 
to contradict  our theoretical model assuming the absence of intra-firm wage 
discrimination. If workers oppose intra-firm wage discrimination, employers 
are forced to pay the compensating wage premium in the form of explicit 
reimbursement, being independent of actual wages. The assumption of wage 
bargaining, which allows for intra-firm discrimination, seems to be more capable 
of explaining the positive correlation. Employers ready to pay high wages can 
pay a relatively small proportion of wages in the form of explicit reimbursement. 
The underlying incentive is tax-evasion: explicit reimbursement in Hungary 
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is not taxed, therefore both employers and workers are interested in receiving 
a part of the wage in the form of reimbursement (see for example, Rouwendal 
and van Ommeren 2008). Since firms paying (and workers receiving) high wages 
gain more from tax evasion, the correlation between wages and reimbursement 
must be positive. However, the conclusion that a positive association between 
wages and reimbursement is at odds with the assumption of no intra-firm wage 
discrimination is premature. First, the positive correlation between wages and 
reimbursement might be due to the presence of a common cause. For instance, 
larger firms pay higher wages, and these are large firms as well who are more 
likely to comply with the legal rules prescribing the reimbursement of travel 
expenses. It is also possible that respondents who received some reimbursement 
misinterpreted the survey question concerning the wage and reported a higher 
figure.5
the effect of commuting time on wages
We proceed with the regression analysis of the relationship between wages 
and commuting time in order to estimate the net effect of commuting time. We 
estimate two regression models. The first specification obtains if we substitute 
the empirical measures of productivity and reservation income into equation (4). 
The second specification obtains if the square of the commuting time variable is 
added to the model in the following way:
wt =lnu0(z+ct+dt
2-y)+y.
We label these specifications the linear and curvilinear specifications, 
respectively.
The models are estimated using ordinary least squares. In the literature, 
returns for commuting time are often estimated using household or individual 
level fixed effects regressions. The aim of this modeling strategy is to minimize 
the bias arising from endogenous residential choices and to remove spurious 
correlations arising from the effect of unobserved characteristics on both wages 
and commuting time. Endogenous moving are not a concern here because our 
sample does not include people who have changed place of residence. We believe 
that the last wage, which is intended to capture the reservation income, also 
reflects unobserved personality traits. The assumption here is that employers can 
observe the personality traits that were hidden at the beginning of the match and 
update their beliefs about workers’ productive abilities. The last wage variable 
refers to the end of a worker-job match, thus it can be expected to incorporate the 
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employers’ assessment of productive abilities. We therefore use simple ordinary 
least squares instead of using fixed-effects regressions.
Estimation results are presented in Table 3. While the coefficient of 
commuting time lacks statistical significance in the linear specification (Model 
1), it is significant in the curvilinear specification (Model 2). The same applies 
to the interaction between commuting time and log unemployment at place of 
work. The significance level of other variables is not affected by the choice of 
specification. The interpretation of the results therefore is based on the estimates 
of the curvilinear specification (Model 2). As we well see, the results from Model 
2 also explain why we failed to find a significant effect of commuting time in 
Model 1.
Table 3. OLS estimates of log monthly wages
Variable All Women Men
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Main effects
Commuting time 0 .0428 0 .4536* -0 .0031 0 .5083* 0 .0391 0 .4695*
(0 .262) (0 .003) (0 .486) (0 .032) (0 .348) (0 .02)
Commuting time 
squared
  -0 .1572*   -0 .2141*   -0 .1502*
  (0 .006)   (0 .037)   (0 .018)
Last monthly 
wage
0 .0003 0 .0003 0 .0042 0 .0045 0 .003 0 .003
(0 .457) (0 .447) (0 .171) (0 .161) (0 .125) (0 .123)
Unemployment 
rate at place of 
residence
-0 .0288* -0 .0313* -0 .0027 0 .0007 -0 .0272* -0 .0311*
(0 .003) (0 .001) (0 .425) (0 .48) (0 .017) (0 .01)
Experience 0 .0022 0 .0022 -0 .0111 -0 .0082 0 .001 -0 .0011
(0 .428) (0 .425) (0 .272) (0 .331) (0 .478) (0 .476)
Experience 
squared
0 .0000 0 .0000 0 .0004 0 .0003 0 .0001 0 .0001
(0 .45) (0 .479) (0 .26) (0 .323) (0 .436) (0 .405)
High-school 
education
0 .201* 0 .2135* 0 .0441 0 .0775 0 .3332* 0 .329*
(0 .022) (0 .016) (0 .374) (0 .288) (0 .024) (0 .025)
Male 0 .3898* 0 .3796*         
(0 .000) (0 .000)         
Log 
unemployment 
rate at place of 
work
-0 .1649 0 .0543 -0 .1217 0 .2629 -0 .3134 -0 .1047
(0 .183) (0 .394) (0 .358) (0 .241) (0 .103) (0 .344)
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Interaction of log 
unemployment at 
workplace with
Commuting time 0 .033 -0 .5137* 0 .0855 -0 .7053* 0 .0369 -0 .4746
(0 .354) (0 .01) (0 .229) (0 .041) (0 .39) (0 .055)
Commuting time 
squared
  0 .2154*   0 .3357*   0 .1842*
  (0 .011)   (0 .037)   (0 .036)
Last monthly 
wage
0 .0014 0 .0013 -0 .0054 -0 .0059 0 .0003 0 .0003
(0 .325) (0 .335) (0 .192) (0 .181) (0 .464) (0 .464)
Unemployment 
rate at place of 
residence
0 .0217* 0 .024* -0 .0053 -0 .0098 0 .0202* 0 .024*
(0 .012) (0 .007) (0 .364) (0 .262) (0 .042) (0 .026)
Experience -0 .0004 -0 .0006 0 .0284 0 .0236 -0 .0034 -0 .0008
(0 .49) (0 .484) (0 .111) (0 .16) (0 .437) (0 .486)
Experience 
squared
-0 .0001 -0 .0001 -0 .0009 -0 .0007 -0 .0001 -0 .0001
(0 .381) (0 .412) (0 .115) (0 .171) (0 .464) (0 .43)
High-school 
education
-0 .1038 -0 .1225 0 .1344 0 .0865 -0 .3394 -0 .3369
(0 .201) (0 .161) (0 .221) (0 .313) (0 .055) (0 .055)
Male -0 .3189* -0 .3069*         
(0 .001) (0 .002)         
Constant 3 .8573 3 .691 3 .8007 3 .5484 4 .046 3 .8663
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
N 783 783 344 344 439 439
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are p-values.   
Coefficients significant at the 5 percent level are marked by asterisk.
Since our regression models include interaction terms, the positive main 
effect of commuting time together with the negative main effect of its square does 
not imply that there is an inverted U shaped relationship between commuting 
time and wages. The main effects of commuting time variables are meaningful in 
an economy where unemployment rate at place of work is 1 percent. If this were 
the case, there is indeed an inverted U shaped relationship; the wage-maximizing 
commuting time is about 71 minutes among women and 94 minutes among men. 
Note, however, that the interaction between log unemployment and commuting 
time is positive and the interaction between log unemployment and commuting 
time is negative. This means that as unemployment at place of work increases, 
the relationship between commuting time and wages first becomes more and 
more flat then U shaped. Another implication is that the wage-maximizing 
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commuting time decreases as the unemployment at place of work increases. 
Among women, the predicted optimal commuting time is zero (or lower than 
zero) if unemployment at place of work is 5 percent or higher. Among men, the 
predicted optimal commuting time reduces to zero if unemployment at place of 
work is about 10 percent or higher. In our sample, the average of unemployment at 
place of work is about 5 percent, which explains why the commuting time variable 
lacked statistical significance in the linear specification (Model 1).
Our wage posting framework implies that unemployment at place of work 
modifies the returns to human capital and the reservation income. More 
specifically, if unemployment in the center of local labor markets increase, 
returns to human capital should decrease but returns to the reservation income 
should increase. Our results do not support this prediction unambiguously. The 
main problem is with commuting time. Unemployment does affect returns for 
commuting time, but the direction of the effect is negative instead of being 
positive. Commuting time is a component of the reservation income in the model, 
therefore the returns for commuting time should increase with unemployment at 
place of work. The evidence presented here clearly contradicts this expectation. 
Within our theoretical model, the unexpected negative interaction effect can 
be explained in three different ways. First, one might assume that commuting 
increases productivity: since unemployment lowers the returns to productivity, 
the negative interaction effect between commuting time and productivity obtains. 
The assumption of a positive relationship between commuting distance and 
productivity were realistic in a sample of qualified white-collar workers who 
moved to suburbs and commute to well paid jobs, or in a sample of urban residents 
who work in rural areas. Since our sample includes people with low educational 
levels, and mainly rural residents who work in urban areas, this explanation 
can be rejected. Second, one might argue that searching for employees who live 
in spatially remote areas is more costly than to search for local workers. This 
assumption is standard in the literature on spatial mismatch (see Gobilon, Selod 
and Zenou 2007). The positive association between commuting distance and 
search costs is also consistent with the hypothesis that employers prefer informal 
employee referrals as the means of filling vacancies. If personal contacts are more 
likely to emerge with commuting distance, employers who wish to hire spatially 
remote workers cannot rely on referrals and must incur some recruitment costs. The 
final logical possibility is that one assumes that the reservation income decreases 
with commuting time. This assumption is realistic if the representative commuter 
is engaged in informal economic activities as well, so that she establishes a lower 
reservation level towards market income. 
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Another puzzling finding is the positive interaction effect between log 
unemployment at workplace and unemployment at residence among men. Our 
model implies that unemployment at place of work should decrease the (negative) 
effect of unemployment at place of residence on wages since the latter is negatively 
associated with the reservation income. The finding can be explained with the 
assumption that unemployment at place of residence also expresses a low level 
of productivity (Gobillon, Selod and Zenou 2007). One reason is that longer trips 
make workers tired, and commuters are more likely to be late, especially if public 
transport is bad. Another reason is territorial discrimination, emerging from the 
spatial segregation of ethnic minorities. In Hungary, a substantial proportion of 
the discriminated Roma minority lives in small villages far from urban areas, 
thus pessimistic expectations concerning the productivity of Roma should overlap 
with pessimistic expectations about the productivity of commuters. The spatial 
location of the worker thus signals not only a low reservation income but also a 
low level of productivity. 
One should also note that unemployment at place of work does not seem to 
modify the returns to human capital, with the exception of gender in the full 
sample. A straightforward explanation of the lack of empirical support concerns 
the characteristic of our sample. First, the sample includes people who were 
successful in escaping unemployment. Since productive abilities deteriorate during 
unemployment, it might be the case that employers think of past unemployment 
of individuals as a dominant signal of productive abilities, which suppress other 
available information, like education and experience. Besides, the discovery of 
interaction effects is usually difficult in samples which are larger than our sample.
the effect of commuting time on reimbursement
Finally, we examine the effect of commuting time on reimbursement. Again, we 
estimate both a linear and a curvilinear specification. The linear specification 
obtains if we substitute the empirical measures of reservation income into 
equation (5). The second specification obtains if the square of the commuting 
time variable is added to the model in the following way:
Rt =lnu0(z+ct+dt
2).
Since only the recipt of any reimbursement is observed, the estimation method 
is logistic regression. Variables measuring human capital are not included since 
they do not appear at the right-hand sides of the equations. But we do include 
monthly wages in order to check whether reimbursement is independent of the 
wage. Under the assumption of no intra-firm discrimination, the probability 
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of receiving some reimbursement must be independent of wages. If, however, 
reimbursement is a form of tax evasion, we should observe a positive relationship 
between reimbursement and wages, since the gains from tax evasion increase 
with wages. 
Table 4. Logistic regression estimates of receipt of reimbursement
Variable All Women Men




0 .2567 0 .7274 1 .6692 4 .7338 -0 .6737 -0 .1338
(0 .758) (0 .734) (0 .193) (0 .228) (0 .569) (0 .962)
Commuting 
time squared
  0 .0921   -1 .1379   0 .1064
  (0 .901)   (0 .449)   (0 .909)
Last monthly 
wage
-0 .0056 -0 .0043 0 .0345 0 .039 0 .0012 0 .0011
(0 .777) (0 .83) (0 .423) (0 .37) (0 .963) (0 .965)
Unemployment 
rate at  
place of 
residence
0 .6376* 0 .6118* 1 .0679* 1 .0099* 0 .5116* 0 .5015*
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .006) (0 .005)
Log 
unemployment 
rate at place of 
work
-4 .172* -4 .419 0 .2036 1 .4248 -4 .130 -4 .3302
(0 .041) (0 .074) (0 .958) (0 .767) (0 .122) (0 .174)
Gross monthly 
wage
0 .009 0 .0097 0 .0472* 0 .0500* -0 .0059 -0 .0059
(0 .144) (0 .125) (0 .003) (0 .003) (0 .427) (0 .436)
Male -0 .831 -0 .853








2 .7352* 4 .1228 1 .0587 -0 .8962 3 .9504* 5 .0329
(0 .015) (0 .171) (0 .51) (0 .874) (0 .018) (0 .199)
Commuting 
time squared
  -1 .0486   0 .5465   -0 .9616





0 .0091 0 .0074 -0 .0553 -0 .0612 0 .0095 0 .0095
(0 .749) (0 .799) (0 .377) (0 .333) (0 .778) (0 .778)
Unemployment 
rate at  
place of 
residence
-0 .4532* -0 .4241* -0 .8071* -0 .7468* -0 .3655* -0 .3488*
(0 .000) (0 .001) (0 .002) (0 .003) (0 .028) (0 .025)
Male 1 .2174 1 .2361
(0 .336) (0 .33)
Constant -0 .9986 -1 .4744 -6 .6813 -8 .373 -0 .1575 -0 .6072
(0 .486) (0 .398) (0 .015) (0 .015) (0 .936) (0 .794)
N 783 783 344 344 439 439
Log-likelihood -397 .624 -392 .626 -162 .534 -160 .141 -225 .606 -223 .159
χ2 121 .568 178 .736 64 .322 88 .852 67 .162 93 .937
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are p-values.  Coefficients significant at the 5 
percent level are marked by asterisk.
The estimated coefficient are shown in Table 4. Contrary to the previous wage 
equations, the linear specification seems to perform better than the curvilinear 
one. Although the main effect of commuting time lacks statistical significance, 
its interaction with unemployment at place of work is positive and significant in 
the sample of men. This means that longer commutes imply a higher probability 
of receiving reimbursement only if the unemployment rate is sufficiently high 
at the place of work. Our estimates suggest that sufficiently high means an 
unemployment rate of about ten percent or higher. This pattern clearly supports 
the theoretical prediction that unemployment should increase the returns for 
commuting in terms of reimbursement. Unfortunately, the interaction effect is 
not significant among women.
The interaction between the two unemployment variables is also significant. 
The negative sign is consistent with the assumption that the unemployment rate 
at place of work is a negative indicator of reservation income, but contradicts the 
assumption that it is a negative indicator of productivity. In the previous analysis, 
we interpreted the unexpected positive interaction of the unemployment variables 
using the assumption that unemployment at place of residence expresses a low 
level of productivity. The change in the interpretation seems to be a contradiction. 
However, one should keep in mind that the decision on reimbursement differs 
from wage setting in an important respect: employers do consider productivity 
when deciding on wages, but they do not consider productivity when making 
decisions on reimbursement. If workers oppose intra-firm wage discrimination 
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and employers establish a wage structure, the decision to reimburse travel 
expenses is made independently of productivity. Therefore, the finding of a 
negative interaction between the unemployment variables in the reimbursement 
regression does not contradict the positive interaction between the same variables 
in the wage regression, since only the latter is affected by the fact that employers 
think of unemployment at place of work as a negative signal of productivity. 
conclusIons
Observers of the persistent regional differences in unemployment argued that 
high costs of commuting prevent residents of high unemployment areas from 
finding employment in other areas. This paper examines the relationship between 
commuting distance, on the one hand, and wages and the receipt of explicit 
reimbursement, on the other. We develop a simple wage posting model, which 
implies not only a positive effect of commuting time on wages and reimbursement, 
but also that returns for commuting must be larger if the unemployment rate 
where jobs are situated is large as well. We test our predictions using data on low 
educated workers who were registered unemployed and got a job in march 2001. 
We find some evidence that returns for commuting is indeed conditional on 
unemployment rate. First, we find a positive effect of commuting time on wages, 
which, however, decreases with unemployment at place of work. This conditional 
effect contradicts our expectation of a positive impact of unemployment on 
returns for commuting time. However, the found pattern can be explained with the 
assumption that commuting time is also a signal of low productivity: if this is the 
case, the observation is consistent with the wage posting model, which hypothesizes 
a negative effect of unemployment on returns to productivity. We also find evidence 
among male workers that commuting time increases the probability of receiving 
some reimbursement of travel expenses, conditional on high unemployment at 
place of work. This finding is consistent with our theoretical framework.
The research outlined in this article is an attempt to contribute to the explanation 
of persistent regional inequalities in Hungary. In regions where unemployment 
is high, the unemployment rate in the large towns, which can be considered as 
centers of local labor markets, have an unemployment rate of approximately 
10 percent. The findings suggest that in such a labor market commuting time 
is not associated with a compensating wage premium, but it is associated with 
a higher probability of receiving reimbursement. Although we did not observe 
the actual value of reimbursement, it is safe to assume that all commuting costs 
are never reimbursed. First, labor law prescribes that employers must reimburse 
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a percentage of the monetary costs of travel, which is lower than 100 percent. 
Second, employers probably do not wish to reimburse the monetary value of time 
spent on traveling. These facts together imply that employers do not compensate for 
costly commuting. The present study therefore supports the conclusion of previous 
studies: commuting is too costly to induce people living in high unemployment 
regions to find a work in urban areas (Köllő, 1997, 2006; Kertesi, 2000). 
The findings might suggest that reimbursement of expenses on the part 
of employers is a necessary condition for the reduction of persistent regional 
inequalities. This conclusion, however, neglects the possibility that employers 
will reduce labor demand as a reaction to increases in labor costs. If employers cut 
labor demand, it is difficult to predict the net effect of reimbursement of expenses 
on regional differences in unemployment rates. Without knowing the precise 
effect of reimbursement of travel expenses on labor demand, it is impossible to 
formulate firm policy recommendations. 
A fundamental limitation of our study is absence of information on the level 
of reimbursement. Our theoretical model predicts a trade-off between wages and 
reimbursement. An exact test of the model predictions requires data about the 
amount of reimbursement received. Unfortunately, we do not have such data at 
our disposal. Therefore, our interpretation of the evidence is not the final word 
on the subject.
Our study has limitations because of the sample and the estimation method 
we used. A substantial limitation of our study is that our sample is probably not 
free of sample selection problems (Cooke and Ross 1999). Our sample was taken 
from a survey of unemployed, and unsuccessful job searchers are not included 
in the sample. This might lead to the problem of self-selection if unobserved 
factors determining the success of job search (getting a job) are correlated with 
unobserved determinants of wages or commuting decisions. 
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notes
1 Associate Professor, Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Corvinus 
University of Budapest, Email: tamas.bartus@uni-corvinus.hu 
2 Rouwendal and van Ommeren (2007) arrive at the same result, albeit using a 
different reasoning.
3 In January 2001, the minimum wage rose from 25.5 to 40 thousand HUF.
4 For the United Kingdom, Manning (2003b) finds that about 80 percent of 
employees commute less than or equal to one hour; for selected cities, an 
average of 4.5 km is found (Frost and Linneker 1998). For the Netherlands, 
van Ommeren (1996) found that half of the workers commute less than 8 
kilometers and only 10 percent of workers commute more than 32 kilometers. 
In terms of commuting time, half of the workers commute less than 20 
minutes. (These estimates use the so-called Enquete Beroepsvolking, having 
been conducted in 1992.) For the United States, estimates are 8.7 miles 
(Hamilton 1982), estimates in commuting time are 22.5 minutes (White 
1988). A recent overviews of empirical findings (Rodriquez 2004) suggest 
that average commuting time in US cities ranges between 14 and 23 minutes 
and average commuting distance ranges between 14 and 25 kms.
5 Unfortunately, the survey question did not make it clear to the respondents 
that they should not think of reimbursement when they estimate or tell their 
wages.

